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ABSTRACT
The author develops a model and computer code for some of the
functions of an Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). These are combined with an
existing FORTRAN program, called TACOPS, which is used by the Naval Weapons
Center (NWC). The functions and attributes of an IADS such as target detection,
track data processing, target position and accuracy estimation, target assignment,
information relay to other units and information relay delays are described.
Shortcomings of the fire control and coordination capabilities of TACOPS are
described. Using the IADS model, the results against a sample engagement are
compared to the original TACOPS. Documentation of the code is provided to allow
future operators the ability to refine and/or restructure the algorithms as needed.




The reader is cautioned that computer programs developed in this research
may not have been exercised for all cases of interest. While every effort has been
made, within the time available, to ensure that the programs are free of
computational and logic errors, they cannot be considered validated. Any application
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. GOAL OF THESIS
The goal of this thesis is to develop computer algorithms which model the Early
Warning (EW) sensors, network connections and information transfer in an
Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). These algorithms will be incorporated with
an existing program called "TACTics and OPtionS" (TACOPS) to enable greater
realism of this anti-air warfare simulation.
B. TACOPS OVERVIEW
TACOPS is a FORTRAN program originally written over 10 years ago at the
Naval Weapons Center (NWC), China Lake, California. It is a many-versus-many (m-
on-n) anti-air warfare (AAW) simulation involving aircraft, air to surface and cruise
missiles (attackers) attempting to penetrate a defensive area to hit assigned targets.
The area has air defense units that simulate Surface to Air Missile (SAM) systems
which will attempt to shoot down the incoming attackers. The program produces as
an output the expected level of damage done to the targets, attackers and SAM sites.
TACOPS is run as a deterministic discrete event model which includes emitter
locations, attacker flightpaths, a variety of attacker weapons and multiple SAM site
engagements. TACOPS is currently being used at the NWC in weapon system
effectiveness studies and is also continually being modified as needed by the users
at NWC to accommodate new systems.
C. TACOPS DEFICIENCIES IN SAM FIRE CONTROL AND COORDINATION
TACOPS currently has one major drawback - the absence of substantial
coordination in the allocation of the SAM units to the attackers. The resulting non-
optimal allocation of SAM's to attackers is manifest in that some attackers will have
more SAMs shoot at them than is needed to reach a desired probability of kill (Pk),
while other attackers may not be shot at all. The attackers' effectiveness against their
assigned targets depends upon the attackers' probability of survival (Ps) which is
based upon the SAMs failure to destroy them (1-Pk). As a consequence, the
attackers' effectiveness as a system results partially from ineffective assignment of the
air defense assets. Because of this it is difficult to accurately assess the effectiveness
of the SAM systems.
The current model assumes that detection and location of all attackers is
performed by some unspecified system. This information is available to all the SAM
units instantly. The systems that do the detection, location and transfer of
information are not able to be targeted and damaged or destroyed. Both of these
characteristics of the TACOPS model are inaccurate. SAMs will not have
instantaneous target data, and parts of the self-defense system are usually high
priority targets of attacking units. By allowing targetable system elements and real
control of SAMs and detection emitters, the air defense options can be better
investigated using different weapons or tactics.
D. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THIS THESIS
The major functions of a general IADS will be defined. Consistent with the
assumptions and precision of modeling in TACOPS, those IADS functions which will
produce the most impact on the effectiveness of the SAM systems will be modeled
and coded to fit into TACOPS. The intent is to create modifications and subroutines
that allow these critical functions of an IADS - detection, location, information
transfer and delays, to be incorporated in TACOPS. The subroutines presented will
give a generic IADS capability. The user will tailor these subroutines to meet his
specific modeling needs. The formulation of the model and the code will be
documented with the goal that a future user with a specific set of needs, functions
or algorithms in mind will have the structure and knowledge to use this work to
implement that specific simulation using parts of these algorithms. The IADS model
will be used in a sample engagement and the results compared to TACOPS without
the IADS algorithms. The last section will include a description of the advantages
and disadvantages in picking various Methods of Effectiveness (MOEs).
II. TACOPS PROGRAM
There are several reasons for providing a description of the TACOPS
model. One is to give the reader an understanding of the existing model. This
will help in understanding how the IADS algorithms were implemented within
the original code. Another is to document my understanding of the functioning
and assumptions of TACOPS. This will ensure that the premises from which
I redesigned the model are current and consistent with the understanding of
the current uses at NWC. A final reason is to provide some documentation on
the model, since there presently exists very little documentation on TACOPS.
A. ASSUMPTIONS OF THE PROGRAM
1. Discrete Time/Event Step, Expected Value, Low Detail Level
TACOPS is a hybrid of discrete time step and event step models. In
a discrete event step model, the time when a significant event will occur is
computed. Then the simulation clock is moved forward in the increment
required to be at the time when the event occurs. The time of the next event
is then computed and so on until the end of the simulation. In a time step
model, time is increased in constant intervals (usually 1 second) and, after each
time step, the program determines what events occur (i.e. update positions of
attackers). The hybrid model used by TACOPS combines the characteristics of
both types. The time steps are constant and discrete (usually at 1 second
increments). After each time increment, the position ofthe attackers is updated
(time step) and a check is made to see if any predetermined significant events
(i.e. a SAM shoots a missile) are to occur (event step). Most of the time steps
will accomplish little more than updating the position of all the attackers. The
increment of time advancement is small enough so that the program will not
advance too far to exclude any of the predetermined events.
The program uses an expected value approach in computing the
probabilities of kill (Pk) and probabilities of survival (Ps) during engagements.
This means that a fixed and constant value will be used in the single shot Pk
computations for all engagements whether it be the first or tenth engagement
with this same attacker. An average value of Pk or Ps will be used to represent
the effectiveness of the system for all conditions. The overall Ps of an attacker
or target will change according to the number of engagements. TACOPS is also
a deterministic model in that no random events occur. The results of one run
will be identical with all subsequent runs of the same scenario.
The model does account for a variety of events and functions for each
of the systems simulated, but the level of detail is low. Examples of this detail
level are: 1) An attacker will move from one three dimensional (X,Y,Z) position
to the next by specifying these positions (called checkpoints) in the input data
file. The program moves the attacker along a straight line at constant speed
between checkpoints and instantaneously changes the course of the attacker
when is reaches its next checkpoint. The attacker is always assumed to be
oriented straight and level; its body axis is parallel and aligned along the line
connecting the last and the next checkpoint, and the pitch, roll and yaw of the
body are zero. 2) Weapons launched by penetrating aircraft are assumed to
always fly to their correct impact point without any inflight system malfunction
or any terminal targeting errors. 3) The Pk of a SAM system against an
attacker is the same anywhere inside its launch envelope.
2. M-on-N Simulation
TACOPS is a m-on-n AAW model. To understand how this differs
from other AAW models, an overview of those model types are presented.
There are general classes of AAW models which are differentiated by the
number of units engaging each other and the way the engagements are
modeled. The smallest number of engaging units is one SAM unit against one
attacker (called a one-on-one) model. Generally these models will be designed
with a high level of detail about each system. When the specific number of
units gets very large, the specific interactions of individual units are not
modeled but the overall force levels and attrition are typically computed using
a Lanchester type equation. This is called a force level model. In between these
two types of models is a model whose number of individual units are
constrained enough to allow the computation of the specific results of individual
units. This is the many-on-many model.
An m-on-n model is the appropriate model when the air defense is
dense enough that the individual units coverage of an area overlap to allow
multiple simultaneous engagements of single or multiple attacker(s). This type
of model must be used in the m-on-n simulation because the results of a one-
on-one engagement cannot be extrapolated to the m-on-n situation. The two
types of models are not completely independent. The averaged results of the
one-on-one model are used in the simulated engagements of the m-on-n model.
Some details from the one-on-one model are lost in the averaging but the m-on-
n model does allow the simulation ofmore than one attacker against more than
one system. Any unusual results of one engagement are expected to be
smoothed out when the results of the multiple engagements of the complete
simulation are produced.
3. Types of Attackers, Air Defense Units and Targets
TACOPS assumes that three different types of attackers can exist in
the simulation. They are functionally grouped and can be thought of as 1)
aircraft, 2) fire and forget air to surface missiles, and 3) missiles needing post
launch control. These three different type of attackers share many common
attributes.
* All can be (and normally are) shot at by the SAM units. Each attacker is
an air vehicle of some sort (aircraft, glide bomb, cruise missile).
* All aircraft start and end in midair (takeoff and landing at an airfield is
not simulated).
* All missiles must be launched by an aircraft in the simulation (they
cannot just appear).
* All attackers have their motion defined by checkpoints in an input data
file. Any motion other than going straight through the checkpoints is not
allowed.
* All attackers will follow the flightpaths until they reach their last
checkpoint (for missiles, this is their impact point) or their Ps is below the
entered threshold and they are presumed dead and taken out of the
simulation.
Although each attacker type is different in some capabilities (i.e. flightpath,
speed), there are other capabilities that are identical for all attackers of the
same type. One example of this would be the Pk of the SAMs against the
attacker type.
The air defense units also have similarities and differences. All units
are SAM systems with up to 9 unique types. The unique types will have
different launch envelopes, velocity of its missile, location in the model, etc.
The different types will have identical fire control logic.
There exists a class of objects in the model which are called 'non-
SAM' targets. These simulate any ground target which has no capability to
shoot back or be offensive in any way. They are the primary targets for which
the attackers objective is to penetrate through the air defense network to
strike. Other scenarios might have the SAM units as the primary targets of the
attackers and the 'non-SAM' targets not even engaged.
8
B. FIRE CONTROL AND COORDINATION
1. Detection of an Attacker
The first step in engaging an attacker is to detect it. This will provide
location information which will be used in determining if the attacker is or will
be within launch range of any SAM units.
a. Radar Cross Section
As stated previously, an overall assumption in the model is that
radar will be used for EW detection and SAM unit tracking. To determine if an
attacker is engageable, a simple formula is used in a subroutine which
represents the radar range equation. It determines whether the attacker in
question would have sufficient signal strength for the radar to detect it. Thus
each attacker has a number in the input data file that is associated with its
radar cross section and a number associated with the parameters of the radar
in the detection process. These variables are named CS(*) and BS(*)
respectively. With the nominal values used at NWC, the attackers will be
detected at a range which is typically much larger than the maximum launch
range of any SAM units launch envelope. At present the detection formula has
little effect upon SAM engageability. It could be useful in the future if the
effect of low cross section on attacker effectiveness is desired.
b. Masking by Terrain or Jamming
Masking interferes with the radars ability to detect and track the
attacker. To jam a radar, a jammer aircraft emits noise which competes with
the attackers reflected radar signal. If this noise is of sufficient strength, the
attacker will not be detected. The radar range equation predicts when the
attacker is close enough to the radar beingjammed so that the reflected signal
of the attacker is stronger than the jamming noise and again is detectable. This
is simulated in the program by adjusting the maximum range of the detection
envelope. If the jamming is effective in stopping detection, the modified
detection envelope will be smaller than the theoretical envelope range of the
jammed detection radar.
The term terrain masking refers to the situation where some
natural obstacle is directly between the radar and the attacker blocking the
direct path needed by the radar signals to proceed to and return from the
attacker. This occurs when an attacker flies behind a mountain. Although the
program allows each SAM site and attacker to have three dimensional (3D)
coordinates, no high resolution computations are made which would simulate
specific 3D terrain masking. A general assumption is made that terrain masking
will exist for low elevation angle engagements. The terrain is characterized by
two numbers in the input data file which simulate a barrier fence of a given
height at a given range. This fence completely encloses the SAM unit in a 360
degree circle. If the attacker is beyond the range of the barrier fence, the
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attackers elevation angle must be above the terrain masking angle limit for the
attackers to be detected. If the attackers range is less than the range to the
barrier fence, the attacker can be detected regardless of its altitude. (Imagine
sitting in the center of a gigantic saucer and trying to observe objects moving
both within the saucer and beyond its lip.)
If the attacker had already been detected and was being tracked
when the attacker is terrain masked, tracking may be lost. If the terrain
masking is temporary within a time limit defined by the user, the program
simulates that the radar will not lose track. Beyond this time limit the track
is completely lost on that attacker by the affected unit.
c. Launch Envelope of a SAM
The launch envelope is a bounded volume. If the attacker is
within the bounds of the envelope of a given SAM unit, it can engaged by the
SAM. The extent of the launch envelope for each different type ofSAM system
is originally found in the input data file. This exists as a pair of range and
altitude points which define the perimeter of the envelope. The TACOPS
program uses this two dimensional (2D) perimeter and creates a 3D volume by
computing the 2D perimeter rotated about the vertical (Z) axis. The program
uses this 3D volume as the maximum enclosure in which attackers may be
engaged.
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d. When an Attacker Maneuvers
Whenever an attacker initially enters the simulation, the time
of the intersections of its flightpath with all SAM units' launch envelopes is
computed. This is based on the extrapolation of the current course of the
attacker through all possible launch envelopes in the simulation. When an
attacker reaches its next checkpoint, its speed and course may change. If either
one of these parameters change, it will change the positions where and times
when the attacker flies through the SAM units' launch envelopes. These
intersection points are recomputed whenever any attacker reaches a
checkpoint.
e. Engagement Conditions for a SAM
In addition to all the above conditions, each SAM unit will have
some conditions specific to that unit that must exist before it will be allowed
to fire against an attacker. The SAM unit must be 'alive', that is, its probability
of survival at this time must be above that set as the minimum survival
probability for all SAM units. If the SAM unit's Ps is below the minimum
threshold, the program will ignore this SAM unit for the remainder of the
simulation. The SAM unit also must have at least one missile to shoot
otherwise it will not be selected to engage any attackers.
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2. Engagement of an Attacker by a SAM unit
a. Launch, Flyout, Kill Assess, Reacquisition Delays
The simulation starts with all attackers at a range in excess of all
launch envelopes. As an attacker approaches the time when it will enter the
launch envelope, TACOPS alerts the SAM site. Each SAM type will have a
unique track time which is the time it takes to accomplish the functions of
turning on its radar and then locating and tracking the attacker with enough
precision to allow a missile to be launched. The program adds the track time
to the time when the attacker will enter the envelope to get a 'start radiating'
time for that SAM site. When the simulation clock time reaches this 'start
radiating' time, the SAM unit is given the attacker identification (I.D.) number
and set from a 'non-radiating' mode to a 'target acquisition' mode. When the
simulation clock reaches the time when the attacker enters the launch
envelope, the SAM units' mode is set to 'launched SAM'. The flyout time of the
SAM is computed as the flight time it will take for the SAM to intercept the
attacker given its current flightpath and velocity. The simulation will wait until
the simulation clock has reached this intercept time and then determine if
successful intercept conditions still exist to warrant Pk computations of this
intercept. If the attacker is still within the launch envelope, the Pk of the
missile is applied to the Ps of the attacker and a new Ps is computed. The




After the intercept, the SAM waits a certain time before being
allowed to continue to the next step in the engagement. This time delay
represents the kill assess time. This is the time it would take for this SAM type
unit to assess if the attacker has been 'killed'. If the attacker has been killed,
the simulation will determine if this unit can engage any other attackers. If no
other attackers are engageable at this time, the unit is set to a 'non-radiating'
mode. If another attacker is already within its envelope, the units mode is set
to 'start radiating' and the engagement sequence repeats for that attacker. If
the original attacker was not killed and the unit has more missiles to fire,
another SAM is fired at the attacker. All previously mentioned computations
are done and the mode of the unit is again set to 'launched SAM'. This one-on-
one engagement continues until the unit has no more missiles to fire or is
killed (by weapons launched at it), the attacker is killed or it exits the launch
envelope.
3. Existing Fire Control/Coordination
a. Fire Control for Each SAM unit
The input data file contains numeric values which are used by
the program for a type of fire control. The data consists of a binary number for
each SAM unit and every attacker. The value indicates which attackers each
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SAM unit will be allowed to engage. A value of 1 allows engagement while a
value allows no possible engagement of the attacker by that SAM unit. This
allows absolute control of possible engagements but puts the operator is the
precarious position of dictating before the simulation of the battle which
engagements will be allowed. This is usually known after the simulation has
completed execution and is used to confine the simulation in order to stop some
unrealistic simulated engagements. This ends up 'gaming' the simulation.
A few lines of code in TACOPS do presently accomplish a level
of fire control logic. One line in the subroutine SHOT1 is used when a SAM
unit has to choose between more than one attacker to engage. The code will
cause the attacker with the highest Ps to be engaged.
b. Coordination
One input in the data file is used to select between what is called
'free-fire' and 'one-on-one only' fire control logic. In the 'one-on-one only' mode,
the program will allow a SAM unit to engage an attacker only if that attacker
is not being engaged by another unit. In the 'free-fire' mode, each unit engages
attackers independently. No consideration is given to the number of other units
that may also be simultaneously engaging this attacker.
c. Effectiveness ofpresent control/coordination
The code that selects the highest Ps attacker when faced with
a choice of which to engage focuses on only the present moment. The EW
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sensors may know of a much higher Ps attacker that will come within the units
launch envelope in a second or two, but the SAM site does not consider this.
The 'free-fire' mode can result in a lead attacker being engaged
by multiple units simultaneously and allowing trailing and nearby attackers to
pass through the launch envelopes without being engaged. This would be
highly unrealistic. The 'one-on-one only' mode will not allow the error of the
'free-fire' mode to occur but limits the units per attacker to only one. More
units that could engage are not allowed to do so resulting in a overall loss in air
defense effectiveness.
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III. THE INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM
Most military organizations have air defense systems but their composition
varies greatly. At the lowest range of effectiveness, the system would consist of hand-
held SAMs and World War II era anti-aircraft artillery (AAA). At the highest, the
system would be composed of the most sophisticated weapons systems connected by
state-of-the-art electronics. In this chapter, the concept, composition and function of
a typical air defense system and its elements are presented. The system components
are differentiated by type and function. The description will be presented with an
slant towards their incorporation in the IADS model.
The majority of the information in this chapter and the following chapter was
obtained from Lt. Thomas J. Bernota's Masters of Science thesis (Bernota, 1990).
That information is contained in this thesis to allow this document to be complete.
Many sources describe specific components or functions of the IADS. His thesis is
an excellent single source for a description of the multiple attributes of an IADS. It
also contains a large listing of references. Both were applicable to this thesis. Some
areas of his thesis have been condensed, reworded or modified so that the
information better applies to the topic of this thesis. (Lt. Bernota's thesis focus was




To model an air defense system, it is necessary to thoroughly understand
two areas: (1) the purpose of the defense system; and (2) the method by which it
achieves its purpose. The ultimate purpose of the air defense system is to prevent any
attacker from reaching and damaging its target. While perfect protection is generally
not possible, the system might have a lesser goal. This goal could be to induce a high
enough attrition on the attackers that either 1) the enemy does not attack at all; or
2) the cost of the attack is so high that these defended targets are not attacked again.
Although specific missions of an air defense system are usually grouped under the
categories of strategic or tactical employment, this thesis does not make any
distinctions.
A purpose in employing the IADS model could be to evaluate different
methods (stealth technology, approach tactics, jamming, selectively damaging parts
of the IADS) which prevent the air defense from being effective. Specifically, an air
defense system must be able to establish and maintain a track on an attacker to
function at all. This track must be sufficiently accurate and complete to direct a
weapon against the attacker. Therefore, the timeliness and accuracy of the attackers
track information are one type of measure as to how well the defense system works.
Other measures are: 1) the amount of damage done to the attackers; and 2) the
amount of damage the attackers inflict upon the air defense system and the ground
targets the air defense was tasked to protect.
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2. Function
The components of an IADS can be physically far apart. For an IADS to
achieve the general mission objective, some means of communication and
coordination between the various components must exist. These components will be
described in more detail.
When a command, control and communications (C3) process is used with
the linked components, the system is more effective than the individual components
acting alone. This is called a force multiplier effect. Modern aircraft and weapons fly
at high speeds thus requiring the IADS to function in a timely manner if it is to
successfully perform its mission. A way to defeat an IADS is to delay or prevent the
completion of those tasks. Included in the tasks the C3 system must support are
(Fowler and Nesbit, 1980):
* positioning of units to maintain a continuous air defense umbrella over moving
ground forces;
* distribution of preplanned friendly air support operation data (safe corridors,
altitudes, ingress and egress time, etc.);
* real time identification of friend or foe;
* coordination of fighter and SAM air defenses;
* coordination of target assignments to prevent unnecessary missile expenditures;
* direct fire control of both SAMs and interceptor aircraft;
* distribution of warnings or tipoffs from other intelligence sources.
Without being properly designed and operated, the numerous tasks the
C3 system is required to handle could negate the force-multiplier effect. Damaging
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the components and disrupting or delaying the functions of the components would
also negate the force-multiplier effect.
The physical layout of the IADS is influenced by a variety of factors.
These are terrain masking limits, importance of the targets to be protected, and
SAM/interceptor aircraft capability and availability. For maximum effectiveness, the
sensors would be placed at expected ingress routes. Similarly, weapons would be
placed around vital assets and/or along expected strike flightpaths. The location of
the components making up the communications net would also be influenced by
terrain masking and may be influenced by the maneuverability of the connected
elements.
B. Components
The components of an IADS are broadly categorized as follows (Fitts,
1980, pp. 209-237; Schleher, 1986, p.342):
* sensors: radars, electro-optic devices, electronic support measures equipment,
human observers;
* data fusion and command centers: reporting and filter centers, command posts
at all levels (division, brigade, battalion, etc.)
* weapons: surface to air missiles, anti-aircraft artillery, interceptor aircraft;
* communications: voice radio, data links, landlines.
1. Sensors
IADS sensors include the components of the C3 structure used to obtain
localizing positional information on any attackers. Other sensors may detect the
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presence of attackers without giving location information. Although not as useful as
positional information, this knowledge can still be put to good use.
a. Radars
A radar is any device that uses the electromagnetic spectrum to obtain
position information on another object. Radars may be categorized by the functions
they perform. For our purposes, they are grouped as follows:
* Early warning (EW),
* Target acquisition (TA),
* Height finders (HF),
* Target trackers (TT),
* Multifunction.
Early warning radars are used to provide the first notification of the
approach of attackers. The information is used to notify the defense. Depending on
the capabilities of the particular radar, the information could also be used to
determine the number and position of the attackers. These radars are usually high
powered to produce the long range detection capability required to fulfill their
mission. They tend to provide azimuth and range information only but some have a
limited height-finding capability (i.e. 3D). Two dimensional information alone is not
sufficient to use for target tracking. Also, the information from an EW radar also
usually lacks the accuracy needed to develop a solution to pass to a target tracker.
Because the scan rates of most long range search radars are low (5-10 revolutions per
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minute (rpm)), and detection is more difficult at extended ranges, a confirmed
detection tends to take more time than with other radars.
The target acquisition (TA) radar is also a long range radar and is
generally associated with a weapon control or target track radar. As its name implies,
the TA radar attempts to develop information that is accurate enough to slew a
target tracker onto a target, or in some cases, the weapon itself. The TA radar may
not be capable of determining the altitude of the aircraft by itself. In that case, it will
operate in conjunction with a height-finding radar. The TA radar can either be an
independent radar or an operating mode of a multifunction radar. Thus used in
conjunction with an EW radar, this combination will be able to detect and locate the
attackers sufficiently for target tracking purposes.
The height-finder (HF) provides altitude information on attackers
using two dimensional surveillance radars. A typical HF radar slews in azimuth to the
bearing obtained by the surveillance radar, and then scans in elevation to acquire the
attacker. Once detected, the combination of azimuth, elevation and range is sufficient
to compute the altitude information. The altitude of the attacker, in conjunction with
the azimuth and range obtained by the 2D radar, is sufficient and accurate enough
for use by a the target tracker. That would be the next step. (Schleher, 1986, p.231)
The target tracker (TT), or weapon control radar, provides sufficiently
accurate information that allows the weapon to engage and destroy the target. This
type of radar is associated with SAMs or AAA. The design and range of this type of
radar will vary depending upon the weapon system it supports but will usually have
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the shortest range of all other radar types. Some of the factors influencing the
capability of the TT radar include the weapons range and coverage, volume, and type
of weapon (e.g. point or area defense) (Schleher, 1986, p.233). Target tracker radars
influence the use and effectiveness of the terminal threats (SAMs,AAA). These
threat's capabilities directly affect the probability of survival of the attackers.
Therefore, MOEs associated with delaying the acquisition and tracking information
pertinent to terminal threat performance are of interest.
Previous to this section, each function described was associated with
a unique group of equipment. Advanced radars have been able to combine multiple
functions described previously into one system. The multifunction radar will perform
several of the above roles. A single radar system may be able to provide target
acquisition, altitude, and tracking data, as well as serve as a weapons guidance
transmitter. Detection may still need to be accomplished by an EW radar. The
implication is the elimination of a need to transfer target data between separate
radars and data communication links. Thus, the targeting process is quicker, simpler
and more reliable. Phased array radars are extremely capable and can operate and
scan quickly. They are typically the radar of choice in multifunction systems.
b. Electro-optic and Infrared Devices
Passive electro-optic (EO) and infrared (IR) devices may exist with
a radar. If they do exist, they are usually subordinate to a primary radar. They have
limited range capability (on the order of tens of miles or less) and generally operate
only in fair or clear air mass weather conditions. There are EO devices that are used
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to track targets, and in some applications, to search for targets. These devices can
give very accurate bearing information on the target. Their narrow field of view make
them impractical when searching for targets that do not have some initial bearing
data. The acquisition device provides input to the IADS, and the tracker acts much
as a radar target tracker.
c ESM Receivers
Electronic support measures (ESM) receivers are used to search,
intercept, locate and identify sources of electromagnetic radiation. The ESM function
is used for threat recognition. As the name implies, they are passive elements that
receive electromagnetic spectrum and bearing information from a transmitter. By
correlating the signals with enemy emitters, target identification is possible. Using
bearings from multiple ESM receiver locations, rough attacker location is possible.
The main advantage of these elements is that they function passively without
revealing their location. In a low observable mode, the IADS would only use the
ESM receivers to search for attackers. If the ingressing attackers are radiating any
emitters (i.e. jamming), an assessment of degradation of ground-based ESM and
direction-finding stations should be made. This assessment will be used by the central
control if the IADS to determine if additional elements of the IADS must be
employed to get the needed information of the attackers.
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2. Data Fusion and Decision Centers
Centers in the IADS that are the focal points for the reception of
information from sensor sources are defined as data fusion nodes. The elements of
the IADS responsible for using that information and acting on it are defined as
decision nodes.
a. Data Fusion Nodes
Data fusion nodes are centers that collect and process information.
There are two types of nodes which differ by the type of information and IADS
elements they handle. The radar reporting stations are associated with the data from
an early warning radar. The radar reporting station compiles a picture of the air
situation from the outlying EW radars. Its outputs are to the filter center. The filter
center correlates this and also receives inputs from ESM stations and any other
sources (ground- or air-based observation posts). The outputs of the filter center can
be modeled to include general alerts to the IADS and data on the air situation to the
weapons control center.
b. Decision Nodes
All command centers are considered to be decision centers. There are
different levels of command centers. The high echelon command centers are those
from the division level upwards. They are primarily responsible for planning the
allocation of forces on a daily cycle and do not handle threats of an immediate
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nature. Disrupting the command and control of such a command center would not
have an immediate impact on the enemy presently engaged in an attack.
In contrast, lower echelon command centers offer a more viable target
for disruption or destruction.
Regiment and battalion command centers are assigned to execute the orders
of the higher echelons. They are primarily involved in the "control" of command
and control. They...conduct the real time coordination of air support, ...air
defense, etc. (Fowler, 1980, pp. 44-45)
Timely countermeasures or destruction against these command centers could disrupt
the process required for successful air defense weapons applications.
The command posts that function as air defense weapons operations
centers (ADWOC) are included in this category. They are alternatively know as air
defense direction centers or weapons operations centers. This is where allocations of
the weapons covering the entire air defense network and involving current attacks are
determined.
3. Communications links
In the previous sections, components of the IADS structure used to obtain
and utilize information were reviewed. Communications connects those components
with each other and allows the information to be shared. The types of
communication links may be broadly categorized as radio or landline/hardwire.
a. Radio
Radio communications operate in many areas of the electromagnetic
spectrum. Radios generally operate in the frequency range from 1 to 500 Mhz
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(Megahertz). Microwave and satellite communications may operate in the 1 to 12
GHz (Gigahertz) region.
The type of data to be transmitted may influence the type of
transmission used. The oldest and most commonly known broadcast communication
means is analog in nature. Analog transmission is more applicable for the
representation of sound and visual information (which is continuous in nature). For
modern C3 systems, digital communication is beginning to dominate over analog
forms. Digital techniques lend themselves well to the transmission of text and
numbers.
There are different communications radios which are dependant upon
the frequency in which they operate. High frequency (HF) radio waves propagate
beyond the horizon, and can either hug the ground or be bent by the ionosphere.
Very High Frequency (VHF) and Ultra High Frequency (UHF) radio waves
essentially travel via line-of site. If the nodes in the communications net are
physically beyond direct line-of-site, VHF and UHF links will use relay stations
between the primary nodes to allow them to function.
b. Landline/hardwire
A large volume of military communications is transmitted by
telephonic or telegraphic hardwire connections. These connections would be made
of electrical cable or fiber optic lines that are laid on or under ground or strung like
standard telephone lines. Landlines are used for voice, data and video information.
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A primary benefit to the user is the relative difficulty of destroying such a link.
Although susceptible to physical destruction, they are impervious to jamming.
For short ranges and fixed positions, landlines are easily established.
They are not suitable where long-distance connections must be established rapidly
or when connections are between mobile command posts. Additionally, a large
volume of telephonic and telegraphic communication is often transmitted by radio
relay at some point between connection nodes.
It is safe to say that potentially every long distance military communication will
be carried over part of its path by electromagnetic radiation. (Fitts, 1980, p. 129)
Jamming and damaging the relay nodes can disrupt the information transfer.
C. Summary
In this chapter, the major functional components of the IADS were examined.
Each plays a vital role in the ability of the system to achieve the mission of the
IADS. Each function must be part of an IADS model. In the next chapter, the
vulnerabilities of the system and its components will be presented.
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IV. DEGRADING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE IADS
Modeling the IADS requires understanding how it operates, both when it is in
perfect operating order and under degraded (i.e. elements are damaged/destroyed
or jammed) conditions. The previous chapter covered the functions and components
of the IADS. In this section, the interaction of those components, and some ideas on
degrading the system are presented. Then a discussion of the methods in which to
defeat the individual components is provided along with the potential impacts on the
overall system.
A. THE IADS AS AN INFORMATION PROCESSION SYSTEM
The approach used in Lt. Bernota's thesis is that the IADS can be viewed as
an information processing system.
Basically, an air defense system is an information processing system. It does
have physical resources - men, guns, missiles and aircraft - which it controls, but
its control over these resources is dependent upon its processing of information
about the threat. (Fitts, 1980, pp. 228-237)
Associated with this approach are four defects which reduce the value of the
information. They are, in increasing order of effect on the system, error, bias,
distortion, and delay. (Fitts, 1980, p. 229) The first three defects typically relate to
the positional information of the attacker, while delay is related to the transfer of the
information regardless of the quality of the data.
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Positional error of the attacker will arise as part of the natural noise induced
error present in a radar system. It can arise from azimuth inaccuracies in the EW
radar which are present when the system is operating at its peak or when damage is
induced from a strike. Jamming induces error due to the error added to the system.
The system attempts to remove error by smoothing or averaging observations so that
the random fluctuations cancel out over time. Electronic counter measures (ECM)
only becomes effective if the averaging time becomes so long that the result is a
delay in estimating the correct position of the target.
Bias is the tendency of the system to produce a measurement that consistently
deviates from the actual measurement. Repeated underestimates of the bearing angle
of the incoming raid indicate a bias in the system.
Distortion may already exist in the system or may be externally increased.
Distortion in an air defense system may arise because of the limits of its
equipment. Slower scan rates on the radars, or extended processing time of its
data correlation centers, may result in a renewed picture of the air situation
only once every 10 seconds. High attacker speeds, in conjunction with turns,
may deviate route projections from the actual position in that period of time.
ECM enhances the distortion effect by allowing fewer glimpses of the actual
position of the aircraft, or increases the processing demands through the
introduction of false targets. (Bernota, 1990, p. 23)
Thus what the attackers are actually doing is distorted by the lack of accurate
information by the air defense system resulting in degraded performance of the
IADS.
The last information defect, delay, usually has the most serious consequences.
The effects of other defects may also be grouped under the category of time delay.
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Recall how error and distortion will affect the IADS and how the IADS handles
these. The IADS must deal with these defects until the solution is within acceptable
bounds before the system will be able to bring weapons on the attacker. In this way,
error and distortion may be viewed by the amount of delay they introduce. TACOPS
does not have a high-resolution detection algorithm nor does it use the estimate of
the exact position of the aircraft in its engagement and terminal effects algorithms.
Modeling the specific defects that positional error, bias and distortion cause is not
compatible with TACOPS modeling assumptions. Their manifestation will be
modeled by the delay they induce. This thesis concentrates on the delays in the
IADS.
Timeliness has utility. The IADS command and control may eventually be able
to resolve the position of the attacker, given enough time. If high speed attackers are
to be engaged before they can do any damage, timing is critical. If the position
solution is obtained as a result of the attention drawn to the attacker when it delivers
bombs on its target, or as the attacker egress out of the effective weapons range of
the SAMs, the information comes too late to have any chance to preclude damage
or to employ surface to air weapons optimally. If the attackers have already exited
from the SAM envelopes, the information will not be useful at all. The three key
areas where delays may be introduced into the system correspond to the components
of the IADS described in Chapter III. Two direct methods are used to cause delays
in the IADS components; physical damage and jamming. Direct methods against
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communications links result in denying or delaying the system ability to move any
information between nodes.
Additional delay may occur as an indirect result of the effectiveness of the
direct methods. This delay would occur in the decision nodes.
The. ..effect is that the commander will often delay a decision because his
information is uncertain. The propensity for a commander to so act is obviously
a very human quality but the pressure is still there, and the resultant delay
might have serious consequences. (Fitts, 1980, p. 230)
Some of the means of introducing the delays into each of these components and
how to treat them in modeling them are now discussed.
B. SENSORS
Mission planning aids currently in use are capable of determining the radio
frequency (RF) propagation restrictions due to the terrain (called terrain masking).
TACOPS already crudely determines terrain masking so this section does not expand
on this phenomenon. However, because hiding from the sensors is an important
means of denying information to the IADS, the user will need to be aware of its
effects.
1. Radars
Destruction is the ultimate combat tool. (Atchision, 1987, p. 66)
Destruction of a radar results in an "infinite delay" for that sensor. The term "infinite"
is used to describe a delay that extends the arrival of the information beyond the
time period of usefulness. If destruction produces too long a delay, then it is assumed
that a small level of damage to a radar will produce a corresponding lower delay.
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The IADS model allows the equating of delay to damage level. Destruction may not
be preferable in all cases. Use of Anti-Radiation Missiles (ARMs) that contribute to
the attrition of the air defense system's radars is desirable, but not feasible for all
sensors. Some elements of the IADS may be too heavily defended to attack. In this
case, jamming may be the weapon of choice. Jamming may be modeled as a denial
of information (infinite delay) until the aircraft is close enough (burn through range)
so that the radar can clearly discern the target. Lt. Bernota's thesis gives a detailed
description of the radar range equation and the detection performance of a radar in
a jamming environment.
2. Others
Where operational requirements include any radiation from the attacker, the
vulnerability to passive ESM stations must be determined. As was the case with
radars, detection of emissions is a function of the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
set in the receiving equipment. The detection probability and utility of
information vary considerably with different types ofESM equipment. (Bernota,
1990, p. 32)
The detection event is a random event. Like modeling the radar for TACOPS, the
user must also come up with deterministic value to model the ESM equipment.
EO/IR devices also have their deficiencies.
EO/IR detectors are limited by several factors. Like a radar, they may have a
limited field of view. They may be dependent on external inputs to slew to the
target, or they may be capable of a search mode. The primary range restriction
other than line-of-sight is due to atmospheric attenuation. (Bernota, 1990, p.
32)
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The prime advantage of these devices is the highly accurate bearing-to-target
information they can provide. Their main disadvantage is that their narrow field of
view results in a very long search time unless given an small search area.
C. COMMUNICATIONS LINKS
Degrading communications links is more difficult than degrading the sensors
(Bernota, 1990). Two possible methods of degradation are considered; damage and
jamming. The previous reference goes into some detail as the differences between
radars and communications links and their signal equations.
Actual damage of the links was not modeled. The algorithms are capable of
being easily modified to allow the links between nodes to be modeled as working
perfectly or being completely broken. Modifications to allow marginally functional
links would require more work. The user will have to evaluate vulnerability of the
actual hardware to model this component.
Encryption of the signals makes jamming less effective. There is not a good
consensus on what constitutes effective communications jamming because of the
complexity and diversity of communications methods used. In this IADS model, the
relationships between link disruption and intelligence denial and between intelligence
denial and operational significance is difficult to quantify.
On the one hand, unless the disruption is 100% effective, the intended message
or an equivalent operational clue may be transferred.
An "alert" may be inadvertently by conveyed by the jamming itself. (Van Brunt,
1978, p. 141)
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If an attack has not yet been detected and was not anticipated, the start of jamming
would indicate to the IADS that hostilities were soon to commence. Detection and
location of the attackers would not be required before the IADS would be at a more
heightened state of readiness. On the other hand, even if complete obscuration of the
signal is not achievable, there may still be substantial benefits to using less
"successful" jamming. If the jamming imposes a finite delay on message traffic at
several points along the communications path, the cumulative effect could be
significant. This, along with delays imposed by actual sensor jamming, may result in
sufficient confusion to delay or prevent successful missile engagement of the attacker.
(Bernota, 1990, p. 36) This would have a major influence on one of the primary
MOEs in TACOPS.
D. DATA FUSION and DECISION NODES
Data fusion nodes were defined here as those centers that receive and
consolidate information from the IADS' sensors. Decision nodes are those that use
the information, or direct other sensors to obtain further information. Specifically,
we are referring to the ADWOC and different levels of command posts.
This next section focuses on the interactions between the sensors of the system
and their control elements. In the model, each node may be connected to a set of
other nodes. The resulting network may be described by the set of connections from
each node, and the set of connections to each node. A network with connections in
this format is called a directed graph.
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To facilitate development of the model, some simplifying assumptions regarding
how delays are imposed on the nodes are made. A collection of information will be
referred to as a message or package.
It was previously mentioned that a commander may delay making a decision if
his information is incomplete. It is assumed that each decision node is
restricted in the action it may pursue by the completeness of the information
package to which it has access. The two general cases then are access to
incomplete information, and access to complete information. A subset of both
cases is that the information is no longer current, and therefore unusable.
(Bernota, 1990, p. 38)
It is further assumed that gaining and processing information will take time. The time
delay will be a constant value when the IADS component is undamaged and will
correspondingly increase as the components' damage level increases.
Each level of decision node has specific requirements for the type and amount
of information. As an example, a target tracker radar (as part of a battalion level
command post) may require a message which contains information on target azimuth
and altitude. With that information, it may slew to a small enough region so that
target acquisition is possible in a reasonably short amount of time. If the information
it has is incomplete or not accurate enough, it may not be directed to radiate at all
because to do so would increase its probability of detection and ARMs could be used
against it. Alternatively, it may be directed to attempt an autonomous acquisition,
with a long expected delay time.
The requirements for all the levels of decision nodes in all situations are too
long to list here. However, the following sections look at some possible information
requirements of the IADS' nodes, and the restrictions placed on their operation by
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incomplete packages. The model has been created with the flexibility to
accommodate a variety of connections and user defined control conditions.
1. Data Fusion Node
A data fusion node acts as an information traffic direction center, relaying
messages, consolidating inputs, and filtering extraneous information. This information
is then passed to any receiving nodes it is connected to. The sample scenario
presented here has two data fusion nodes: the EW reporting station and the Filter
Center. The inputs to the EW reporting station come from the EW and HF radars
(assumed to be part of the EW site). From the information gained by using these
radars, a complete information package (message) would consist of a three-
dimensional position report on the attackers each EW site can detect. This would be
sufficient to allow computations for target allocation assignments. Incomplete
packages would lack any or all of the three dimensions. An incomplete package may
just consist of existence of jamming and its azimuth direction of arrival and still be
somewhat useful. In either case, there is no restriction on attempting to pass that
information to the Filter Center. Also from the EW Reporting Station, (if the
ADWOC is destroyed and will not alert the battalion centers and SAM units) an Air
Situation Broadcast ("ALERT") is made to let the rest of the system know of the
impending strike. In general, the alert may contain limited sector information, or just
consist of a general alert. In the sample scenario, the entire IADS will try to
autonomously get detection and track on the attackers.
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The Filter Center receives, in the sample scenario, the information from the
EW site and a redundant copy from the EW reporting station. Note that the
information is passed via one of several possible parallel communications links.
Eliminating one of the links would not prohibit the message from its destination
node. As previously mentioned, there may be an additional delay in reverting to a
secondary parallel link because each node will incur a delay in handling the message.
The Filter Center combines the information received from all EW sites to produce
a overall description of the total attackers detected at each moment.
2. Decision Nodes
As a decision node, the ADWOC commander uses the overall picture of
the information on all the attackers to assign specific SAM units to engage the
attackers. If it is necessary, the ADWOC may attempt to obtain missing information,
or refine the attackers position. This could be done by using its TA or HF radar or
coordinating this information with other reports.
Three possible situations that may occur are as follows. No delays are incurred
at the ADWOC if it is a complete package. If the package is incomplete, a
delay is imposed until the information is obtained, at which time the ADWOC
commander may designate which battalion or battery will be responsible for
engaging the attacker. Alternatively, a delay is imposed until the ADWOC
commander chooses to instruct the battalion to assume responsibility for
detection and engagement of the attacker. (Bernota, 1990, p.45)
Assume the ADWOC, knowing the position of the attacker, directs
Battalion 1 to engage the attacker. After any delays incurred have elapsed, the
Battalion Command Post (CP) receives the instructions to prosecute the target. With
sufficient information for target acquisition, the Battalion CP attempts to direct SAM
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Batteries under his command to track and fire upon the aircraft. If the position of
the attacker were not known accurately, the Battalion Center would attempt to get
the lacking information, by using a TA radar. Without the exact location of the
attacker, the SAM sites would have do their own detection, acquisition, identification
and tracking of the attacker before they could engage the attacker. This is normally
a lengthy process. Assigning the SAM unit to do all these functions would not be as
effective as a functioning IADS with complete information.
In the TACOPS model, target trackers require current down range, cross
range and altitude (x,y,z) position data to acquire the attacker. In actual systems,
azimuth and altitude data will usually be sufficient for acquisition. Attacker position
data may be rendered obsolete by terrain masking, delayed jamming, or the attacker
exiting the envelope of the radar. If the communication link to a battery is
completed, but the data passed is not current, the target tracking radar cannot find
the attacker without a prolonged search. As long as the radar radiates, the attackers
ESM equipment can locate this radar. Since that increases the vulnerability to
ARMs, the battery CP would probably decide to use his own TA radar to obtain the
information to feed his TT radar. This would reduce the chance of damage to the
only components of the IADS that can engage the attacker. If the TA radar is being
jammed, the CP must decide on using the TT radar for autonomous acquisition.
The above situations illustrate the wide number of conditions that must
be considered for a strike against an IADS protected target. Modeling an actual
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IADS would require detailed knowledge of the decision process. However, from the
descriptions, the following requirements need to be part of the model:
* a matrix of all communication links, defining who can send message to whom;
* a logical decision process as to what events require sending messages and the
ultimate destination of that message;
* a definition of what data needs to be contained in the message;
* a decision process as to the radiating state of the IADS elements, the
conditions when this state should change;
* provisions to duplicate operations of a destroyed ADWOC and the SAM units
trying autonomous operations;
* a decision process for target allocation and SAM engagements.
In the sample scenario, the Filter Center and the ADWOC are assumed to be
synonymous and collocated. Once the overall detection information is assembled (the
Filter Center's function), the model allows the SAM sites to engage the attackers
(the ADWOC's function).
A complete description of the techniques used in and capabilities of the model
are presented in the next chapter.
E. SUMMARY
The IADS can be thought of as an information processing system. Delay is one
of the significant errors associated with the IADS and will be focused on in this
thesis. Delays are incurred in three areas of the IADS: sensors, communications, and
decision and data fusion nodes. Each category has unique considerations as to how
the information flow delay is incurred. The cumulative effect is a delay in obtaining
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Now that the functions of the IADS and its elements are defined, algorithms
can be written to represent these functions in a simulation. This chapter will describe
four areas. First, the assumptions and simplifications that were adopted are
described. Next, the data file inputs which define the IADS network and connections
are specified, and the response of the information transfer of the IADS network is
presented. Finally, the algorithms developed to simulate the IADS elements are
detailed. Some areas will be highly detailed so that the user can take these insights
and tailor them to his future needs.
A. Modeling Considerations
One of the major considerations in developing these algorithms was to allow
the IADS model to be compatible to the original TACOPS program. This influenced
the choices in level of detail, modeling assumptions and the programming language.
Since the original TACOPS is written in the FORTRAN77 computer
programming language, that necessitated the use of that same language in writing the
IADS algorithms. (Object oriented languages such as MODSIM II would be better
structured to model all these algorithms.) The original TACOPS could run on a
desktop personal computer (PC). Again to keep the IADS model compatible with the
TACOPS, algorithm coding was conducted which would keep memory requirements
within the size available in a PC.
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Although TACOPS has the capability to be used in a Monte-Carlo fashion, it
has never (to my knowledge) been successfully used that way. It has always been used
in its expected value deterministic mode. Hence, the IADS algorithms were written
assuming an expected value mode would be used.
TACOPS computes times when future events occur similar to an event step
model. It increments the simulation clock by one time increment similar to a time
step model and waits until the time the event is to occur equals the simulation time.
The IADS algorithms uses the same approach to be compatible with the original
program.
B. THE IADS NETWORK
1. Connections in the Network
a. IADS Types
The model assumes that the major IADS functions are differentiated
into five different components which in this document will be called IADS 'types'. A
unique number distinguishes each type. The numbers associated with the different
'types' are; 1 - an EW site, 2 - an EW Reporting Station, 3 - the ADWOC center, 4 -
a Battalion Center and 5 - a SAM unit. These types communicate their information
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Figure 1 - Information Flow in the IADS
b. Maximum number ofIADS Elements
Assumptions are also made as to the maximum number of 'elements'
for each of these types. (This defines the array sizes.) There can each be a maximum
of 9 EW sites, EW Reporting Stations and Battalion Centers. There can be only one
ADWOC element. From the previous original TACOPS assumptions, the maximum
number of SAM elements (units) is set by the parameter 'JM' in the original code.
c. Defining the IADS Connections using Directed Graph
The concept of a 'directed graph' is used to envision the connections
between elements in the IADS network. Each element in the network can send
messages to other elements in the network only when it is connected to that element.
A connection does not indicate that message traffic is allowed to travel both ways.
A directed graph specifies that messages may only be sent in a specified direction.
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See Figure 2 which illustrates one IADS element with a directed connection to
another element.
Figure 2 - Example of Directed Graph Connection
All the IADS connections are assigned a four number designator. In
each single four number packet, the connection and the direction from one element
to another is established. The format is as follows: Isolate a pair of elements in the
IADS network and visualize the appropriate direction of message flow in the
connection. The first pair of numbers represent the originating IADS type number
and the element number of the IADS element in question. The last two numbers
specify the IADS type number and the element number of the receiving IADS
element. (Example, 1,2,2,4 means that type T (EW site), element '2' (site #2), can
send a message to type '2' (EW Reporting Station), element '4' (Station #4).) See
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Figure 3. To completely specify the IADS, all elements must be considered
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Figure 3 - Example of a Connections Data set
There is a possible source of confusion in determining the EW or
SAM site element number. This is because there are two numbering schemes being
used to associate identification numbers to EW and SAM sites. Confusion may arise
because the SAM sites use the same numbering scheme for damage assessment and
specifying its IADS connection element number while the EW sites use two different
numbering schemes for these areas. The differences are now detailed.
The original TACOPS code identifies all SAM sites in the input data
block using a site identification number. This site number comes from the order of
occurrence of that site's data in the site data block (i.e. the first site in the data block
is #1, the next is #2, etc.). This identification number will be used for the SAM site's
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element number. This scheme will not be used for the EW sites element number. In
defining the IADS connections, another numbering scheme is used.
The model associates a unique number of all EW sites numbering the
sites starting with #1 and proceeding sequentially up to the maximum number ofEW
sites in the scenario. The element numbering association for an EW site is linked to
the relative position of that EW site's data in the data block to the other EW sites.
In the input data file, the EW and SAM site's positional data are all grouped
together in a block. There is no relative ordering sequence in this block for the EW
or SAM sites data. (The EW sites may be listed all together and then all the SAM
sites or they may be randomly interspersed.) Starting at the top of this block, each
successive line signifies a different site. Whatever the order in this block, the
occurrence of the first EW site will be designated EW site element #1. The next EW
site occurring in the block will be EW site element #2 even if there are multiple
SAM sites between the EW sites. The user must correctly identify the EW site's
element number using this scheme. He must use this element number when he
specifies the IADS connection. Here is an example.
If there are 2 EW sites and 4 SAM sites, there are 6 sites total.
Assume that the EW sites were put in the input data file as the first and third lines
of the SAM data block. Thus the original TACOPS site identification numbers for
the EW sites would be 1 and 3 and the SAM sites would be numbered 2,4,5 and 6.
When referring to IADS types and elements numberings, the type '1' IADS elements
would be for EW sites only regardless of original site number. For these two EW
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sites, the EW site element numbers # 1 and #2 would refer to the original TACOPS
site numbers 1 and 3.
d. Controlling the ultimate destination of a message
Although the network can have each element connected to many
other elements, it is not desired to have messages follow down all possible paths.
Loops are created when a IADS network is setup which allows messages to follow
along multiple parallel paths. This allows the possibility that messages may be passed
along forever by going over the same loop over and over again. See Figure 4 for an
example of multiple parallel paths and loops. This situation would slow down the
running of the program by having unneeded copies of messages existing and moving
through the network and require too much memory (array size). Two techniques
were created to handle this problem. One technique uses the source and final
destination information in the message to selectively direct messages along specific
paths from a node in the network. The other technique keeps track of each unique
message.
By using the source and/or final destination information in the
received message, the user can put logical statements in the program to control the
direction of messages. This will result in messages being passed along specified paths
from a node in the network. The model uses this technique in all subroutines that
send messages. A form was created to accompany this part of the model and can be
found useful in organizing the logic flow of the code. The copy of this form is in
APPENDIX A. Users should find this helpful in understanding the logic flow of these
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Figure 4 - Multiple Parallel Paths and Loops in the IADS Network
subroutines and in any future modifications or expansions of this code along similar
lines.
2. Message Content, Delay and Transfer
a. Message Content
The IADS model and the associated network presently requires 13
pieces of information to function. These pieces of information are contained in a
'message'. If the model is expanded, it will probably require more pieces of
information per message. To account for this, the size of the array which holds the
message is assigned by a PARAMETER statement. This allows this upper limit to
be easily modified if more pieces of information are needed.
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Each of the 13 data values in a message has a unique meaning based
upon its position in the message. The meaning of each data value is:
1. The time in the simulation when the event triggering this message occurred;
2. The time in the simulation when this message is planned to be sent to the
next IADS network node;
3. The probability of survival of the originating IADS element when the event
triggering this message occurred;
4. The present IADS type number from which this message is relayed;
5. The present IADS element number from which this message is relayed;
6. The IADS type number for the receiver of this relay;
7. The IADS element number for the receiver of this relay;
8. The 'action' bit: a value associated with an action that the receiving element
must perform;
9. This message's identification number;
10. This message's originating IADS type number;
11. This message's originating IADS element number;
12. This message's final destination IADS type number;
13. This message's final destination IADS element number.
b. Message Delay
Messages are not sent immediately upon occurrence of the triggering event.
The data for the message will be assembled and put in a message holding array until
it is ready for transmission. The gap between the time of the event and the time
when the message is transmitted to the next IADS network node is called the delay
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time. It is the sum of two delays; normal processing and damage related delays. Each
IADS element will have in the input data file numbers specifying these values.
A normal delay will be a fixed number associated with the time required
for the IADS element to process the message and transfer it to the next node. This
would be the minimum delay associated with the element if that element was not
damaged.
A delay due to the sustained damage of the IADS element is dependant
upon preassigned values in the input data file. They are used in the subroutine
'CDELAY' to compute the extra delay for any damage inflicted upon the element.
The realistic relationship between damage level and delay was unknown so the
subroutine has a linear and an exponential equation to compute the delay. Both
equations are present to allow the user a choice in the computation of the delay
function. The user must determine which delay equation is appropriate. Delay in
both equations is accomplished by correlating the element's damage to the
probability of survival. The input values in the data file specify the maximum delay
that can be computed when the elements Ps goes to 0.0 and the increment of delay
to be computed for the increment of Ps. The equations are simple and the
relationship of the input value to the computed delay are easy to assess once studied.
Once both delays are computed, they are summed. This combined delay is
the time delay the message must wait from the occurrence of the event until the
message is transmitted. Adding this delay to the time of the event goes in position
2 of the message described above.
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c Message Holding Array
As previously mentioned, information is gathered and formed into a
message at the time an event occurs. All messages generated are inserted into a
message holding array (called MESHOLD). At each simulation clock increment, the
holding array is checked to determine if a message is ready for transmission. This is
accomplished by checking the message ready time with the current simulation clock
time. If the ready time is within one 'DT (the variable name of the simulation time
increment, usually one second), the message is transmitted. The message is then
removed from the array. By removing transmitted messages, the memory size of the
array needed to handle all messages during the run of the simulation is kept to a
minimum. (The message removal is done by subroutine SHIFTU).
When a weapon impacts and damages an IADS element, the model scans
through the message holding array to determine if any messages are waiting for
transmission from the newly damaged element. If so, the corresponding message's
ready time is increased to account for this new damage level. If the IADS element
is damaged severely enough to be considered destroyed (below its destruction
threshold), all messages from element are deleted.
d. Message Transfer
When a message is transmitted from one element to another, the message
is removed from the message holding array. The message is now considered residing
at the receiving IADS element. The receiving element may send the message to other
IADS elements. The elements which will get a copy of this message is based upon
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the IADS connections and the users defined routing of messages. This will use the
origin and destination IADS type and element numbers previously mentioned.
One might envision the message being created at one of the IADS
elements, waiting until it is ready to be transmitted. When ready, it and any other
copies of it instantly move to the appropriate adjacent network connections. The
message waits at these elements until they (independently) are ready to transmit the
received message.
Two conditions can stop the message from moving along the network. The
first condition is when the message arrives at its final destination. The data is then
processed but not passed along to any further elements. The data in this message
may illicit other actions requiring messages, but they will not be copies of the original
message.
The second condition which will stop a message from moving along the
network is when an IADS element refuses to accept the message. There are two ways
for a message to be refused. One is if the IADS element is destroyed and therefore
not functioning. Once an element is destroyed, the model does not allow the element
to send or receive any messages. It does not stop any other IADS elements from
trying to send messages to this element. The other means of stopping receipt of a
message is if a copy of this message has already been received by this IADS element.
The model tags each unique message at the point of origin with a message
identification (i.d.) number (data #9) and stores this number for each IADS element
which relays that message. When an element is notified by the model that a message
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is going to be sent to it, it looks at the message's i.d. number and compares it to all
the i.d. numbers previously handled. If there is a match, the message is ignored by
not receiving it. This halts the message from being copied and passed along by this
IADS element. This technique is used to keep the number of messages existing on
the network at any given time to a minimum so that the size of the program arrays
will remain small.
If the message is only to be copied and relayed, only four data values in
the message are altered. Positions #4 and #5 of the message are changed to be
those of the relaying element's value and positions #6 and #7 are changed to be the
next IADS type and element values in the network connection. The message to be
sent out will now appear to come from the relaying IADS element. The origin and
final destination data values are not changed. Thus in each message, the transmitting
and receiving IADS elements are identified along with the message origin and final
destination. This maintains all the information needed by the model to relay the
information to its correct destination.
If this message necessitates the creation of a message with a different
meaning than the one received, a new message must be created. The data package
is constructed for this new message along with a unique i.d. number and the message
is then put on the holding array.
54
C. IADS Modeled Functions and Elements
As previously mentioned five IADS elements were modeled associating IADS
functions to each element. The following is a detailed description of the modeling of
each of these IADS elements.
1. EW Site
The purpose of the EW site is to be the first element of the IADS to
detect the attackers. It is assumed that the EW site will have multiple (EW, HF, TA)
radars. These will produce positional information on the attacker with sufficient
accuracy to be useful in a target allocation algorithm. Thus 'detection' of an attacker
indicates that its position is known accurately enough for the SAM units to engage
it.
The three dimensional detection range capability of the EW site is
modeled using the original TACOPS algorithms that compute the SAM launch
envelope capability. It is assumed that an EW site is a radiating site just like a SAM
site. An EW site's capabilities are specified in the same way a SAM sites capabilities
are specified in the original TACOPS. Its data is included in the section where the
original TACOPS had included the SAM site data. The user inputs other data further
on in the data file to differentiate between the SAM and the EW sites.
The model computes the attackers flightpath's intersections with the EW
sites three dimensional detection envelope. From these intersections, the entrance
and exit times are determined. The original code in the TACOPS subroutine
'SHOTO' (which determines if an attacker is within the SAMs launch envelope) was
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copied and simplified for use in the EW detection envelope. If the attacker is within
the envelope, the attacker is considered 'detected' by that EW site. If the attacker
is outside the bounds of the envelope, the attacker is not 'detected' by the EW site.
The EW detection envelope has other restrictions which allow an attacker
not to be detected even if it is within the detection envelope. These are the same as
the SAMs limitations in the original TACOPS model. One limitation is terrain
masking. Each SAM and EW site has terrain masking limits specified which will not
allow the radar to detect or track attackers that are hidden by terrain. Another
limitation is jamming. The effects of jamming are not presently modeled within the
EW site detection algorithm. The similarities in the effects of SAM site and EW site
jamming would allow modifications of the EW detection algorithm to incorporate the
procedure in which SAM sites are jammed.
The algorithm for the EW site detection assumes that the TACOPS
simulation will query all EW sites at each simulation clock increment. Changes in the
status of the number of detected attackers for each EW site is important. The model
keeps track of the detection of each site's attackers. When the EW site is queried as
to its present detection status (by calling the subroutine EWDET), the present
detection status is compared to the previous detection status for all attackers in the
simulation. If a new attacker is detected, a '1' is associated with that EW site and
that attacker is placed in a memory array. If a previously detected attacker is not
reacquired, a '-1' is associated with that EW site and that attacker. If an attackers
detection status has not changed from the previous look, a '0' is put into the array.
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If there are any changes in the detection status of any of the attackers for
each EW site, a new message must be transmitted. This change in detection status
is stored in the message array as defined earlier and processed at its final destination
(the ADWOC).
An EW site sends a message by calling the EWMES subroutine. EWMES
creates the message in the proper format and places it in a message holding array.
The IADS element the message will be transmitted to depends upon the users
defined connections of the IADS network and the ultimate destination of the
message. It is assumed that the EW information would primarily go the ADWOC.
Copies of this information would also be sent along other parallel paths to allow for
the IADS functional reliability and redundancy.
2. EW Reporting Station
The EW Reporting Station represents a data fusion node of the IADS.
Since it is assumed that the EW site will gather positional information on the
attacker, the reporting station will serve the function of a parallel path from the EW
site to the ADWOC. It has already been shown how the user can create multiple
serial and parallel connections between the ADWOC and the EW sites using these
reporting stations.
If the ADWOC is functioning, the reporting station will only need to pass
the messages along from the EW sites to the ADWOC. If the ADWOC is not
functioning (has been destroyed), the reporting station should initiate a new message,
an 'alert', to the other IADS elements and specifically the SAM units that an attack
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in imminent. To generate an 'alert' message, a new message is created by the EW
reporting station. This 'alert' message will be sent to the connecting network
battalion center and SAM units. In this 'alert' message, the 'action' position is set to
T indicating an alert.
The IADS algorithm presently sets all the SAM elements to the radiating
(target track) mode upon receipt of an alert. Since the EW detection range is
assumed to be much farther than the SAMs launch range, the alert is typically
received well before the attackers arrive within the SAMs envelope. If there is no
target to track, the SAMs will shut down after a few seconds. This is part of the
original TACOPS algorithm that the IADS model implemented. The user will need
to expand the logic and code for this type of message if the SAMs are to remain in
a radiating mode.
3. ADWOC/Filter Center
The model assumes that the ADWOC combines the functions of a filter
center and a decision node. This is where the major target allocation and IADS
control (i.e. who will radiate) decisions will be made. The EW and SAM sites will
also direct their information to this central point.
The ADWOC will control the radiating status of all EW and SAM sites.
Presently the SAMs firing control logic is the same as that in the original TACOPS
model. This means that, given a detection from the EW site, a SAM will radiate only
when a target is within its launch envelope. The user will need to develop SAM site
radiation control algorithms as part of the improved future target allocation
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algorithms suggested later. The ADWOC can presently control the EW sites radiating
status by sending a message. This message is sent to the desired site with the 'action'
position set to the desired command. A '0' instructs the EW site to stop radiating
(and thus stop is detection process). A T instructs the EW site to start radiating.
The site remains in the commanded state until ordered otherwise or it is destroyed.
The ADWOC performs another function. It gets the combined detection
status of all attackers from all the EW sites message information. The model keeps
the detection status of each EW site based solely upon the information received from
messages. (This mimics the situation where the detection status is based on time
delayed data that may not reflect the present conditions.) The ADWOC then
processes all information to come up with a value which indicates the total number
of EW sites which have detected each attacker. If the value is greater than zero, at
least one EW site has detected that attacker. This information is used in the target
track algorithm of the SAM units. No SAM unit is allowed to engage an attacker
until the ADWOC has received detection information.
4. Battalion Center
The Battalion center in the IADS is assumed to function as a data fusion
node. It will act similar to an EW reporting station. It will pass copies of messages
between the ADWOC and the SAM units. The user can similarly create multiple
parallel paths for these messages to ensure that the entire IADS network has no
weak points for information transfer. There is one difference between a battalion
center and a EW reporting station. It is presently assumed that there are no events
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where a battalion center will be the source of a unique message. (The EW reporting
station could generate an 'alert' message.)
5. SAM Units
The SAM units are the only elements in the IADS that have weapons to
engage the attackers. All the original algorithms associated with target track through
kill assessment in the original TACOPS model were implemented into the IADS
model. The subroutines with the name 'SHOT in the original TACOPS were used
and renamed 'FIRE' in the IADS model. The only modification to the code has
already been mentioned. Before a SAM unit can engage an attacker, it has to meet
the additional requirement that the ADWOC has a notification on the attacker in
question. The use of the original SAM algorithm allowed the original TACOPS
model to function with the IADS model incorporated into it.
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VI. A SAMPLE SCENARIO
A. PURPOSE
There are three main purposes in presenting this sample scenario. One is to
document how the user can construct an IADS network. Another is to show how that
network is described by inputs to its associated input data file. Finally, this will
illustrate the effects of information delay on attacker attrition in the modified
TACOPS model.
B. THE ASSUMPTIONS
The measures of effectiveness will be the amount of attrition done to the
attackers by the SAMs. SAMs will use free-fire engagement control logic. The only
parameter that will vary will be the attackers approach angle. This will indicate any
sensitivity to the approach angle for this scenario. For each approach angle, the
original TACOPS and the IADS TACOPS will compute results and these will be
compared.
C. THE SCENARIO
Specifying the inputs for the input data file is not straightforward. With the
explanations below, the chapter on program documentation and APPENDIX B, the
user should will be able to produce the necessary inputs.
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1. The IADS Network
Two EW sites, two EW reporting stations and two Battalion centers along
with one ADWOC and four SAM sites define this sample network. The desired
information flow connections of this network is shown in Figure 5. The most
important connections are between the EW sites and the ADWOC. This direct
connection means that the EW sites' message will get to the ADWOC with the EW
sites' message time delay as the only delay. The multiple parallel paths will take
longer than this direct connection. The delay in this detection information will be a
critical parameter affecting the attacker attrition. This is because this detection
information must arrive at the ADWOC before the SAMs are allowed to engage the
attackers.
Figure 5 - IADS Network for Sample Scenario
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a. Specifying the IADS
In addition to the original information needed by TACOPS for its
input data file, data specifying all the parameters of the IADS are needed. A copy
of the data file used in this scenario is listed in APPENDIX C. To produce an input
data file associated with this sample network, the user starts by indicating that this
run will use the IADS model versus the original TACOPS model. This is done by
having the third value in the first line of data be greater than or equal to 5. This is
highlighted as 'LABEL A' in APPENDIX C. The exact value specifies the fire
control logic used by the SAMs. In this case, 5 indicates a free-firing logic with IADS.
A indicates a free-firing logic without IADS. See the chapter on program
documentation for a list of all values and their associated meaning in fire control
logic.
Next the total number of EW sites in this scenario is specified. This
and other IADS inputs are located after the original TACOPS data is specified. This
line is highlighted as 'LABEL B' in APPENDIX C. Since two EW sites are present,
the value '2' is input. The succeeding values indicate which of the sites in the site
data block are EW versus SAM sites. The model uses this to identify and
differentiate the EW sites from the SAM sites. Next, the normal and damage delay
parameters are specified for each EW site. This is highlighted as 'LABEL C. In our
scenario, we will vary the normal delay time to make the IADS sluggish and note the
effects. Next, the minimum probability of survival is specified for all EW site types
is specified. Each EW sites Ps must be at or above this value to stay in the
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simulation. Otherwise the site is considered 'dead' and is no longer included in the
simulation.
A pattern for inputting the data for the other IADS types exists. It is
identical to the preceding description of the EW site data except it does not include
the EW/SAM i.d. numbers. This pattern is; 1) state the total number of elements for
this IADS type, 2) list the time delay parameters for each element and 3) specify the
minimum Ps for this IADS type. The model expects the data to be in order of the
type number (i.e. 2,3,4,5). This signifies that the values for EW Reporting Stations
be specified next, followed by the values for the ADWOC, followed by the values for
the Battalion Centers and finally the values for the SAM elements.
Two exceptions to this pattern exist. One relates to the ADWOC data
line for the minimum Ps. There is an additional value on the same line following the
minimum Ps value. This is highlighted as 'LABEL D'. This specifies the initial Ps of
the ADWOC. Specifying this value below the minimum Ps has the effect of removing
the ADWOC before the simulation starts. This allows the user to experiment with
an IADS without the command and control provided by the ADWOC. The second
exception is in the SAM area. This is highlighted as 'LABEL E'. The total number
of SAM units in the scenario and the minimum Ps are not specified here. It has been
previously specified in the original TACOPS data.
b. Specifying the LADS Network Connections
Next, the user identifies each one of the IADS elements by type and
element number. (The convention for specifying the IADS components by type is
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now described.) Starting at the far left of Figure 5, two EW sites are located. EW
sites are IADS type T. The IADS element numbers for these EW sites are #1 and
#2. Proceeding to the right are two EW Reporting Stations. These are IADS type
'2' and are given station element numbers of #1 and #2. Then comes the ADWOC
which is type '3' and is #1. Continuing to the right, two Battalion centers exist in this
network. They are type '4' and are elements #1 and #2. Finally, the SAM sites are
type '5' in the IADS network. The input data file block defines the EW and SAM
sites parameters ('LABEL H'). Because of their relative location in this block, the
four SAM sites are associated with the original TACOPS SAM target identification
numbers #3, #4, #5 and #6.
Now that all the parts of the IADS has been identified, the numbers
associated with the directed graph connections for the entire network are specified.
(The model does not require any specific order in specifying the connections but a
systematic approach will probably reduce errors. Start with all the EW sites, then
specify all the EW Reporting Station connections, then the ADWOC, the Battalion
Center and finally all the SAM site connections.) Starting with IADS EW sites (type
T); element T has a connection to the (type '2') EW Reporting Station #1. This
first connection is specified by the data set {1,1,2,1}. This area is highlighted as
'LABEL F in APPENDIX C. The next connection from the same EW site is to EW
Reporting Station #2. This is specified by the data set {1,1,2,2}. The last connection
from this EW site is to the ADWOC (type '3'). Even though there is only one
ADWOC, the model expects the #1 as an element number. This set would be
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{1,1,3,1}- These three lines are found in the sample data file in APPENDIX C. The
rest of the network is similarly specified.
c Non-SAM targets id. numbers for the IADS elements.
If the IADS elements are going to be attacked, they must be assigned
non-SAM target identifier numbers so their attrition can be computed. Assigning this
type of identifier to the IADS element lets the TACOPS model know that this
elements attrition will be handled differently then the SAM (radiating and possibly
shooting) elements in the simulation. This structure of SAM and non-SAM type
targets comes from the original TACOPS and was used in the IADS model as well.
If an IADS element is not going to be attacked, it can but does not need to be
assigned a target identification number.
These identifying numbers are placed after the IADS connection
block. This area is highlighted as 'LABEL G' in APPENDIX C. Three values in each
line form the data set. The first is the non-SAM target number, next is the IADS type
number and finally the IADS element number. The order in specifying target
numbers is up to the user. The model does not require any order sequence. Note that
SAM and EW sites considered 'SAM-type, radiating' targets are already assumed to
be targetable by TACOPS. These units do not have to be assigned target numbers.
The model will automatically assign the site i.d. number (from the data block) as
their target number. Only the other remaining IADS elements that will be a target
need to be specified. In this scenario, EW Reporting Station #1 is non-SAM target
#1. This is specified by the data set {1,2,1} and is found in the sample data file. All
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the other remaining four IADS elements are specified as non-SAM targets. The
IADS part of this scenario is now completely specified.
2. The Physical Layout
The relative positions of the IADS elements in Figure 5 are not to be
interpreted as a physical layout of the IADS and the SAM units. Figure 5 only shows
the possible message paths of the IADS network. Before the user creates the input
data file, the physical location of all SAM and non-SAM units in the scenario along
with all attacker flightpaths must be defined. The physical location of the EW and
SAM sites are specified in the SAM data block section of the input data file. The
model requires the EW and SAM site's location be specified. Computations of the
intercept of the site's envelope with the attackers flightpath require this information.
The model does not require position information for the other IADS elements.
Although these IADS elements may be assumed to be at the final impact position
of the attackers weapons, only its 'non-SAM' target i.d. number is needed to compute
the new attrition value. The user might envision the positions of all the elements in
the scenario so that the arrangement of targets and SAM units is logical and
meaningful.
Figure 6 shows the positional layout of the sample scenario. The EW and
SAM sites location are shown. The detection and launch ranges of the EW and SAM
sites are also indicated. Figure 7 shows the assumed relative location of the IADS
elements not shown in Figure 6. The SAM units are located around the ADWOC
giving it maximum protection. The location of the EW Reporting Stations and
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Battalion Centers are such that the SAMs give them some protection. This would be
a logical arrangement for the SAM units.
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Figure 6 - EW and SAM Site Locations and Max Range
Six attackers will fire a missile 1.0 mile from their targets then turn and
exit the area. One attacker is assigned to each site. Two of the attackers will always
approach directly from the left, shoot their missiles at the EW sites and turn 180
degrees to the left and exit the area. The four remaining attackers all start at a
location 65 miles away from the center of the group of all SAM sites and at a
specified approach angle. They fan out from this starting point, approach their
targeted sites directly and then turn to the left exiting the area as the first two
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Figure 7 - Site and IADS Elements Assumed Locations
geometry of the scenario. See Figure 8 to understand how the approach angle is
defined. The first approach angle starts at 45 degrees clockwise up from a horizontal
line. The simulation is run and at attrition values computed and recorded for this
approach angle. The simulation is run again using an input data file for a different
approach angle. The next approach angle is incremented down (counter-clockwise)
from the previous angle by 10 degrees. The angle is incremented until the final angle
is 45 degrees below the horizontal line. This gives 10 different approaches. Figure 9
shows the scenario with one such approach angle (-25 degrees). The arrows indicate




Figure 8 - Attacker Approach Angle Defined
3. Picking the EW Site Delay Time
The EW site time delay has a direct effect on the attackers attrition. This
delay is the time that must pass before the EW site sends its detection information
to the ADWOC. If the delay is short enough, the detection information will arrive
at the ADWOC and then be available to the SAMs before the attackers enter any
of the SAM launch envelopes. The number of shot opportunities at the attackers
(and the resulting attacker attrition) will be the same as the original TACOPS model.
If the EW site delay is so long that the detection information arrives after the last
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Figure 9 - Attacker Flightpath for -25 Degree Approach Angle
A time delay which resulted in an effect on the attackers attrition was
desired. Realistic IADS delay times were not determined. The delay picked was
based upon the timing of the attackers in the scenario. The exact time that the first
attacker hit its SAM (not EW) site was determined from all the approach angles.
Assuming that the SAMs were not previously alerted to any hostile activity, they
should not be radiating or trying to engage any targets. Only after an initial hit on
one of their SAM sites, should the sites start to engage the now discovered attackers.
Due to the geometry differences of the flightpaths, the different approach angles
resulted in different times of impact of the first weapon. The earliest weapon impact
time of all the different approach angles was determined using the simulation. A time
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delay which would result in the detection information arriving at the ADWOC 30
second after this weapon impact was chosen. A time delay was picked and used for
all other approach angle scenarios. Using this fixed time delay with the other
approach angles results in the detection information arriving, at the latest, 60 seconds
after the first weapon impact. That would be the time when the SAMs would be
allowed to engage the attackers. This delay should reduce the shot opportunities
somewhat but still allow variations in attrition due to the different approach angles.
For this scenario, unclassified and somewhat arbitrary values were picked.
The EW maximum detection range was set at 30 miles, the SAM maximum launch
range was set at 5 miles and the attackers speed was a constant .125 miles per
second. The resulting EW detection of the attackers always occurred at t+125
seconds into the simulation. A EW detection normal processing time delay of 355
seconds met the conditions previously described. This value was used for all the
different approach angles.
D. RESULTS
Attacker attrition values were computed for each approach angle using both the
original and the IADS TACOPS. The results are summarized in Figure 10. A sample
of the output of TACOPS is listed in APPENDIX D. The attrition value used in this
section is located at 'LABEL A' in that appendix.
The original TACOPS results are commented on first. The attrition is
symmetrical having a plateau for the smaller approach angles and a reduction at both
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ATTACKER ATTRITION
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Figure 10 - Attacker Attrition versus Approach Path using Original anc
IADS TACOPS
extreme angles. Symmetrical attrition values result from the symmetrical relative
placement of the SAM sites. A reduction in attacker attrition at the two extreme
approach angles is a result of the attackers flightpath. At these two extremes, the
attackers flightpath will yield less shot opportunities than the other angles.
The IADS TACOPS values are all below the original TACOPS results. The
selected IADS delay significantly reduces the shot opportunities. This results in a
reduction in attacker attrition compared to the original model. The variations of
attacker attrition versus approach angle are the result of attacker flightpath
differences (directly due to angle-of-approach differences) when assuming the fixed
IADS delay. The major variation in attrition is the depression for small approach
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angles. Relative to when the first weapon impact occurs, a fixed time delay lets the
SAMs start engaging the attackers at a different time for each approach angle. Small
approach angles have the longest delay after first weapon impact compared to larger
angles. This results in less shot opportunities and subsequently less attrition. This




Many new subroutines were added to TACOPS to incorporate the IADS model
capability. Figure 10 shows all the new subroutines developed for the IADS model.
Note that some of the original TACOPS subroutines were slightly modified to allow
the IADS functions to reside in the program. These are indicated in this figure with
a darkened triangle in the upper right corner of the subroutine block. Complete
listings of these modified subroutines are included with the listings of the IADS
subroutines in APPENDIX D. Also included in this appendix is a listing of some
subroutines developed and used in the testing of the IADS program. They may be
useful when expanding and debugging the program.
B. DOCUMENTATION IN THE IADS SUBROUTINES
At the beginning of each subroutine is a block of comment lines. These
comments include 1) an overall description of the purpose of the subroutine and how
the subroutine will accomplish the purpose, 2) the name of the calling subroutine,
and 3) the names of all subroutines called by this subroutine. Within the code,












































































Figure 11 - Block Diagram of TACOPS and the new IADS Subroutines
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C. MEANING OF THE 'INCLUDE' STATEMENT
A FORTRAN statement is used in the IADS subroutines that is available at
the Naval Postgraduate Schools mainframe computer that may not be universally
available. That statement is the INCLUDE statement. The format of this statement
is "INCLUDE 'filename filetype'". This directs the statement to locate and use the
lines contained in the designated file. When the code is compiled, the lines in the file
are included into the code as part of the subroutine.
This statement made using named COMMON statements easier during the
program development time. It allowed changing a named COMMON block that
many subroutines used by changing the contents of only one file. Without this
statement, all the subroutines using the COMMON block would have to be changed
separately. Not only would this take more work but there would be the chance that
the modifications would not be identical (which is required). All files used with the
INCLUDE statement were given the filetype 'DEF. They are listed after the code
in APPENDIX D.
D. CREATING THE INPUT DATA FILE
As noted in the chapter on the sample scenario, creating the input data file
before TACOPS can run is demanding. There exists little documentation on the
inputs, their bounds and implications, their format and required position in the data
file.
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APPENDIX B contains a sample input data file that has been annotated to
help the user understand program input. The annotations focus on the format,
implications and required position of the input values in the context of the whole file.
Examples of different model options and the resulting required input needs are
shown. The annotations also identify the variable names the input values will be
associated with in the code.
E. RUNNING TACOPS WITH AND WITHOUT THE IADS
While TACOPS has been expanded to include an IADS, it is still possible to
run the model in its original modes. The original fire control logic modes were
selected by inputting a specific number for the third value in the first data line in the
input data file. Originally, only the values from 0-1 had any meaning. These were
expanded to have meaning for the values of 0-5. Only one IADS mode (a value of
5) was developed so the IADS model could be exercised. Developing better target
allocation algorithms will expand these choices further. This following list is the value
and the resulting fire control logic that TACOPS will use.
1. = Free-fire doctrine, non-IADS mode; if more that one target is engageable
by the same site, select the one with the highest Ps and then the shortest SAM
flight time.
2. 1 = Maximum of one SAM unit engaging one attacker at a time (one-on-
one), non-IADS mode; if more that one target is engageable by the same site,
select the one with the highest Ps and then the shortest SAM flight time.
3. 2 = Maximum of two SAM units engaging one attacker at a time, non-IADS
mode; if more that one target is engageable by the same site, select the one
with the highest Ps and then the shortest SAM flight time.
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4. 3 = Similar to the free-fire doctrine (non-IADS mode), but if more that one
target is engageable by the same site, selection is not made using the highest
Ps or the shortest SAM flight time. The first attacker found to be engageable
while going through the loops checking all attackers will be selected.
5. 4 = Similar to the one-on-one doctrine, but if more that one target is
engageable by the same site, selection is not made using the highest Ps or the
shortest SAM flight time. The first attacker found to be engageable while
going through the loops checking all attackers will be selected.
6. 5 = Identical to value (free-fire) but using IADS mode.
When an IADS mode simulation is desired, the input data file will contain all
the originally needed data plus the IADS data. The user can run the same data file
with all the different fire control logic options just by changing the previously
described fire control logic input value. Thus with an IADS data file, non-IADS
modes still work. The reverse situation is obviously not allowed as the IADS data
would not be specified.
F. DEBUG OPTIONS
The original TACOPS has print statements imbedded into the code and are
selected by a user input value when TACOPS first starts running. The times of
significant events and results of important computations are printed to a file for
future study. This is called the 'DEBUG' level. The higher the number, the higher
the level of detail. The subroutines developed for the IADS model continued this
procedure. The user is cautioned about selecting the 'DEBUG' level. A level of 1 will
give the most significant events of the simulation. A level of 2 will show some of the
IADS message traffic and some TACOPS intermediate calculations. This will also
79
easily be 10 times the size of output from level 1. A level of 3 gives output for all the
imbedded printout statements and may fill up the users disk space before the
simulation is done.
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VIII. MOEs OF THE IADS
This model may be run by simulating different combinations of weapons and
tactics to explore the different results of the systems and tactics. The conclusions
reached when comparing these combinations against each other will be greatly
influenced by the choice of MOEs. A variety of MOEs are described in this chapter
which are indicators of the effectiveness of LADS with selected systems and tactics
against a threat. The MOEs explored are: 1) attrition against the attackers; 2)
attrition of the IADS-defended units; and 3) indicators which show the degradation
of the IADS functions. Some subtle implications of these MOEs are also described.
A. ATTRITION AGAINST THE ATTACKERS
1. Maximum Total Damage to the Attackers
The TACOPS model computes the expected number of attackers that
survive at the conclusion of the simulation. The total attrition of the attackers is
computed by subtracting the number of attackers that survive from the initial number
of attackers. The total attrition against the attackers relates the effectiveness of the
IADS model and can be used as an MOE. Since the IADS' purpose is to defend its
units, it would do this by inflicting the maximum damage (attrition) on the attackers.
With this attained, it could be supposed that the attackers effectiveness would be at
a minimum. Thus any damage inflicted by the attackers on its targets would assumed
to be at a minimum.
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When the importance value of each IADS unit is the same and the threat
from each attackers is also the same, maximizing the total damage to all attackers
might be a good approach to minimizing the damage to the IADS and a good MOE.
If each targets' value or attackers' threat is not the same, this approach might allow
unacceptable damage to occur to specific high value targets while minimizing the
total damage to all targets. To correct this situation, the value of the target should
be included in the MOE.
B. ATTRITION OF THE IADS-DEFENDED TARGETS
The model computes the expected number of IADS-defended targets remaining.
Similarly to the computation of the attackers attrition, this number is used to
compute the total attrition of the attackers targets. This total attrition could be an
MOE that indicates the attackers effectiveness in damaging its targets. Similarly to
the case of the attackers attrition, when all targets are of equal value the sum of the
attrition of these targets may a valid MOE. When the values are not equal, the sum
may have to be weighted to account for the difference in value. Another MOE might
be to focus on the attrition to the high value target alone.
C. INTERRUPTION OF IADS RELATED FUNCTIONS
Reducing the effectiveness of the IADS may be the objective when running this
model. There would a variety of MOEs which would be legitimate indicators. A
couple of them are presented.
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1. Number of SAMs launched
A final output of the model is the total number of missiles each SAM site
has remaining available to launch after the simulation has ended. This indicates a
residual fighting capability that was not used during the simulation. A large number
of remaining missiles would indicate that the IADS was not functioning as well as it
could, especially if this correlated with a reduction in the total attrition to the
attackers.
The implications of this MOE could be dominated by effects in the model.
If the same number of SAMs were used but the allocation of them was different, the
new attrition might show a significant difference (which could be higher or lower
attrition). Drawing the correct conclusions from this situation would be complex. It
must be remembered that the allocation algorithm can have a major influence on the
total attrition of attackers; thus the residual fighting capability alone is not a strong
MOE.
2. Delay in Transferring Messages
The timely transfer of messages is crucial to the functioning of the IADS.
Damaging the IADS elements will result in extra delay. As shown in the sample
scenario, with sufficient damage, the IADS will not function effectively. Destroying
parts of the IADS will cause the messages to arrive by alternative paths. These paths
will usually involve more delay than the primary path. Although not a present output
of the model, the user could modify the code to output the delays.
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It is not appropriate to use this MOE alone. To be useful, this MOE must
be correlated with one measuring attrition. Until the increased delays start to
influence the engagement opportunities of the SAM units, the model will not show
any change in attrition values. Beyond a certain delay, no more engagements are
possible and any further delays will not be apparent. The results will typically look
for delays which have significant impact on attrition. Correlation of the delays and
attrition will identify the influential delays.
D. CONCLUSION
Simulations are used to produce the data in order to answer specific questions.
This model can produce a large variety of information relating to the intermediate
and final results of an IADS. The appropriate choice of MOEs will help to answer
the original questions. The inappropriate choice of MOEs will, at best, confuse the




Documentation of the TACOPS program was virtually nonexistent. This thesis
presents an overview of the program, a description of the type of model used in the
simulation and a detailed description of the detection, engagement and fire control
processes modeled in TACOPS. The assumptions and deficiencies in these areas
were highlighted.
B. THE INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM
Integrated air defense systems exist throughout the world. They are diverse in
function and capability. The overall functions and structure of an IADS and the
individual components were presented. Ways of degrading the performance of the
IADS were also presented. Time delay in information transfer was consistent with
the modeling assumptions of TACOPS and used as the appropriate measure of IADS
performance. Its effect on the IADS performance and some methods to influence it
were described.
C. IADS ALGORITHMS
The major functions of an IADS were written as computer algorithms and
incorporated into TACOPS. These include EW detection of the attackers, message
generation and transfer, data fusion nodes for message traffic control and decision
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nodes where the data in collected and acted upon. These IADS elements may be
damaged by the attackers and the IADS functions degraded.
The expanded TACOPS model can be run in its original mode or with the
IADS functions selected. Documentation of the IADS algorithms is provided in the
form of; 1) an operating description; 2) a sample scenario; 3) a sample input data
file; 4) a sample output data file; 5) a complete code listing.
Some IADS functions were not modeled. One of them was the effects of
jamming the EW sites. TACOPS models the effects of jamming of the SAM sites.
Since the modeling of EW and SAM sites is essentially identical, the jamming
subroutine in TACOPS could be easily adapted to simulate the effects of EW
jamming. It is left for a future user to expand this area.
Target allocation was another IADS functions not modeled. Optimization in
this area would be a thesis subject unto itself. Once developed, its algorithms could
be incorporated with the ones presented here.
D. SUMMARY
The inclusion of these IADS algorithms has improved the realism of TACOPS.
In addition, TACOPS can now be used to evaluate tactics against the IADS elements
themselves.
The author has presented much about the functions, components and structure
of an IADS. The benefits of a directed graph approach to simulate information
transfer have been reinforced.
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The advantages of using the appropriate model and programming language for
a simulation have also been reinforced. TACOPS is a hybrid of a discrete event and
time step model written in the FORTRAN77 programming language. A considerable
amount of work was needed to develop the model. As the model was written,
modifications in one area required modifications in many other areas of the model.
Expanding the model further is expected to take a good deal of effort. A purely
discrete event step model and an object orientated programming language would
have required less effort develop and should be easier to expand.
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APPENDIX A
A Form for Evaluating
Each IADS Directed Graph Connections
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BLANK FORM
IADS Type to be Studied:
What is the required response from this type when it:
Receives a Message from EW Site:






Receives a Message from an EW Reporting Station:






Receives a Message from the ADWOC:
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Receives a Message from a Battalion Center:






Receives a Message from a SAM site:








EXAMPLE OF FORM FILLED IN
IADS Type to be Studied: EW Reporting Station
What is the required response from this type when it:
Receives a Message from EW Site:
(This type normally passes messages along and makes copies for the multiple
connections. If the ADWOC is dead and an EW site sends a message, this type will
generate an 'alert' message)
Does it send a message to?:
EW Site: No connection.
EW Reporting Station: Pass copy to other Stations
ADWOC: Pass copy to ADWOC
Battalion Center: Send only if an 'alert'
SAM: Send only if an 'alert'
Receives a Message from an EW Reporting Station:
Messages from another EW Reporting Station will be routed depending upon
their source and final destination. If the message is from an EW site, its final
destination will be the ADWOC. If the message is from the ADWOC, its final
destination will be an EW site. If the message is an 'alert', copies are passed to this
Stations Battalion Centers and SAM units.
Does it send a message to:
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EW Site: Send only if this is the final destination
EW Reporting Station: Send copy of message
ADWOC: Send only if this is the final destination
Battalion Center: Send only if an 'alert'
SAM: Send only if an 'alert'
Receives a Message from the ADWOC:
A message from the ADWOC will be directed to the EW sites. Pass messages
based upon the final destination (specific EW site #). Pass a copy to other EW
Reporting Stations.
Does it send a message to:
EW Site: Send only if this is the final destination
EW Reporting Station: Send copy of message
ADWOC: Do not send copy of message
Battalion Center: Do not send copy of message
SAM: Do not send copy of message
Receives a Message from a Battalion Center:
The sample scenario assumes that there are no messages from any Battalion
Centers to any EW Reporting Stations.
Does it send a message to:
EW Site: No connection
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EW Reporting Station: No connection
ADWOC: No connection
Battalion Center: No connection
SAM: No connection
Receives a Message from a SAM site:
The sample scenario assumes that there are no messages from any SAM units
to any EW Reporting Stations.
Does it send a message to:
EW Site: No connection
EW Reporting Station: No connection
ADWOC: No connection
Battalion Center: No connection
SAM: No connection
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The resulting IADS connection paths are represented in the following figures. The
paths are separated into messages coming from and going to the EW Reporting
Station. Station # 1 is used in this example.
Figure 12 - Incoming Message Paths
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.7/17/91..BRYAN F. SMITH WEAPON PLANNING GROUP, CODE 304
NAVAL WEAPONS CENTER, CHINA LAKE, CA 93555
UNCLASSIFIED
INCLUDES UP TO MOD 11
THIS IS A DOCUMENTATION OF THE STANDARD TACOPS DATAFILE
TEXT PRECEEDED WITH A ARE COMMENTS ABOUT THE DATA. THOSE LINES
WTTHOUTA ARE THE ACTUAL DATA.
THIS DOCUMENTATION COVERS THE FOLLOWING MODS:
1) NTARGETS ADDED TO HAVE ATTRITION ON NON-SAM TYPE TARGETS
2) NPENTYPE,PENTYPE,MDEST(I,2) ADDED FOR MORE THAN ONE TYPE
OF STANDOFF WEAPON (i.e. SLAM/ATWS/WALLEYE) TO BE USED.
PENTARPK(*) ALLOWS EACH PENETRATOR TYPE TO HAVE A UNIQUE
PK AGAINST THE DIFFERENT SAM TYPES AND THE NON-SAM TARGETS
3) ZS(J) ADDED FOR EACH SAM TO HAVE ITS OWN ALTITUDE.
4) THE VARIABLE PKM WAS CHANGED TO THE ARRAY PKM(9) TO ALLOW
THE ARM TO HAVE A UNIQUE PK AGAINST EACH OF THE 9 SAM TYPES.
5) BOM(I),BOMPT(I),BOMTGT(I,l),BOMTGT(I,2),LAUNCH(I),LNCHPT(I),
LNCHWPN(I) ADDED TO ALLOW A/C TO DROP BOMBS AND LAUNCH
PENETRATORS IF THEY SURVIVE TO THE RELEASE POINT.
6) CHANGED NUMSHT(9) TO NUMSHT(JM) AND ADDED THIS AND PS(J) TO
THE SITE DATA TO HAVE EACH SITE WITH A DEFINED STARTING PS
AND NUMBER OF AVAILABLE SALVOS.
7) CORRECTION TO PARM FLIGHT PATH COMPUTATIONS; SUB FUTLOK
REPLACES SUB LOCKON - WILL NOT ALLOW SITES TO FIRE IF, AT
INTERCEPT, THE FUZE ANGLE WILL BE BAD; EXPANDED DOCUMENTING
OUTPUT DATA FOR ZTR PROGRAM IN THE AREAS OF SAM SITE
RADIATING STATUS AND ARM FUNCTIONS; EXPANDED MODEL TO ALLOW
AIRCRAFT TO LAUNCH AND CONTROL MULTIPLE TYPE 1 AND TYPE 2
STANDOFF WEAPONS; DEFINED TYPE 1 STANDOFF WEAPON TO BE A
FIRE AND FORGET TYPE, AND A NEW TYPE 2 STANDOFF WEAPON THAT
REQUIRES POST-LAUNCH CONTROL OR DESIGNATION;EXPANDED CODE TO
ALLOW EACH A/C TO HAVE UP TO 4 BOMB DROP POINTS, LAUNCH UP TO
4 TYPE 1 AND/OR TYPE 2 WEAPONS, AND CONTROL UP TO 4 TYPE 2
WEAPONS
8) CORRECTED CODE IN SHOT SUBROUTINES TO NOT ALLOW SITES TO
FIRE AND INTERCEPT PENETRATORS THAT ARE OUT OF ENVELOPE OR
ARE TERRAIN MASKED; ADDED TO INPUT DATAFILE VALUES FOR THE
MAXIMUM WAIT TIME BEFORE THE SITE LOSES THE TRACK FOR TERRAIN
MASKING AND THE OUT OF ENVELOPE CONDITION WHILE A SAM IS
ENROUTE
9) ALLOWS 1-1 AND FREE-FIRE SAM FIRING DOCTRINE. IOP(3) = SPECIFIES
FREE-FIRE (PREVIOUS MODE), IOP(3) = l SELECTS FIRING DOCTRINE THAT
WILL ONLY ALLOW A MAXIMUM OF ONE SAM TO ENGAGE A TARGET.
100
ALSO IF IOP(4) = 1, THIS MAKES A LAUNCH AIRCRAFT NOT LAUNCH ITS
POST-LAUNCH CONTROLLED TYPE WEAPON IF THE ASSOCIATED CONTROLLING
AIRCRFT HAS ALREADY BEEN DESTROYED AT TIME OF LAUNCH. IF IOP(4) =
THE WEAPON IS LAUNCHED REGARDLESS OF THE STATE OF THE CONTROLLING
AIRCRAFT (THE PREVIOUS MODE) AND THE PK OF THE WEAPON AGAINST THE
TARGET IS 0.0 IF THE CONTROLLING AIRCRAFT HAS BEEN DESTROYED. THIS
INPUT DATAFILE IS COMPATIBLE WITH THE PREVIOUS MODE(8).
10) ALLOWS SAM SITES TO BE GROUPED TOGETHER TO SIMULATE A MULTI-
TARGETTING SAM SYSTEM. DATAFILE NOT COMPATIBLE WITH PREVIOUS MODES.
11) ALLOWS IADS TO BE MODELED. NOT COMPATIBLE WITH PREVIOUS MODES.
TITLE
THE FIRST LINE IS THE TITLE AND CAN BE 70 CHARACTERS LONG.
IT SHOULD CONTAIN THE DATE AND A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE RUN SO
AS TO HELP THE PROGRAMMER UNDERSTAND ITS UNIQUE ATTRIBUTES.
2/1/88 MOD 8 FORMAT UNCLASSIFIED DATA VALUESe
IOP(*) ARRAY DETERMINES THE DOCTRINE THE SAM SITES WILL RADIATE WITH
AND WHICH MODELING (EXPECTED VALUE OR STOCHASTIC) WILL BE USED
IOP(1) = - ATTRITION MODELLING: EACH TIME AN A/C IS INTERCEPTED BY A
- SAM SALVO, THE NEW A/C PS = OLD PS - PK(SALVO)*PS(SITE).
- WHEN THE A/C PS GETS BELOW THE MIN PS THRESHOLD, THE A/C
- IS 'KILLED' AND REMOVED FROM THE SIMULATION.
IOP(l) = l - STOCHASTIC MODELING: EACH TIME AN A/C IS INTERCEPTED BY A
- SAM SALVO, THE A/C PS = 1/0 DEPENDING UPON A RANDOM # DRAWN.
- IF A/C PS = 0, A/C IS 'KILLED' AND REMOVED FROM THE SIMULATION
IOP(2) = - REGULAR SITE RF EMMISION DOCTRINE
IOP(2) = l - PERFECT(ONLY AFTER LAUNCH) SITE RF EMMISION DOCTRINE
IOP(3) = - FREE-FIRE (REGULAR) SITE LAUNCH DOCTRINE
IOP(3) = l - MAX OF 1-1 SITE FIRING DOCTRINE
IOP(3) = 2 - MAX OF 2-1 SITE FIRING DOCTRINE
IOP(3) = 3 - FREE-FIRE DOCTRINE W/O MAX PS AND MIN TF SELECTION TESTS
IOP(3) = 4 - MAX OF 1-1 DOCTRINE W/O MAX PS AND MIN TF SELECTION TESTS
IOP(4) = - REGULAR AIRCRAFT DOCTRINE FOR LAUNCHING TYPE 2 WEAPONS
- I.E. DO NOT CONSIDER IF CONTROLLING AIRCRAFT IS DEAD
IOP(4) = l - NEW AIRCRAFT DOCTRINE FOR LAUNCHING TYPE 2 WEAPONS
- I.E. DO NOT LAUNCH WEAPON IF CONTROLLING AIRCRAFT IS DEAD
IOP(10) - # OF TIMES TO RUN THE DATA
IOP(3) = (0,1,2,3,4) NON-IADS MODE




NAC - MAX # OF AIRCRAFT(PENETRATORS) USED FOR THIS DATAFILE.
- VALUE OF PARAMETER IM IN FORTRAN CODE SETS THE UPPER LIMIT.
- PRESENTLY SET TO 30
NSITE - MAX # OF SAM AND EW SITES IN THE DATAFILE.
- VALUE OF PARAMETER JM IN FORTRAN CODE SETS THE UPPER LIMIT.
- PRESENTLY SET TO 60
PSAMIN - MINIMUM SURVIVAL PROBABILrTY FOR THE AIRCRAFT BEFORE THE
- PENETRATOR IS DESTROYED AND THUS TAKEN OUT OF THE GAME.
NPENTYPE - # INDICATING THE HIGHEST STANDOFF WEAPON TYPE USED
NTARGETS - MAX # OF NON-SAM AND IADS TARGETS ASSUMED FOR THIS RUN
4,3,0.4,2,0
MAXMS - MAX # OF MULTI-TARGETTING SAM GROUPS IN DATAFILE
- IF = 0, NEXT DATA IS SAM SITE LOCATION AND WEAPON PARAMETERS
- IF = 1, READ IN J = 1,MAXMS MSID(J,1) AND MSID(J,2)
- J = 15 PRESENT MAXIMUM
MSID(J,1) - LOWER SAM I.D. # WHICH IDENTIFIES THE START OF THE GROUP
MSID(J,2) - UPPER SAM I.D. # WHICH IDENTIFIES THE END OF THE GROUP
XS(J),YS(J),ZS(J),VM(J),GDT(J),PPK(J),MSITE(J),THETJ(J),CKONl(J),
GTFUS(J),PS(J),NUMSHT(J)
IF IN A NON-IADS MODE, (I.E. IOP(3) = (0,1,2,3,4))
EACH LINE HOLD THE ABOVE DATA FOR ONE SAM SITE. THE FIRST LINE IS FOR
SAM SITE #1, THE SECOND LINE WILL BE FOR SITE #2,ETC...(J = 1-LAST SITE)
IF IN A IADS MODE, (I.E.IOP(3) = (5,...))
EACH LINE HOLD THE ABOVE DATA FOR ONE SAM SITE AS DEFINED FOR THE NON-
IADS MODE. BUT SOME OF THE SAM SITES WILL BE REDESIGNATED AS EW STTES
LATER ON IN THE DATA FILE. NOT ALL SAM SITE DATA WILL APPLY TO THE EW
STTES BUT MUST BE PRESENT IN THE PROPER FORMAT TO BE READIN CORRECTLY.
XS(J) - X POSITION OF SAM SITE J IN NMI FROM SELECTED REFERENCE POINT
YS(J) - Y POSITION OF SAM SITE J IN NMI FROM SELECTED REFERENCE POINT
ZS(J) - Z POSITION OF SAM SITE J IN NMI FROM SELECTED REFERENCE POINT
VM(J) - AVERAGE SAM MISSILE VELOCITY IN NMI/SEC
GDT(J) - KILL ASSES DELAY TIME (IN SECONDS) FOR THIS SAM SrTE
PPK(J) - PK OF SAM SALVO
MSrTE(J) - TYPE (DATA BLOCK #1-9) OF SAM SYSTEM AT THIS LOCATION
- ALSO USED TO READ IN LAUNCH BOUNDRY DATA LATER ON
THET(J) - MASKED SITE ANGLE (IN RADIANS) DUE TO A JAMMING A/C
CKONl(J) - RADAR BURN-THROUGH RANGE VALUE
GTFUS(J) - MIN. INTERCEPT ANGLE (IN RADIANS) USED TO DETERMINE IF SAM
- SUCSESSFULLY ENGAGED TARGET
PS(J) - INITIAL SURVIVAL PROBABILITY OF THE SITE. USED IN MULTIPLE
RAIDS WHERE DAMAGE FROM THE PREVIOUS RAID MUST BE MAINTAINED.
NUMSHT(J) - THE TOTAL NUMBER OF SALVOS THAT THIS TYPE OF SAM CAN FIRE
- DURING THIS RUN. FOR SINGLE RAIDS, THIS WILL BE THE SITES
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- FULLY LOADED VALUE; FOR MULTIPLE RAIDS, THIS WILL BE WHAT
- THE SITE CAN HAVE TIME TO RELOAD TO.
-05.00, 5.00, 0.0, 0.3000, 1, 0.11, 1, 0.1, 1, 0.4000, 1.00, 6
-10.00, 10.00, 0.0, 0.3000, 5, 0.22, 2, 0.1, 1, 0.4000, 0.90, 4
-10.00, -1.00, 0.0, 0.3000, 9, 0.33, 3, 0.1, 1, 0.4000, 0.80, 2
DATA DESCRIBING THE AIRCRAFT AND STANDOFF WEAPON TYPE ARE NOW READ.
EACH BLOCK OF DATA DESCRIBE THE PENETRATOR. THE FIRST BLOCK
WILL BE FOR PENETRATOR #1, THE SECOND FOR PENETRATOR#2, UNTIL THE
LAST BLOCK (NAC) IS READ
PENTYPE(I) (20 CHARACTER COMMENT MAY BE ADDED AFTER THE DATA; NO
SPACES)
PENTYPE(I) - INTEGER VALUE WHICH INDICATES THE TYPE OF PENETRATOR THIS
- DATA BLOCK DESCRIBES:(0 = AIRCRAFT); (1 = FIRE AND FORGET)
- ;(2 = CONTROL OR DESIGNATION AFTER LAUNCH)
TYPE_l_WEAPON_FROM_AIRCRAFT_2
IF PENTYPE(I) = 0; THE PENETRATOR IS ASSUMED TO BE AN AIRCRAFT THAT CAN
DROP BOMBS AND/OR LAUNCH AND/OR CONTROL STANDOFF WEAPONS. IT IS
REQUIRED THAT THE AIRCRAFT PENETRATOR # BE LESS THAN THE WEAPON
PENETRATOR # IT LAUNCHES (i.e. A/C #3 CAN LAUNCH WEAPON # 12 BUT IT
SHOULD NOT LAUNCH WEAPON 1 OR 2). THE FOLLOWING DATA WILL DEFINE IF ANY
THESE ACTIVITIES WILL BE PERFORMED BY THIS AIRCRAFT.
BOM(I),LNCHl(I),LNCH2(I),CNTRL2(I)
THIS LINE DETERMINES THE ACTIVITY OF THE TYPE (AIRCRAFT) PENETRATOR
BOM(I) - TOTAL # OF BOMBS THIS A/C DROPS (MAX 4)
LNCHl(I) - TOTAL # OF TYPE 1 STANDOFF WEAPONS THIS A/C LAUNCHS (MAX 4)
LNCH2(I) - TOTAL # OF TYPE 2 STANDOFF WEAPONS THIS A/C LAUNCHS (MAX 4)




IF BOM(I) > = 1;THE AIRCRAFT WILL DROP GROUPS OF BOMBS. 3 MORE VALUES
ARE NEEDED FOR EACH GROUP OF BOMB DROPS UP TO N GROUPS.
BOMPT(I,N) - THE CHECKPOINT # WHERE BOMB GROUP N ARE TO BE RELEASED.
BOMTGT(I,l,N) - THE TARGET TYPE. 1 =SAM SrTE TYPE TARGET; 2 =NON-SAM SITE
- TYPE TARGET.
BOMTGT(I,2,N) - THE TARGET LOCATION #.
- IF BOMTGT(I,l) = l; THE VALUE IS THE SAM SITE # (1-NSrTE)
- IF BOMTGT(I,l) = 2; THE VALUE IS THE NON-SAM SITE TYPE






IF LNCH1(I,N)> =1 THEN LINES CONTAINING TWO VALUES EACH MUST FOLLOW
WHICH DESCRIBE THE LAUNCH OF EACH TYPE 1 (FIRE AND
FORGET) STANDOFF WEAPON DESIGNATED UP TO N LINES
L1CKPT(I,N) - THE CHECKPOINT # OF THE LAUNCH A/C WHERE THE WEAPON
- IS TO BE LAUNCHED.
L1WPN(I,N) - THE WEAPON PENETRATOR # TO BE LAUNCHED FROM THIS A/C.
2,3
L2CKPT(I,N),L2WPN(I,N)
IF LNCH2(I,N) > = 1 THEN LINES CONTAINING TWO VALUES EACH MUST FOLLOW
WHICH DESCRIBE THE LAUNCH OF EACH TYPE 2 (LAUNCH AND
CONTROL) STANDOFF WEAPON UP TO N LINES
L2CKPT(I,N) - THE CHECKPOINT # OF THE LAUNCH A/C WHERE THE WEAPON
- IS TO BE RELEASED.




IF CNTRL2(I,N)> =1 THEN LINES CONTAINING THREE MORE VALUES MUST FOLLOW
WHICH DESCRIBE THE ACTIVITY OF THE CONTROL AIRCRAFT
UP TO N LINES.
C2START(I,N) - THE CHECKPOINT # OF THE CONTROL A/C WHERE CONTROL OF THE
- TYPE 2 WEAPON WILL START
C2END(I,N) - THE CHECKPOINT # OF THE CONTROL A/C WHERE CONTROL OF THE
- TYPE 2 WEAPON WILL END
C2WPN(I,N) - THE WEAPON PENETRATOR # TO BE CONTROLLED FROM THIS A/C.
C2TIME(I,N) - THE MAXIMUM TIME (IN SECONDS) BEFORE IMPACT OF THE WEAPON
- # N WHEN CONTROL OF THE WEAPON CAN BE LOST (i.e. THE




IF PENTYPE(I) = 1 OR =2; DATA ON THE TARGET FOR THIS WEAPON IS NEEDED.
MDEST(I,1) - AN INTEGER VALUE WHICH INDICATED THE TYPE OF TARGET THAT
- THIS PENETRATOR IS PROGRAMMED TO HIT. 1 =SAM SITE TYPE
- TARGET;2 =NON-SAM SITE TYPE TARGET.
MDEST(I,2) - AN INTEGER VALUE WHICH HOLD DATA ON THE TARGET.
- IF MDEST(I,1) = 1; THE VALUE IS THE SAM SITE # (1-NSITE)
- IF MDEST(I,1) = 2; THE VALUE IS THE NON-SAM SITE TYPE
- TARGET # (1-NTARGETS)
1,3
NCKPT(I),T(I,1)
IF PENTYPE = 0, THEN THE MAX # OF CHECKPOINTS AND THE START TIME
MUST NOW BE INPUT.
IF PENTYPE(I) > 0, ONLY THE MAX # OF CHECKPOINTS NEEDS TO BE
INPUTTED. THE PROGRAM WILL CALCULATE THE START TIME
OF THE STANDOFF WEAPON.
NCKPT(I) - THE TOTAL # OF LINES OF DATA (TO FOLLOW THIS LINE) WHICH
- DESCRIBE THE FLIGHTPATH OF THE PENETRATOR. THIS IS USED BY
- THE DATA READING PROGRAM TO DETERMINE HOW MANY LINES TO READ
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- FOR EACH PENETRATOR. THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF CHECKPOINTS IS
- SET IN THE FORTRAN CODE BY THE PARAMETER KM AND IS PRESENTLY
- EQUAL TO 15.
T(I,1) - THE TIME IN SECONDS WHEN THE Ith PENETRATOR COMES INTO THE
- SIMULATION. BEFORE THIS TIME, THIS PENETRATOR DOES NOT EXIST.
3,0
X(I,K),Y(I,K),Z(I,K),V(I,K)
THESE LINES OF THE DATA BLOCK HOLD THE A/C CHECKPOINT FLIGHTPATH DATA
X(I,K) - X POSITION IN NMI OF A/C FOR CHECKPOINT # K
Y(I,K) - Y POSITION IN NMI OF A/C FOR CHECKPOINT # K
Z(I,K) - Z POSITION IN NMI OF A/C FOR CHECKPOINT # K
V(I,K) - A/C VELOCITY BETWEEN THIS AND THE NEXT CHECHPOINT IN NMI/SEC
-35.0, 0.0, 0.500, 0.100
-10.0, 10.0, 0.100, 0.100
-40.0, 9.0, 0.500,0.100









-27.5, -5.0, 0.100, 0.200
-35.0,-5.0, 0.100,0.200









-15.00, 0.00, 0.200, 0.20
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-12.50, -0.50, 0.100, 0.05
-10.00, -1.00, 0.000, 0.10
PENTARPK(II,1,L),L= 1,9
IF ANY STANDOFF WEAPONS ARE BEING USED IN THIS RUN (i.e. NPENTYPE>0),
THE PK OF THESE WEAPONS AGAINST 9 SAM TYPES MUST NOW BE LISTED.
0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5,0.6,0.7,0.8,0.9 TYPE 1 PK FOR SAM TYPES
PENTARPK(II,2,L),L= 1,NTARGETS
IF NON-SAM TARGETS ARE ASSUMED (i.e. NTARGETS>0), ANOTHER LINE MUST
NOW LIST THE PK FOR THE FIRST STANDOFF WEAPON AGAINST THESE TARGETS.
THE NUMBER OF PK VALUES MUST EQUAL THAT NUMBER (NTARGETS) OF TARGETS.
IF NPENTYPE'S VALUE (# OF STANDOFF WEAPON TYPES) IS GREATER THAN 1,
ANOTHER TWO LINES MUST FOLLOW IN THE SAME FORMAT AS THE PREVIOUS TWO
WHICH HOLD THE PK VALUES FOR THE OTHER STANDOFF WEAPON TYPES AGAINST
THE TARGETS. IN THIS CASE, ONLY ONE MORE TYPE OF STANDOFF WEAPON IS
INDICATED (NPENTYPE = 2) SO ONLY TWO MORE DATA LINES ARE NEEDED.
0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5,0.6,0.7,0.8,0.9 TYPE 2 PK FOR SAM TYPES
BOMPK(l,L),L=l-9
IF ANY OF THE A/C ARE TO DROP BOMBS, THE PK OF THE BOMBS AGAINST THE
TARGETS MUST NOW BE INPUT. SIMILAR TO THE FORM ABOVE, THE FIRST LINE
IS FOR THE BOMBS AGAINST THE 9 SAM TYPES.
0.2,0.1,0.3,0.4,0.5,0.6,0.7,0.8,0.9 BOMB PK FOR SAM TYPES
BOMPK(2,L),L= 1-NTARGETS
IF ANY NON-SAM TYPE TARGETS ARE SPECIFIED FOR THIS RUN, THE BOMB PK
AGAINST THESE TARGETS MUST NOW BE LISTED EVEN IF THE BOMBS WILL ONLY
BE USED AGAINST THE SAM TYPE TARGETS.
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ISECT(I,J);I = 1,NAC:J = 1,NSITE
FOR EACH A/C, A LINE MUST EXIST WHICH INDICATES WHETHER EACH SAM SITE






DATA ON THE USE OF 'ARM' WEAPONS FOR THIS RUN
NHRMAC - TOTAL NUMBER OF ARM CARRYING A/C.
TMEM - TIME (IN SECONDS) DURING WHICH THE ARM WILL STILL HIT THE SAM
- SITE EVEN THOUGH THAT SITE HAS STOPPED RADIATING.
1,30
PKM(9)
PKM - PK OF ARM AGAINST THE 9 SAM SITE TYPES (i.e. MUST BE 9 #'S)
0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5,0.6,0.7,0.8,0.9 ARM PK FOR SAM TYPES
IDHAC,NUMD(IDHAC),NUMB(IDHAC),NUMR(IDHAC)
ARM FIRING TIMES
IF NHRMAC = THEN NO ARM A/C ARE ASSUMED AND NO ARM DATA IS NEEDED.
IF NHRMAC >0 THEN DATA ON THE FIRING TIMES OF THE ARMS IS PRESENTED.
IDHAC - PENETRATOR # FOR WHICH THE FOLLOWING ARM DATA APPLIES
NUMD(IDHAC) - # OF DIRECTIVE ARM MISSILES ON A/C IDHAC (AT PRESENT,
- THIS ARM MODE IS NOT USED AND MAY NOT BE A VALID MODE.)
NUMB(IDHAC) - # OF PREPROGRAMMED ARM MISSILES ON A/C IDHAC
NUMR(IDHAC) - # OF REACTIVE ARM MISSILES ON A/C IDHAC
1,0,3,0 ARM DATA
IF NUMD>0 THEN THE FOLLOWING DATA IS FOR THE DIRECTED ARM. IN THIS
EXAMPLE NUMD = SO NO DIRECTED ARMS WERE ASSUMED TO BE USED.
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DRMTG(IDHAC,JJ),TLDRM(IDHAC,JJ)
THE DATA DESCRIBES THE LAUNCH TIME AND THE SITE TYPE
THAT MISSILE HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO FLY TO
DRMTG(IDHAC,JJ) - LAUNCH TIME (IN SECONDS) FOR ARM #JJ OFF OF
- A/C #IDHAC
TLDRM(IDHAC,JJ) - SAM SITE LOCATION THAT ARM WILL FLY TO
IF NUMB>0 THEN THE FOLLOWING DATA IS FOR THE PREPROGRAMMED ARM. IN
THIS EXAMPLE NUMB = 8 SO 8 PREPROGRAMMED ARMS WERE ASSUMED TO BE USED.
TLB(IDHAC,JJ) - LAUNCH TIME (IN SECONDS) FOR ARM JJ OFF OF A/C IDHAC
PMPREF(IDHAC,JJ) - SAM SITE TYPE THAT ARM WILL FLY TO HIT IF IT IS
- RADIATING DURING THE TIME THE ARM IS SEARCHING.
- SEE DESCRIPTION OF MSITE(*) IN THE FIRST PART OF
- THIS REPORT FOR THE SAM TYPE AND ITS 'SA-' #.
IF NUMR>0 THEN THE FOLLOWING DATA IS FOR THE REACTIVE ARM. IN THIS
EXAMPLE NUMR = SO NO REACTIVE ARMS WERE ASSUMED TO BE USED. THE





START READING SAM SITE DATA
PSSMIN - MIN SURVIVAL PROBABILITY THAT THE SAM SITE MUST MAINTAIN
- TO STAY IN THE SIMULATION
0.50 MIN SAM SURVIVIAL PROBABILITY
LL,TRACK(J),MWAITIM(J),OWAITIM(J)
SAM SITE LAUNCH BOUNDRY VALUES
LL - TOTAL # OF LINES THAT FOLLOW WHICH CONTAIN DATA FOR THIS SAM TYPE
- THE PROGRAM USES TO DETERMINE HOW MANY LINES TO READ AFTER THIS
TRACK(J) - THE TIME (IN SECONDS) THAT THIS SAM SYSTEM TYPE WILL TAKE
- FROM THE START OF THE TRACKING FUNCTION BEFORE THE SYSTEM
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- WILL BE READY TO FIRE A SALVO AT THE TARGET.
MWAITIM(J) - MAXIMUM WAIT TIME (IN SECONDS) AFTER THE TARGET IS
- TERRAIN MASKED BEFORE THIS SITE TYPE LOSES TRACK AND
- THE OUTBOUND SAM IS LOST
OWAITIM(J) - MAXIMUM WAIT TIME (IN SECONDS) AFTER THE TARGET IS
- OUTSIDE OF THE SITE LAUNCH ENVELOPE BEFORE THIS SITE
- TYPE LOSES TRACK AND THE OUTBOUND SAM IS LOST
6,10,5,10 SAM TYPE 1
LDUMMY,ESITE1(J,L),ESITE2(J,L)
THIS IS THE RANGE AND ALTITUDE DATA PAIRS THAT OUTLINE THE LAUNCH
BOUNDRY FOR THIS TYPE OR SAM SYSTEM
LDUMMY - A DUMMY VARIABLE TO READ IN THE LINE NUMBER (1-6)
ESITE1(J,L) - RANGE IN NMI OF LAUNCH BOUNDRY DATA PAIR







THE SAM SYSTEM DATA BLOCKS WILL LOOK LIKE THESE BLOCKS BELOW. SINCE
THERE ARE 9 SAM TYPES, THERE MUST BE A TOTAL OF 9 DATA BLOCKS.


























































START OF REACTIVE ARM FOOTPRINT DATA
FEND(L,1) - MIN RANGE BOUNDRY (IN NMI) FOR REACTIVE ARM FOR A SPECIFIC
- RANGE AND LAUNCH CONDITION. 7 VALUES REQUIRED ONE FOR EACH
- 15 DEGREES FROM 90 DEGREES TO THE LAUNCH AXIS TO ON AXIS.
4.00,4.50,5.00,7.00,7.50,8-00,8.50
SSEND(L,1);L=1,7
SSEND(L,1) - MAX RANGE BOUNDRY (IN NMI) FOR REACTIVE ARM FOR A SPECIFIC
- RANGE AND LAUNCH CONDITION. 7 VALUES REQUIRED ONE FOR EACH
- 15 DEGREES FROM 90 DEGREES TO THE LAUNCH AXIS TO ON AXIS.
19.60,19.70,20.90,22.20,24.80,28.60,33.00
KK - NUMBER OF LINES OF DATA TO READ THAT FOLLOW. DATA REPRESENTS EVERY
- TEN SECONDS OF TIME FOR REACTIVE ARM RANGE DATA SETS
FTPRTA(K,L);L=1,7







START OF ARM TRAJECTORY DATA
ANGM - HALF ANGLE (IN DEGREES) OF ARM SEEKER FOV
ALTMN - MIN. ALTITUDE (IN NMI) THAT ARM HAS TO BE BELOW BEFORE






THREE PARAMETERS (TIME, RANGE AND ALTITUDE) MATCH UP TO MAKE A DATA
SET WHICH DEFINES THE ARM TRAJECTORY;10 DATA POINTS EXIST ON THREE
LINES. EACH LINE CONTAINS ALL THE DATA FOR ONE PARAMETER.
TARM(L) - TIME (IN SECONDS) FROM LAUNCH OF ARM
ALTARM(L) - ALTITUDE (IN NMI) OF ARM AT GIVEN TIME FROM LAUNCH
RNGARM(L) - DOWNRANGE (IN NMI) OF ARM AT GIVEN TIME FROM LAUNCH
0, 80, 90, 110, 130, 150, 170, 190, 210, 230
12.00, 11.00, 10.00, 9.00, 8.00, 7.00, 6.00, 5.00, 4.00, 0.0
0, 5.0, 10.0, 15.0, 20.0, 25.0, 30.0, 32.0, 34.0, 36.0
ORDR
BM(L)
DATA FOR THE DIRECTIVE ARM TRAJECTORY; Nth ORDER AND COEFFICIENTS
FOR THE CURVE INTERCEPT TIME = B0 + Bl*X + B2*X~2+... + BN*X~N
ORDR - NUMBER OF DATA VALUES TO READ IN MINUS ONE




SAM SITE TERRAIN MASKING DATA PAIRS; USED BY PROGRAM TO TERRAIN MASKING
ONE LINE REQUIRED FOR EACH SAM SITE
HT(J) - HEIGHT OF OBSTRUCTING TERRAIN (IN NMI) AT DIST(J) FOR SITE J
DIST(J) - RANGE (IN NMI) FROM SITE LOCATION WHERE OBSTRUCTING TERRAIN
- IS LOCATED




PENETRATOR DATA RELATING TO RADAR CROSS-SECTION USED TO DETERMINE IF
PENETRATOR IS DETECTABLE TO THE SAM SITES.
ONE LINE NEEDED FOR EACH PENETRATOR. FIRST LINE IS FOR A/C #1, ETC...
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CS(I) - ?????
SIG(I) - RADAR CROSS-SECTION (IN SQUARE METERS) OF PENETRATOR




NEWSITES - # OF EW SITES THAT ARE PART OF THE SAM DATA BLOCK. MAX = 9
EWID(9) - ID # OF SAM SITES THAT WILL BE EW SITES
IF NEWSITES = AND IOP(3) < = 3 THEN NO MORE DATA WILL BE READ IN SO THE
DATA FILE CAN END AFTER THE SINGLE ZERO. THIS IS THE CASE FOR NO IADS AND
NO EW SITES.
IF NEWSITES > 0, MORE DATA IS NEEDED. IF A NON-IADS MODE IS SELECTED
THEN THE VALUE OF NEWSITES MORE DATA IS NEEDED. IF AN IADS MODED IS
SELECTED, MUCH MORE DATA IN NEEDED. WHEN NEWSITES > 0, THE FOLLOWING
NUMBERS ARE READIN TO EWID(*) AND INDICATE THE ID NUMBER IDENTFYING






DATA WHICH DEFINES THE DELAY THE EW SITES WILL HAVE BEFORE SENDING
MESSAGES TO THE ADWOC CENTER AND EW REPORTING STATION ON DETECTIONS
EWPROCDLY(JJ) - NORMAL PROCESSING DELAY TIME (SECONDS) FOR THIS EW SITE
EWDAMDLY(JJ) - MAX. DELAY TIME (SECONDS) DUE TO MAX (PS = 0.0) DAMAGE
EWDAMRAT(JJ) - DAMAGE DELAY SCALE FACTOR USED IN EQUATION COMPUTING
- THE EXTRA DELAY DUE TO DAMAGE
10.0,100.0,1.0
EWPSMIN





NEXT IS BLOCK OF DATA ASSOCIATED WITH THE EW REPORTING STATIONS.
THE FIRST IS THE TOTAL NUMBER OF STATIONS IN THIS SIMULATION, THE NEXT
LINE DEFINES THE MESSAGE DELAY PARAMETERS, THE FINAL LINE IS THE MIN. PS
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FOR THE REPORTING STATIONS
NUMRPT - MAX NUMBER OF EW REPORTING STATIONS IN THIS SIMULATION.







THE NEXT BLOCK RELATES TO THE ADWOC CENTER
ADWPROCDLY - NORMAL PROCESSING DELAY FROM DETECTION OF PENETRATOR
- UNTIL ADWOC CENTER READY TO SEND MESSAGE (SECONDS)
ADWDAMDLY - MAX. EXTRA DELAY UNTIL ADWOC CENTER READY TO SEND
- MESSAGE DUE TO SITE BEING DAMAGED
ADWDAMRAT - SCALE FACTOR USED WITH ADWDAMDLY(9) TO COMPUTE DELAY
- DUE TO SITE DAMAGE
MINADWOCPS - MINIMUM SURVIVAL PROBABILITY FOR ADWOC TO SAY IN SIM.






NEXT IS BLOCK OF DATA ASSOCIATED WITH THE BATTALION CENTERS.
THE FIRST IS THE TOTAL NUMBER OF CENTERS IN THIS SIMULATION, THE NEXT
LINE DEFINES THE MESSAGE DELAY PARAMETERS, THE FINAL LINE IS THE MIN. PS





THE FINAL BLOCK OF A SIMILAR NATURE IS FOR THE SAM SITES
SAMPROCDLY,SAMDAMDLY,SAMDAMRAT
10.0,100.0,1.0 SAMPROCDLY,SAMDAMDLY,SAMDAMRAT
THE NEXT BLOCK DEFINES THE IADS INTERCONNECTION. EACH IADS TYPE AND
UNIT NUMBER IS SPECIFIED AND THE CONNECTION TO ANOTHER IADS TYPE AND
UNIT NUMBER IS LISTED. THIS DEFINES THE POSSIBLE SENDING PATH FOR
MESSAGES.
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NUMCON - # OF CONNECTIONS TO BE READIN IN IADS STRUCTURE DATA FILE
CONNECT(MAXCON,4) - HOLDS IADS CONNECTION STRUCTURE. INDICATES WHERE
EACH IADS NODE CAN SEND A MESSAGE TO. FIRST PAIR OF #'S IDENTIFY SENDER
AND SECOND PAIR IDENTIFY RECEIVER.
(*,1) - FROM TYPE # ;(*,2) - FROM UNIT #
(*,3) - TO TYPE # ;(*,4) - TO UNIT #
TYPE #1 - EW SITE; TYPE #2 - EW REPORTING STATION; TYPE #3 - ADWOC CENTER
TYPE #4 - BATTALION CENTER; TYPE #5 - SAM STTE, USE SAM ID # FOR UNIT #
38 NUMBER OF LINES TO FOLLOW DESCRIBING







































WHEN THE IADS ELEMENTS ARE TARGETTED IN THE SIMULATION, THEY ARE
CONSIDERED NON-SAM TYPE TARGETS. THE TOTAL NUMBER OF NON-SAM TARGETS,
NTARGETS, MUST REFLECT THIS CONDITIONAND THEFOLLOWING LINESAREADDED
TO GIVE THE SIMULATION DATA ON INDENTIFYING THE IADS TARGETS
FROM OTHER NON-IADS TARGETS.
NUMIADSTGTS - TOTAL NUMBER OF IADS UNITS THAT ARE NON-SAM TARGETS
- IN THIS INPUT DATAFILE
IDIADSTGT(MAXIADSTGTS,2) - FOR EACH NON-SAM TARGET NUMBER, THIS
- HOLDS THE IADS TYPE AND UNIT NUMBER, USED TO IDENTIFY
- WHAT THE NON-SAM TARGET IS. (*,1) - IADS TYPE #;
- (*,2) - IADS UNIT #
5 NUMIADSTGTS







The Input Data File for the
-25 Degree Appproach Angle
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TEST85 FLIGHTPATH SET 8; -25 DEGREE APPROACH; IADS; FREE-FIRE
0,0,5,0,0,0,0,0,0,1 ** LABEL A**
12,6,0.4,1,5
** LABEL H **
-18.00,-10.00, 0.0, 0.3000, 1, 0.10, 8, 0.1, 1, 0.4000, 1.00, 6 EW # 1
-18.00, 10.00, 0.0, 0.3000, 1, 0.10, 8, 0.1, 1, 0.4000, 1.00, 6 EW # 2
-6.00, -5.00, 0.0, 0.3000, 2, 0.10, 1, 0.1, 1, 0.4000, 1.00, 16
0.00, 0.00, 0.0, 0.3000, 2, 0.10, 1, 0.1, 1, 0.4000, 1.00, 16
-11.00, 0.00, 0.0, 0.3000, 2, 0.10, 1, 0.1, 1, 0.4000, 1.00, 16
-6.00, 5.00, 0.0, 0.3000, 2, 0.10, 1, 0.1, 1, 0.4000, 1.00, 16






-19.1, -8.2, 1.000, 0.125
-65.0, -8.2, 1.000, 0.125




-65.0, 10.2, 1.000, 0.125
-19.1, 10.2, 1.000, 0.125
-19.1, 12.2, 1.000, 0.125
-65.0, 12.2, 1.000, 0.125






-7.1, -3.2, 1.000, 0.125
-65.0, -3.2, 1.000, 0.125
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-1.1, 0.2, 1.000, 0.125
-1.1, 2.2, 1.000, 0.125
-65.0, 2.2, 1.000, 0.125





-12.1, 0.2, 1.000, 0.125
-12.1, 2.2, 1.000, 0.125
-65.0, 2.2, 1.000, 0.125





-7.1, 5.2, 1.000, 0.125
-7.1, 7.2, 1.000, 0.125
-65.0, 7.2, 1.000, 0.125





1 WEAPON #2 FROM A/C #2 TO HIT EW SITE #2
1,2
2
-19.10, 10.20, 1.000, 0.30
-18.00, 10.00, 0.000, 0.30
1 WEAPON #3 FROM A/C #3 TO HIT SAM SITE #3
1,3
2
-7.10, -5.20, 1.000, 0.30
120
-6.00, -5.00, 0.000, 0.30
1 WEAPON #4 FROM A/C #4 TO HIT SAM SITE #4
1,4
2
1.10, 0.20, 1.000, 0.30
0.00, 0.00, 0.000, 0.30
1 WEAPON #5 FROM A/C #5 TO HIT SAM SITE #5
1,5
2
-12.10, 0.20, 1.000, 0.30
-11.00, 0.00, 0.000, 0.30
1 WEAPON #6 FROM A/C #6 TO HIT SAM SITE #6
1,6
2
-7.10, 5.20, 1.000, 0.30
-6.00, 5.00, 0.000, 0.30
0.5,0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5,0.6,0.7,0.1,0.9 STANDOFF WPNS PK FOR SAM TYPES
0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5 STANDOFF WPNS PK FOR 5 NON-SAM TYPES
0,30
0.35



































































100000, 105000, 1 10000, 1 15000, 120000, 125000, 130000
135000, 140000, 145000, 150000, 155000, 160000, 165000
170000,175000,180000,185000,190000,195000,200000
50,10.00
0, 80, 90, 110, 130, 150, 170, 190, 210, 230
12.00, 11.00, 10.00, 9.00, 8.00, 7.00, 6.00, 5.00, 4.00, 0.0






















2 TOTAL # OF EW SITES ** LABEL B **
1 SAM SITE #1 IS AN EW SITE #1
2 SAM SITE #2 IS AN EW SITE #2















10.0,100.0,10 SAMPROCDLY,SAMDAMDLY,SAMDAMRAT ** LABEL E **
46 NUMBER OF LINES TO FOLLOW DESCRIBING ** LABEL F **















































5 NUMIADSTGTS ** LABEL G **

















STANDARD TACOPS OUTPUT WITH DEBUG SET = 1;
TEST85 FLIGHTPATH SET 8; -25 DEGREE APPROACH; IADS; FREE-FIRE
STARTING ISEED = 1000000.00 RANDOM NO. = *********
1. SEC PEN. 1 CHANGES COURSE 270.0=AZ 0.0 = EL -64.87-10.20 1.00
1. SEC PEN. 2 CHANGES COURSE 270.0 =AZ 0.0 = EL -64.87 10.20 1.00
1. SEC PEN. 3 CHANGES COURSE 246.7 =AZ 0.0 = EL -58.79-27.45 1.00
1. SEC PEN. 4 CHANGES COURSE 244.4=AZ 0.0= EL -58.79-27.45 1.00
1. SEC PEN. 5 CHANGES COURSE 239.4 =AZ 0.0 = EL -58.79-27.44 1.00
1. SEC PEN. 6 CHANGES COURSE 237.7=AZ 0.0=EL -58.79-27.43 1.00
1. SEC ADWOC WILL SEND START UP MESSAGE AT TIME 10
MSGID= 1
1. SEC ADWOC WILL SEND START UP MESSAGE AT TIME 10. TO EW SITE # 1
VIARPTSTA# 1 MSGID= 1
1. SEC ADWOC WILL SEND START UP MESSAGE AT TIME 10. TO EW SITE # 2
MSGID= 2
1. SEC ADWOC WILL SEND START UP MESSAGE AT TIME 10. TO EW SITE # 2
VIARPTSTA# 1 MSGID= 2
10. SEC EW SITE 1 ORDERED TO TURN ON; DOES SO.
1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 20. MSGID # 1
2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 20. MSGID # 1
2 ORDERED TO TURN ON; DOES SO.
1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 20. MSGID # 2
2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 20. MSGID # 2
1 DETECTS PEN. 3 -45.58 -21.77 1.00
1 DETECTS PEN. 4 -45.82 -21.23 1.00
1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 471.
1 DETECTS PEN. 5 -46.21 -19.99 1.00
1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 473.
1 DETECTS PEN. 6 -46.32 -19.56 1.00
1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 474.
1 DETECTS PEN. 1 -48.00 -10.20 1.00
1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 491.
2 DETECTS PEN. 2 -48.00 10.20 1.00
2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 491.
1 DETECTS PEN. 2 -40.12 10.20 1.00
1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 554.
2 DETECTS PEN. 1 -40.12 -10.20 1.00
2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 554.
2 DETECTS PEN. 6 -36.60 -13.42 1.00
2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 566.
2 DETECTS PEN. 5 -35.99 -13.94 1.00
2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 568.
2 DETECTS PEN. 4 -33.76 -15.45 1.00
2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 578.
2 DETECTS PEN. 3 -32.61 -16.18 1.00
2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 584.
1 LAUNCHES PEN. # 7 (TYPE 1 WEAPON) ;A/C PS - 1.00







116. SEC EW SITE
116. SEC EW SITE
118. SEC EW SITE
118. SEC EW SITE
119. SEC EW SITE
119. SEC EW SITE
136. SEC EW SITE
136. SEC EW SITE
136. SEC EW SITE
136. SEC EW SITE
199. SEC EW SITE
199. SEC EW SITE
199. SEC EW SITE
199. SEC EW SITE
211. SEC EW SITE
211. SEC EW SITE
213. SEC EW SITE
213. SEC EW SITE
223. SEC EW SITE
223. SEC EW SITE
229. SEC EW SITE





1 CHANGES COURSE 180.0=AZ 0.0 = EL -19.10 -10.10 1.00
2 CHANGES COURSE 180.0=AZ 0.0 = EL -19.10 10.30 1.00
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368. SEC PEN. 7 CHANGES COURSE 259.7=AZ -41.8 = EL -18.92 -10.17 0.84
368. SEC PEN. 8 CHANGES COURSE 280.3=AZ -41.8 = EL -18.92 10.17 0.84
368. SEC EW SITE 1 DETECTS PEN. 7 -18.92 -10.17 0.84
368. SEC EW SITE 1 DETECTS PEN. 8 -18.92 10.17 0.84
368. SEC EW SITE 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 723.
368. SEC EW SITE 2 DETECTS PEN. 7 -18.92 -10.17 0.84
368. SEC EW SITE 2 DETECTS PEN. 8 -18.92 10.17 0.84
368. SEC EW SITE 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 723.
372. SEC EW SITE 1 LOST DETECTION PEN. 8 -18.04 10.01 0.04
372. SEC EW SITE 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 727.
372. SEC EW SITE 2 LOST DETECTION PEN. 7 -18.04 -10.01 0.04
372. SEC EW SITE 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 727.
373. SEC STANDOFF WEAPON 7 IMPACTS SITE 1 PS = 0.90 RND#**** -18.0 -10.0
IMPACTED SITE IS EW SITE # 1
373. SEC STANDOFF WEAPON 8 IMPACTS SITE 2 PS =0.90 RND#**** -18.0 10.0
IMPACTED SITE IS EW SITE # 2
373. SEC EW SITE 1 LOST DETECTION PEN. 7 -18.04 -10.01 0.04
373. SEC EW SITE 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 738.
373. SEC EW SITE 2 LOST DETECTION PEN. 8 -18.04 10.01 0.04
373. SEC EW SITE 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 738.
384. SEC PEN. 1 CHANGES COURSE 90.0=AZ 0.0=EL -19.20 -8.20 1.00
384. SEC PEN. 2 CHANGES COURSE 90.0=AZ 0.0=EL -19.20 12.20 1.00
435. SEC A/C 5 LAUNCHES PEN. # 11 (TYPE 1 WEAPON) A/C PS = 1.00
436. SEC PEN. 5 CHANGES COURSE 180.0=AZ 0.0=EL -12.10 0.32 1.00
436. SEC PEN. 11 CHANGES COURSE 280.3=AZ -41.8 =EL -11.89 0.16 0.81
436. SEC EW SITE 1 DETECTS PEN. 11 -11.89 0.16 0.81
436. SEC EW SITE 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 801.
436. SEC EW SITE 2 DETECTS PEN. 11 -11.89 0.16 0.81
436. SEC EW SITE 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 801.
440. SEC EW SITE 1 LOST DETECTION PEN. 11 -11.01 0.00 0.01
440. SEC EW SITE 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 805.
440. SEC EW SITE 2 LOST DETECTION PEN. 11 -11.01 0.00 0.01
440. SEC EW SITE 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 805.
441. SEC STANDOFF WEAPON 11 IMPACTS SITE 5 PS = 0.50 RND#**** -11.0 0.0
441. SEC STANDOFF WEAPON 11 IMPACTS SAM SITE # 5 PS = 0.50 RND#0.00
451. SEC A/C 3 LAUNCHES PEN. # 9 (TYPE 1 WEAPON) ;A/C PS = 1.00
452. SEC PEN. 3 CHANGES COURSE 180.0=AZ 0.0 = EL -7.10 -5.10 1.00
452. SEC PEN. 5 CHANGES COURSE 90.0=AZ 0.0 = EL -12.22 2.20 1.00
452. SEC PEN. 9 CHANGES COURSE 259.7=AZ -41.8= EL -6.92 -5.17 0.83
452. SEC EW SITE 1 DETECTS PEN. 9 -6.92 -5.17 0.83
452. SEC EW SITE 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 817.
452. SEC EW SITE 2 DETECTS PEN. 9 -6.92 -5.17 0.83
452. SEC EW SITE 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 817.
456. SEC EW SITE 1 LOST DETECTION PEN. 9 -6.04 -5.01 0.03
456. SEC EW SITE 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 821.
456. SEC EW SITE 2 LOST DETECTION PEN. 9 -6.04 -5.01 0.03
456. SEC EW SITE 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 821.
457. SEC STANDOFF WEAPON 9 IMPACTS SITE 3 PS =0.50 RND#**** -6.0 -5.0
457. SEC STANDOFF WEAPON 9 IMPACTS SAM SITE # 3 PS = 0.50 RND#0.00
468. SEC PEN. 3 CHANGES COURSE 90.0=AZ 0.0 = EL -7.20 -3.20 1.00
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481. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 491. MSGID # 3
481. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 491. MSGID # 3
481. SEC SITE 3 NO LOCK-ON PEN. 3 ;BAD FUZE ANGLE AT INTERCEPT
-8.83 -3.20 1.00
481. SEC SITE 3 STARTS RADIATING
481. SEC SITE 3 LOCKS ON PEN. 4 -4.68 -1.52 1.00
481. SEC SITE 4 STARTS RADIATING
481. SEC SITE 4 LOCKS ON PEN. 4 -4.68 -1.52 1.00
481. SEC SITE 5 STARTS RADIATING
481. SEC SITE 5 LOCKS ON PEN. 3 -8.83 -3.20 1.00
483. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 493. MSGID # 4
483. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 493. MSGID # 4
484. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 494. MSGID # 5
484. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 494. MSGID # 5
484. SEC SITE 6 STARTS RADIATING
484. SEC SITE 6 LOCKS ON PEN. 6 -7.74 4.80 1.00
490. SEC A/C 6 LAUNCHES PEN. # 12 (TYPE 1 WEAPON) ;A/C PS = 1.00
491. SEC PEN. 6 CHANGES COURSE 180.0=AZ 0.0 = EL -7.10 5.32 1.00
491. SEC PEN. 12 CHANGES COURSE 280.3=AZ -41.8 = EL -6.89 5.16 0.81
491. SEC EW SITE 1 DETECTS PEN. 12 -6.89 5.16 0.81
491. SEC EW SITE 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 856.
491. SEC EW SITE 2 DETECTS PEN. 12 -6.89 5.16 0.81
491. SEC EW SITE 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 856.
491. SEC SITE 3 FIRES ON PEN. 4 SALVO 1 -3.55 -0.98 1.00
491. SEC SITE 4 FIRES ON PEN. 4 SALVO 1 -3.55 -0.98 1.00
491. SEC SITE 5 FIRES ON PEN. 3 SALVO 1 -10.08 -3.20 1.00
494. SEC SITE 6 FIRES ON PEN. 6 SALVO 1 -7.10 5.69 1.00
495. SEC EW SITE 1 LOST DETECTION PEN. 12 -6.01 5.00 0.01
495. SEC EW SITE 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 860.
495. SEC EW SITE 2 LOST DETECTION PEN. 12 -6.01 5.00 0.01
495. SEC EW SITE 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 860.
4%. SEC STANDOFF WEAPON 12 IMPACTS SITE 6 PS = 0.50 RND#**** -6.0 5.0
4%. SEC STANDOFF WEAPON 12 IMPACTS SAM SITE # 6 PS = 0.50 RND#0.00
501. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 511. MSGID # 6
501. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 511. MSGID # 6
501. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 511. MSGID # 7
501. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 511. MSGID # 7
501. SEC SITE 4 INTERCEPTS PEN. 4 -2.4 -0.4 NEW PS = 0.90
502. SEC SITE 6 INTERCEPTS PEN. 6 -7.1 6.7 NEW PS = 0.95
503. SEC SITE 4 FIRES ON PEN. 4 SALVO 2 -2.20 -0.33 1.00
503. SEC SITE 5 INTERCEPTS PEN. 3 -11.6 -3.2 NEW PS = 0.95
504. SEC SITE 6 FIRES ON PEN. 6 SALVO 2 -7.10 6.94 1.00
505. SEC SITE 5 FIRES ON PEN. 3 SALVO 2 -11.83 -3.20 1.00
507. SEC PEN. 6 CHANGES COURSE 90.0=AZ 0.0 =EL -7.22 7.20 1.00
510. SEC SITE 4 INTERCEPTS PEN. 4 -1.4 0.1 NEW PS = 0.81
512. SEC A/C 4 LAUNCHES PEN. # 10 (TYPE 1 WEAPON) A/C PS =0.81
512. SEC SITE 4 FIRES ON PEN. 4 SALVO 3 -1.19 0.16 1.00
513. SEC PEN. 4 CHANGES COURSE 180.0 =AZ 0.0 = EL -1.10 0.23 1.00
513. SEC PEN. 10 CHANGES COURSE 79.7=AZ -41.8 = EL 1.05 0.19 0.95
513. SEC EW SITE 1 DETECTS PEN. 10 1.05 0.19 0.95
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513. SEC EW SITE 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 878.
513. SEC EW SITE 2 DETECTS PEN. 10 1.05 0.19 0.95
513. SEC EW SITE 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 878.
517. SEC EW SITE 1 LOST DETECTION PEN. 10 0.17 0.03 0.15
517. SEC EW SITE 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 882.
517. SEC EW SITE 2 LOST DETECTION PEN. 10 0.17 0.03 0.15
517. SEC EW SITE 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 882.
517. SEC SITE 3 MISSES PEN. 4 > MAX RANGE -1.10 0.73 1.00
CD1-CD4: 460.16 482.15 24513.00 24513.00
517. SEC SITE 4 INTERCEPTS PEN. 4 -1.1 0.7 NEW PS = 0.73
517. SEC SITE 6 INTERCEPTS PEN. 6 -8.5 7.2 NEW PS = 0.90
518. SEC STANDOFF WEAPON 10 IMPACTS SITE 4 PS = 0.60 RND#**** 0.0 0.0
518. SEC STANDOFF WEAPON 10 IMPACTS SAM SITE # 4 PS = 0.60 RND#0.00
518. SEC SITE 3 STOPS RADIATING
519. SEC SITE 4 FIRES ON PEN. 4 SALVO 4 -1.10 0.98 1.00
519. SEC SITE 6 STARTS RADIATING
519. SEC SrTE 6 LOCKS ON PEN. 6 -8.72 7.20 1.00
520. SEC SITE 5 INTERCEPTS PEN. 3 -13.7 -3.2 NEW PS = 0.90
521. SEC SITE 5 STOPS RADIATING
528. SEC SITE 4 INTERCEPTS PEN. 4 -1.1 2.1 NEW PS = 0.69
529. SEC PEN. 4 CHANGES COURSE 90.0=AZ 0.0 =EL -1.13 2.20 1.00
529. SEC SITE 4 NO LOCK-ON PEN. 4 ;BAD FUZE ANGLE AT INTERCEPT
-1.13 2.20 1.00
529. SEC SITE 4 STOPS RADIATING
529. SEC SITE 6 FIRES ON PEN. 6 SALVO 3 -9.97 7.20 1.00
530. SEC SITE 4 STARTS RADIATING
530. SEC SITE 4 LOCKS ON PEN. 4 -1.26 2.20 1.00
536. SEC EW SITE 1 LOST DETECTION PEN. 2 -38.20 12.20 1.00
536. SEC EW SITE 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 901.
540. SEC SITE 4 FIRES ON PEN. 4 SALVO 5 -2.51 2.20 1.00
554. SEC SITE 6 MISSES PEN. 6 > MAX RANGE -13.09 7.20 1.00
CD1-CD4: 460.55 533.98 24507.00 24507.00
555. SEC SITE 6 NO LOCK-ON PEN. 6 ;BAD FUZE ANGLE AT INTERCEPT
-13.22 7.20 1.00
556. SEC SITE 6 STARTS RADIATING
556. SEC SITE 6 LOCKS ON PEN. 4 -4.51 2.20 1.00
558. SEC SITE 4 MISSES PEN. 4 > MAX RANGE -4.76 2.20 1.00
CD1-CD4: 483.24 556.67 24529.00 24529.00
559. SEC SITE 4 NO LOCK-ON PEN. 4 ;BAD FUZE ANGLE AT INTERCEPT
-4.88 2.20 1.00
559. SEC SITE 4 STOPS RADIATING
562. SEC SITE 5 STARTS RADIATING
562. SEC SITE 5 LOCKS ON PEN. 4 -5.26 2.20 1.00
564. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 574. MSGID # 8
564. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 574. MSGID # 8
564. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 574. MSGID # 9
564. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 574. MSGID # 9
566. SEC EW SITE 2 LOST DETECTION PEN. 1 -41.95 -8.20 1.00
566. SEC EW SITE 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 931.
566. SEC SITE 6 FIRES ON PEN. 4 SALVO 4 -5.76 2.20 1.00
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572. SEC SITE 5 FIRES ON PEN. 4 SALVO 3 -6.51 2.20 1.00
576. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 586. MSGID # 10
576. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 586. MSGID # 10
577. SEC SITE 6 INTERCEPTS PEN. 4 -7.1 2.2 NEW PS = 0.65
578. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 588. MSGID # 11
578. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 588. MSGID # 11
579. SEC SITE 6 FIRES ON PEN. 4 SALVO 5 -7.38 2.20 1.00
585. SEC SITE 5 INTERCEPTS PEN. 4 -8.1 2.2 NEW PS = 0.62
587. SEC SITE 5 FIRES ON PEN. 4 SALVO 4 -8.38 2.20 1.00
588. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 598. MSGID # 12
588. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 598. MSGID # 12
594. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 604. MSGID # 13
594. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 604. MSGID # 13
594. SEC SITE 6 INTERCEPTS PEN. 4 -9.3 2.2 NEW PS = 0.59
595. SEC SITE 6 STOPS RADIATING
597. SEC SITE 5 INTERCEPTS PEN. 4 -9.6 2.2 NEW PS = 0.56
599. SEC SITE 5 FIRES ON PEN. 4 SALVO 5 -9.88 2.20 1.00
608. SEC SITE 5 INTERCEPTS PEN. 4 -11.0 2.2 NEW PS = 0.53
610. SEC SITE 5 FIRES ON PEN. 4 SALVO 6 -11.26 2.20 1.00
614. SEC EW SITE 2 LOST DETECTION PEN. 2 -47.95 12.20 1.00
614. SEC EW SITE 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 979.
615. SEC EW SITE 1 LOST DETECTION PEN. 1 -48.08 -8.20 1.00
615. SEC EW SITE 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 980.
620. SEC SITE 5 INTERCEPTS PEN. 4 -12.5 2.2 NEW PS = 0.50
622. SEC SITE 5 FIRES ON PEN. 4 SALVO 7 -12.76 2.20 1.00
637. SEC SITE 5 INTERCEPTS PEN. 4 -14.6 2.2 NEW PS = 0.48
638. SEC SITE 5 NO LOCK-ON PEN. 4 ;BAD FUZE ANGLE AT INTERCEPT
-14.76 2.20 1.00
638. SEC SITE 5 STOPS RADIATING
718. SEC EW SITE 1 LOST DETECTION PEN. 5 -45.47 2.20 1.00
718. SEC EW SITE 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 1083.
731. SEC EW SITE 2 LOST DETECTION PEN. 5 -47.09 2.20 1.00
731. SEC EW SITE 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 1096.
733. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 743. MSGID # 14
733. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 743. MSGID # 14
733. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 743. MSGID # 15
733. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 743. MSGID # 15
737. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 747. MSGID # 16
737. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 747. MSGID # 16
737. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 747. MSGID # 17
737. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 747. MSGID # 17
738. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 748. MSGID # 18
738. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 748. MSGID # 18
738. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 748. MSGID # 19
738. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 748. MSGID # 19
770. SEC EW SrTE 2 LOST DETECTION PEN. 3 -44.95 -3.20 1.00
770. SEC EW SITE 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 1135.
789. SEC EW SITE 1 LOST DETECTION PEN. 3 -47.33 -3.20 1.00
789. SEC EW SITE 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 1154.
790. SEC EW SITE 1 LOST DETECTION PEN. 6 -42.59 7.20 1.00
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790. SEC EW SITE 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 1155.
801. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 811. MSGID # 20
801. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 811. MSGID # 20
801. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 811. MSGID # 21
801. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 811. MSGID # 21
805. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 815. MSGID # 22
805. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 815. MSGID # 22
805. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 815. MSGID # 23
805. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 815. MSGID # 23
817. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 827. MSGID # 24
817. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 827. MSGID # 24
817. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 827. MSGID # 25
817. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 827. MSGID # 25
821. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 831. MSGID # 26
821. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 831. MSGID # 26
821. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 831. MSGID # 27
821. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 831. MSGID # 27
833. SEC EW SITE 2 LOST DETECTION PEN. 6 -47.97 7.20 1.00
833. SEC EW SITE 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 1198.
856. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 866. MSGID # 28
856. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 866. MSGID # 28
856. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 866. MSGID # 29
856. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 866. MSGID # 29
860. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 870. MSGID # 30
860. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 870. MSGID # 30
860. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 870. MSGID # 31
860. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 870. MSGID # 31
878. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 888. MSGID # 32
878. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 888. MSGID # 32
878. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 888. MSGID # 33
878. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 888. MSGID # 33
882. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 892. MSGID # 34
882. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 892. MSGID # 34
882. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 892. MSGID # 35
882. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 892. MSGID # 35
884. SEC EW SITE 1 LOST DETECTION PEN. 4 -45.51 2.20 1.00
884. SEC EW SITE 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 1249.
8%. SEC EW SITE 2 LOST DETECTION PEN. 4 -47.01 2.20 1.00
8%. SEC EW SITE 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 1261.
901. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 911. MSGID # 36
901. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 911. MSGID # 36
931. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 941. MSGID # 37
931. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 941. MSGID # 37
979. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 989. MSGID # 38
979. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 989. MSGID # 38
980. SEC RPT STA 1 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 990. MSGID # 39
980. SEC RPT STA 2 WILL SEND MESSAGE AT TIME 990. MSGID # 39
SITE 1 HAS 6 SALVOS LEFT OF 6 PS 0.9000 -18.0 -10.0
SITE 2 HAS 6 SALVOS LEFT OF 6 PS 0.9000 -18.0 10.0
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SITE 3 HAS 15 SALVOS LEFT OF 16 PS 0.5000 -6.0 -5.0
SITE 4 HAS 11 SALVOS LEFT OF 16 PS 0.5950 0.0 0.0
SITE 5 HAS 9 SALVOS LEFT OF 16 PS 0.5000 -11.0 0.0
SITE 6 HAS 11 SALVOS LEFT OF 16 PS 0.5000 -6.0 5.0
TOTAL SITE DAMAGE BEFORE THIS RUN - 0.000
TOTAL SITE DAMAGE TO THE PRESENT = 2.105
TOTAL SITE DAMAGE DURING THIS RUN = 2.105
AIRCRAFT DAMAGE BY SAMS = 0.716 ** LABEL A **
SITE DAMAGE BY NON-ARM WEAPONS = 2.105
SITE DAMAGE BY PRE-EMPTIVE ARMS = 0.000
SITE DAMAGE BY REACTIVE ARMS = 0.000
NON-SAM GROUND TARGET 1 HAS FINAL PS = 1.0000
NON-SAM GROUND TARGET 2 HAS FINAL PS = 1.0000
NON-SAM GROUND TARGET 3 HAS FINAL PS = 1.0000
NON-SAM GROUND TARGET 4 HAS FINAL PS = 1.0000
NON-SAM GROUND TARGET 5 HAS FINAL PS = 1.0000
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APPENDIX E
LISTING OF FORTRAN CODE
AND OTHER FILES
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The programs are separated from each other by a long line of dashes;
for example: " "





































THEN THE ORIGINAL TACOPS PROGRAMS MODIFED FOR THE IADS





FINALLY THE CONTENTS OF THE 'DEF' FILES USED IN THE IADS

















The listing of the program starts now.
SUBROUTINE CDELAY(PROCDLY,DAMGDLY,DAMGRAT,PS,DELAY)
C LATEST CHANGE MADE 7/01/91 BFS
C COMPUTES THE DELAY FOR PROCESSING DATA BASED UPON NORMAL TIMES
C AND ADDITIONAL DELAY DUE TO DAMAGE OF THE SITE
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cC CALLED BY - EWDET





C PROCDLY - NORMAL PROCESSING DELAY TIME FOR THIS UNIT
C DAMGDLY - MAX. DELAY TIME (SECONDS) FOR MAX. DAMAGE
C DAMGRAT - DAMAGE RATIO; SCALE FACTOR USED IN DELAY COMP.
C PS - PROB. OF SURVIVAL OF UNIT
C DELAY - COMPUTED DELAY OF MESSAGE PROCESSING TIME BASED
C - UPON PASSED INPUTS
REAL DAMGRAT,PS,DELAY,DAMGDLY
C
C ... LINEAR DAMAGE DELAY FUNCTION ...
DELAY = DAMGDLY*((1.0-PS)/DAMGRAT)
C ... EXPONENTIAL DAMAGE DELAY FUNCTION ...




C LATEST CHANGE MADE 07/27/91 BFS
C LOCATES ALL MESSAGES WAITING TO BE SENT BY PASSED PARAMETERS
C IDENTIFYING THE IADS TYPE AND UNIT ELEMENT #; DELETES ALL FOUND
C FOUND MESSAGES AND SHIFTS UP INTO DELETED SLOT REMAINING
C MESSAGES ON HOLDING ARRAY. ALSO DELETE ALL MESSAGES GOING TO
C THIS IADS TYPE AND UNIT #S.
C
C CALLED BY - IADSPS
C CALLS - SHIFTU
C
PARAMETER (IM = 30,JM = 25,KM = 20)
IMPLICIT LOGICAL (A-Z)
C DECLARE PASSED VARIABLES.
INTEGER TYPE.UNIT
138
C DECLARE LOCAL VARIABLES.
INTEGER FROMTYPE,FROMUNIT,II,LL,MESID,TOTYPE,TOUMT
REAL MESTIME





C VARIABLES USED IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C
C VARIABLES SET BY PARAMETER STATEMENT
C IM - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C JM - MAX # OF SAM SITES
C KM - MAX # OF PENETRATOR CHECKPOINTS
C IN COMMON BLOCK
C DEBUG - FLAG FOR DEBUG PRINTOUTS
C LOCAL TO THIS SUBROUTINE
C FROMTYPE - IADS TYPE # QUERIED MESSAGE IS COMING FROM
C FROMUNIT - IADS UNIT # QUERIED MESSAGE IS COMING FROM
C II - LOOP COUNTER
C LL - LOOP COUNTER
C MESID - HOLDS MESSAGE ID #
C MESTIME - SENDING TIME OF QUERIED MESSAGE
C TOTYPE - IADS TYPE # QUERIED MESSAGE IS GOING TO
C TOUNIT - IADS UNIT # QUERIED MESSAGE IS GOING TO
C START PROGRAM
C WRITE(*,*) 'DELMES'
C ... CHECK IF ANY MESSAGES MATCH THE TYPE AND UNIT NUMBER
C ... CONSTRUCT A LOOP THAT WILL ALLOW POINTING AND ENDING INDEX
C ... TO BE MODIFIED WHEN MESSAGES ARE TAKEN OFF ...
11 = 1






IF(DEBUG .GE. 3) THEN




C ... IF TIME EQUALS ZERO THEN WE ARE AT THE END OF THE ARRAY ....
IF(NINT(MESHOLD(II,l)) .EQ. 0) THEN
IF(DEBUG .GE. 3) THEN
WRITE(16,*)' MESSAGE POINTER = ',II,' MESHOLD(II,1) = 0',




C ... LOOK FOR MATCHING TYPE AND UNIT NUMBERS
IF (DEBUG .GE. 3) THEN
WRITE(16,*) ' MESSAGE QUERIED :',
& (MESHOLD(II,LL),LL = l.MAXMSGSIZE)
ENDIF
IF(FROMTYPE .EQ. TYPE AND. FROMUNIT .EQ. UNIT .OR.
& TOTYPE .EQ. TYPE AND. TOUNIT .EQ. UNIT) THEN
IF(DEBUG .GE. 3) THEN
WRITE(16,*) ' FOUND A MESSAGE THAT WILL BE DELETED',
& ';MSGID # =',MESID
ENDIF
IF (DEBUG .GE. 3) THEN
WRITE(16,*) ' MESSAGE TO BE DELETED IS:',
& (MESHOLD(II,LL),LL=l,MAXMSGSIZE)
ENDIF
C ... DELETE THIS MESSAGE BY SHIFTING ALL FOLLOWING MESSAGES UP ONE
CALL SHIFTU(II)
ENDIF
C... INCREMENT POINTER, IF > 200 THEN AT END OF ARRAY AND STOP LOOP ..
11 = 11 + 1









C LATEST CHANGE MADE 07/26/91 BFS
C FINDS ALL MESSAGES IN HOLDING ARRAY WAITING TO BE SENT AND MATCHES
C TO THE TYPE AND UNIT PASSED. MODIFYIES THE TIME THIS MESSAGE WILL
C WILL BE SENT. THIS IS AS A RESULT OF THE UNIT BEING DAMAGED.
C
C CALLED BY - IADSPS
C CALLS - NONE
C
PARAMETER (IM = 30,JM = 25.KM = 20)
IMPLICIT LOGICAL (A-Z)
C DECLARE PASSED VARIABLES.
INTEGER TYPE,UNIT
REAL DELAY





C DECLARE LOCAL VARIABLES
INTEGER II,LL
REAL OLDTIME
C VARIABLES USED IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C
C VARIABLES SET BY PARAMETER STATEMENT
C IM - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C JM - MAX # OF SAM SITES
C KM - MAX # OF PENETRATOR CHECKPOINTS
C IN COMMON BLOCK
C DEBUG - FLAG FOR DEBUG PRINTOUTS
C LOCAL TO THIS SUBROUTINE
C II - LOOP COUNTER




C ... SEARCH FOR ANY MESSAGES THAT MATCH THE SENDING TYPE AND UNIT #
C ... IF ANY MATCH, MODIFY THE TIME WHEN THE MESSAGE WILL BE SEND
DO 10 II = l,NEXTHOLDPOS-l
IF(DEBUG .GE. 3) THEN
WRrTE(16,*)' MES. POINTER =\II,' IADS TYPE =\TYPE,
& ' IADS UNIT #',UNIT
ENDIF
IF(DEBUG .GE. 3) THEN
WRITE(16,*) ' MESSAGE QUERIED :',
& (MESHOLD(II,LL),LL = l.MAXMSGSIZE)
ENDIF
IF(TYPE .EQ. NINT(MESHOLD(II,4)) AND.
& UNIT .EQ. NINT(MESHOLD(II,5))) THEN
OLDTIME = MESHOLD(II,2)
MESHOLD(II,2) = MESHOLD(II,l) +DELAY
IF(DEBUG .EQ. 3) THEN
WRITE(16,*) ' THIS MESSAGE WILL BE MODIFIED'
WRITE(16,*) ' PREVIOUS TIME TO BE SENT = ',OLDTIME
WRITE(16,*) ' NOW NEW TIME TO BE SENT = \MESHOLD(II,2)
ENDIF
IF(DEBUG .GE. 3) THEN
WRITE(16,*) ' MODIFIED MESSAGE :',
& (MESHOLD(II,LL),LL = 1.MAXMSGSIZE)
ENDIF
ELSE
IF(DEBUG .EQ. 3) THEN







C LATEST CHANGE MADE 07/02/91 BFS
C DETERMINES IF EW SITE DETECTS ANY PENETRATORS. FIRST INITIALIZES
C THE NEWDET(*) AN ARRAY WHICH WILL HOLD THE PRESENT DETECTION
C RESULTS. ALL SITES ARE QUERIED TO DETERMINE WHICH PENETRATORS
C THEY NOW DETECT. FINALLY THE PRESENT DETECTION IS COMPARED TO
C TO PREVIOUSLY DETERMINED STATE. IF NEW DETECTIONS OCCUR OR IF




C CALLED BY - IADS
C CALLS - TERRA,CDELAY,EWMES
C
PARAMETER (IM = 30,JM = 25,KM = 20)
C IMPLICIT LOGICAL (A-Z)
C DECLARE LOCAL VARIABLES.
INTEGER IK,JJ,L,NEWDETECT(9,IM),CHANGE
REAL DELAY,TDELAY

















C VARIABLES USED IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C
C VARIABLES SET BY PARAMETER STATEMENT
C IM - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C JM - MAX # OF SAM SITES
C KM - MAX # OF PENETRATOR CHECKPOINTS
C IN COMMON BLOCK.
C CD1(IM,JM) - TIME (IN SECONDS) WHEN PENETRATOR IM ENTERS OUTER
C - LAUNCH ENVLOPE OF SAM SITE JM
C CD2(IM,JM) - TIME (IN SECONDS) WHEN PENETRATOR IM TRANSITIONS
C - LAUNCH ENVLOPE OF SAM SITE JM. IF THE PENETRATORS
C - FLIGHTPATH INTERSECTS THE ENVELOPE 2 TIMES, THIS IS
C - THE ENVELOPE EXIT TIME. IF 4 INTERSECTIONS OCCUR,
C - THIS IS THE EXIT OF THE ENVELOPE INTO THE SITES
C - MIN RANGE ZONE.
C CD3(IM,JM) - TIME (IN SECONDS) WHEN PENETRATOR IM TRANSITIONS
C - LAUNCH ENVLOPE OF SAM SITE JM. IF THE PENETRATORS
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C - FLIGHTPATH INTERSECTS THE ENVELOPE 2 TIMES, THIS
C - TIME HAS NO MEANING. IF 4 INTERSECTIONS OCCUR,
C - THIS IS THE ENTRANCE INTO THE ENVELOPE FROM THE
C - SITES MIN RANGE ZONE.
C CD4(IM,JM) - TIME (IN SECONDS) WHEN PENETRATOR IM TRANSITIONS
C - LAUNCH ENVLOPE OF SAM SITE JM. IF THE PENETRATORS
C - FLIGHTPATH INTERSECTS THE ENVELOPE 2 TIMES, THIS
C - TIME HAS NO MEANING. IF 4 INTERSECTIONS OCCUR,
C - THIS IS THE EXTT OF THE PENETRATOR FROM THE ENVELOPE
C DEBUG - FLAG FOR DEBUG PRINTOUTS
C I - PEN. LOOP COUNTER
C IOP(IO) - HOLDS FLAGS(l/0) TO SELECT PROGRAM RUNNING MODES
C ISECT(IM,JM) - HOLDS A FLAG(l/0) FOR EACH PENETRATOR IM WHICH
C - INDICATES WHETHER EACH SAM SITE JM CAN( = 1) OR
C - CANNOT( = 0) FIRE AT THIS PENETRATOR
C ISHOT(IM,JM)
C ITAR(JM) - HOLDS PEN. # THAT SAM SITE JM IS LOCKED ONTO
C DC(JM) - FLAG (1/0) USED TO CONTROL PRINTING OUTPUT DATA
C J - SAM SITE LOOP COUNTER
C MSITE(JM) - HOLDS THE SAM SITE TYPE (1-9) FOR SITE JM
C NAC - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C NSITE - MAX # OF SAM SrTES
C PS(JM) - SURVIVAL PROBABILITY OF SITE JM
C PSA(IM) - SURVIVAL PROBABILITY OF PENETRATOR IM
C PSAMIN - MINIMUM SURVIVABILITY OF PENETRATOR;IF PSA(IM) IS BELOW
C - THIS, THE PENETRATOR IS REMOVED FROM THE SIMULATION
C RRAD(JM) - HOLDS TIMING DATA (IN SECONDS) FOR SAM SITE JM; USED
C - IN DETERMINING WHEN TO FIRE,RE-FIRE,TRACK,ETC...
C STATS(JM) - INTEGER VALUE INDICATING THE STATUS OF EACH SAM SITE
C - IF =0; SITE IS NOT RADIATING
C - IF = 1; SITE IS ESTABLING A TRACK FILE ON A TARGET
C - AND GETTING READY TO FIRE
C - IF =2; SITE HAS A SALVO ENROUTE TO THE TARGET
C - IF =3; SITE IS PERFORMING POST INTERCEPT DECISIONS






C LOCAL TO THIS SUBROUTINE
C CHANGE - FLAG(l/0) = 1 INDICATES THAT A CHANGE IN DETECTION OF PENS.
C - (I.E. LOST OLD OR FOUND NEW DETECTION) HAS HAPPENED
C IK - FLAG(l/0) USED BY SUBROUTINE JAMMER TO INDICATE IF( = 1)
C - THE PENETRATOR IS MASKED TO A SAM SITE BY JAMMING; BY
C - SUBROUTINE TERRA TO INDICATE IF( = 1) THE PENETRATOR IS MASKED
C - BY THE TERRAIN FROM A SAM SITE; BY SUBROUTINE CHECKS TO
C - INDICATE( = 1) THAT THE PENETRATOR HAS BEEN DESTROYED; BY
C - SUBROUTINE FUTLOK TO SEE IF( = 1) THE ENGAGEMENT ANGLE OF THE
C - PENETRATOR AND THE SAM IS WITHIN THE VALUE TO ALLOW FOR A
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C - LAUNCH AGAINST THIS PENETRATOR
C JJ - LOOP COUNTER
C L - LOOP COUNTER
C NEWDETECT(9,IM) - TEMP ARRAY TO HOLD PRESENT DETECTION STATUS
C - USED TO COMPARE WITH OLD DETECTION STATUS AND
C - NOTE ANY CHANGES
C START PROGRAM
C WRITE(V) 'EWDET'






DO 30 JJ = 1,NEWSITES
C ... SKIP OVER THIS EW SITE IF IT IS NOT TURNED ON
IF (DEBUG .GE. 3) THEN
WRITE(16,*) 'EW SITE #, STATUS',JJ,STATS(EWID(JJ))
ENDIF
IF (STATS(EWID(JJ)) .EQ. 0) GO TO 30
C ... SKIP OVER THIS EW SITE IF IT IS DEAD
IF (DEBUG .GE. 3) THEN
WRITE(16,*) 'EW SITE #,PS,EWPSMIN',JJ,PS(EWID(JJ)),EWPSMIN
ENDIF




C ... CHECK FOR TERRAIN MASKING OF PENETRATOR
IF (PSA(I) .LT. PSAMIN) GO TO 65
CALL TERRA(IK)
IF (IK .NE. 0) GO TO 65
C POSSIBLE FUTURE MODS INCLUDING JAMMMING OF EW SITES
C CALL JAMMER(IK)
C IF (IK .NE. 0) ISHOT(I,J) = 1
C IF (IK .NE. 0) GO TO 65
C
C CHECK FOR PENETRATOR WITHIN EW DETECTION CONE
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C NO PENETRATOR WITHIN DETECTION CONE
C IF ANY OF THESE TESTS PASS
IF (DEBUG .GE. 3) THEN
WRITE(16,*) 'TIME, WITH EW SrTE #,PEN #\TIME,JJ,I
WRITE(16,*)'CD1-CD4' )CD1(I,J),CD2(I )J),CD3(I,J),CD4(I,J)
ENDIF
IF (CD1(I,J) .GT. 20000.) GO TO 65
IF (TIME .LT. CD1(I,J) .OR. TIME .GT. CD4(I,J)) GO TO 65
IF (TIME .GT. CD2(I,J) AND. TIME XT. CD3(I,J)) GO TO 65
C ... TO GET TO NEXT LINE, PENETRATOR IS DETECTED
NEWDETECT(JJ,I) = 1
C ... TO GO TO 65 DIRECTLY MEANS PENETRATOR IS UNDETECTED
65 CONTINUE
C ... TEST IF DETECTION STATUS OF PENETRATOR HAS CHANGED




IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1001)TIME,JJ,I^CT(I,2),YT(I,2),ZT(I,2)
1001 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC EW SITE ',12,' DETECTS PEN. \I2,4X,F6.2,3X,
$ F6.2,3X,F6.2)
ENDIF




IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1002)TIME,JJ,I,XT(I,2),YT(I,2),ZT(I,2)





C ... IF ANY CHANGE IN DETECTION STATUS HAS OCCURED FOR THIS EW SITE
C ... SEND A MESSAGE
IF(CHANGE .EQ. 1) THEN
IF (DEBUG .GE. 3) THEN






IF (DEBUG .GE. 3) THEN
WRITE(16,*) ' CHANGE IN DETECTION STATUS FOR EW SITE #yj
WRITE(16,*) '(-1= LOST, 0= NO CHANGE, 1= NEW DETECTION)'
WRITE(16,*) ' (1-NAC) UPDATE DETECTION ARRAY :',
& (UPEWTGT(JJ,L),L=1,NAC)
WRITE(16,*) ' COMPUTED DELAY = ',DELAY,
& ' TIME WHEN MESSAGE WILL BE SENT = ',TIME +DELAY
ENDIF
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1003) TIME,JJ,TIME +DELAY
1003 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC EW SITE ',12,' WILL SEND MESSAGE',









C LATEST CHANGE MADE 07/29/91 BFS
C SIMPLIFIED VERSION OF EWDET SURBROUTINE, USED WHEN AN EW SITE HAS
C BEEN DESTROYED AND AN UPDATED DETECTION STATUS IS NEEDED. THIS
C WILL DETERMINE ALL THE PENETRATORS THAT THE PASSED SITE DETECTS
C
C CALLED BY - IADSPS
C CALLS -TERRA
C
PARAMETER (IM = 30,JM = 25,KM = 20)
C IMPLICIT LOGICAL (A-Z)
C DECLARE PASSED VARIABLES
INTEGER JJ,UPDATE(IM)
C DECLARE LOCAL VARIABLES
INTEGER II,IK,J1












$CD3(IM )JM) )CD4(IM,JM),LEG(IM),NEW(IM) )I,J,STATS(JM),ITAR(JM)
C VARIABLES USED IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C
C VARIABLES SET BY PARAMETER STATEMENT
C IM - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C JM - MAX # OF SAM SITES
C KM - MAX # OF PENETRATOR CHECKPOINTS
C IN COMMON BLOCK
C CD1(IM,JM) - TIME (IN SECONDS) WHEN PENETRATOR IM ENTERS OUTER
C - LAUNCH ENVLOPE OF SAM SITE JM
C CD2(IM,JM) - TIME (IN SECONDS) WHEN PENETRATOR IM TRANSITIONS
C - LAUNCH ENVLOPE OF SAM SITE JM. IF THE PENETRATORS
C - FLIGHTPATH INTERSECTS THE ENVELOPE 2 TIMES, THIS IS
C - THE ENVELOPE EXIT TIME. IF 4 INTERSECTIONS OCCUR,
C - THIS IS THE EXIT OF THE ENVELOPE INTO THE SITES
C - MIN RANGE ZONE.
C CD3(IM,JM) - TIME (IN SECONDS) WHEN PENETRATOR IM TRANSITIONS
C - LAUNCH ENVLOPE OF SAM SITE JM. IF THE PENETRATORS
C - FLIGHTPATH INTERSECTS THE ENVELOPE 2 TIMES, THIS
C - TIME HAS NO MEANING. IF 4 INTERSECTIONS OCCUR,
C - THIS IS THE ENTRANCE INTO THE ENVELOPE FROM THE
C - SITES MIN RANGE ZONE.
C CD4(IM,JM) - TIME (IN SECONDS) WHEN PENETRATOR IM TRANSITIONS
C - LAUNCH ENVLOPE OF SAM SITE JM. IF THE PENETRATORS
C - FLIGHTPATH INTERSECTS THE ENVELOPE 2 TIMES, THIS
C - TIME HAS NO MEANING. IF 4 INTERSECTIONS OCCUR,
C - THIS IS THE EXIT OF THE PENETRATOR FROM THE ENVELOPE
C DEBUG - FLAG FOR DEBUG PRINTOUTS
C IOP(IO) - HOLDS FLAGS(l/0) TO SELECT PROGRAM RUNNING MODES
C ISECT(IM,JM) - HOLDS A FLAG(l/0) FOR EACH PENETRATOR IM WHICH
C - INDICATES WHETHER EACH SAM SITE JM CAN( = 1) OR
C - CANNOT( = 0) FIRE AT THIS PENETRATOR
C ISHOT(IM,JM)
C ITAR(JM) - HOLDS PEN. # THAT SAM SITE JM IS LOCKED ONTO
C IX(JM) - FLAG (1/0) USED TO CONTROL PRINTING OUTPUT DATA
C MSITE(JM) - HOLDS THE SAM SITE TYPE (1-9) FOR SITE JM
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C NAC - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C NSITE - MAX # OF SAM SITES
C PS(JM) - SURVIVAL. PROBABILITY OF SrTE JM
C PSA(IM) - SURVIVAL PROBABILITY OF PENETRATOR IM
C PSAMIN - MINIMUM SURVIVABILITY OF PENETRATOR;IF PSA(IM) IS BELOW
C - THIS, THE PENETRATOR IS REMOVED FROM THE SIMULATION
C RRAD(JM) - HOLDS TIMING DATA (IN SECONDS) FOR SAM SITE JM; USED
C - IN DETERMINING WHEN TO FIRE,RE-FIRE,TRACK,ETC...
C STATS(JM) - INTEGER VALUE INDICATING THE STATUS OF EACH SAM SITE
C - IF =0; SITE IS NOT RADIATING
C - IF = 1; SITE IS ESTABLING A TRACK FILE ON A TARGET
C - AND GETTING READY TO FIRE
C - IF =2; SITE HAS A SALVO ENROUTE TO THE TARGET
C - IF =3; SITE IS PERFORMING POST INTERCEPT DECISIONS






C LOCAL TO THIS SUBROUTINE
C CHANGE - FLAG(l/0) = 1 INDICATES THAT A CHANGE IN DETECTION OF PENS.
C - (I.E. LOST OLD OR FOUND NEW DETECTION) HAS HAPPENED
C IK - FLAG(l/0) USED BY SUBROUTINE JAMMER TO INDICATE IF( = 1)
C - THE PENETRATOR IS MASKED TO A SAM SITE BY JAMMING; BY
C - SUBROUTINE TERRA TO INDICATE IF( = 1) THE PENETRATOR IS MASKED
C - BY THE TERRAIN FROM A SAM SITE; BY SUBROUTINE CHECKS TO
C - INDICATE( = 1) THAT THE PENETRATOR HAS BEEN DESTROYED; BY
C - SUBROUTINE FUTLOK TO SEE IF( = 1) THE ENGAGEMENT ANGLE OF THE
C - PENETRATOR AND THE SAM IS WITHIN THE VALUE TO ALLOW FOR A
C - LAUNCH AGAINST THIS PENETRATOR
C II - LOOP COUNTER
C Jl - SAM UNIT # FOR THIS EW SITE
C JJ - LOOP COUNTER
C L - LOOP COUNTER
C NEWDETECT(9,IM) - TEMP ARRAY TO HOLD PRESENT DETECTION STATUS
C - USED TO COMPARE WITH OLD DETECTION STATUS AND









C ... CHECK FOR TERRAIN MASKING OF PENETRATOR
IF (PSA(II) .LT. PSAMIN) GO TO 65
CALL TERRA(IK)
IF (IK .NE. 0) GO TO 65
C CHECK FOR PENETRATOR WITHIN EW DETECTION CONE.
C NO PENETRATOR WITHIN DETECTION CONE
C IF ANY OF THESE TESTS PASS
IF (DEBUG .GE. 3) THEN




IF (CD1(II,J1) .GT. 20000.) GO TO 65
IF (TIME LT. CD1(II,J1) .OR. TIME .GT. CD4(II,J1)) GO TO 65
IF (TIME .GT. CD2(II,J1) AND. TIME LT. CD3(II,J1)) GO TO 65
C ... TO GET TO NEXT LINE, PENETRATOR IS DETECTED
UPDATE(II) = 1






C LATEST CHANGE MADE 07/23/91 BFS
C RECEIVES UPDATED EW SITE DETECTION MESSAGE DATA, ORGANIZES THE
C DATA TO BE SENT, IDENTIFIES THE IADS ELEMENTS TO SEND MESSAGES
C TO AND CALLS A SUB WHICH PUTS THE MESSAGE IN A HOLDING ARRAY
C
C
C CALLED BY - EWDET
C CALLS - HOLDMES
C
PARAMETER (IM = 30,JM = 25,KM = 20)
C IMPLICIT LOGICAL (A-Z)






















C DECLARE LOCAL VARIABLES
INTEGER L,LL,POS
REAL MSG(MAXMSGSIZE)
C VARIABLES USED IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C
C VARIABLES SET BY PARAMETER STATEMENT
C IM - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C JM - MAX # OF SAM SITES
C KM - MAX # OF PENETRATOR CHECKPOINTS
C IN COMMON BLOCK
C DEBUG - FLAG FOR DEBUG PRINTOUTS
C IOP(IO) - HOLDS FLAGS(l/0) TO SELECT PROGRAM RUNNING MODES
C J - SAM SITE LOOP COUNTER
C NAC - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C TIME - SIMULATION TIME (IN SECONDS) FROM THE START OF THE RUN
C LOCAL TO THIS SUBROUTINE
C L - LOOP COUNTER
C LL - LOOP COUNTER
C MSG(MAXMSGSIZE) - HOLDS MESSAGE PARTICULARS





IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) 'EW MESSAGE POINTER IS NOW = \EWMESPOS(JJ)
WRITE(16,*) 'MESSAGE ID # IS NOW = ',MSGID
ENDIF
IF(POS .GT. MAXEWMES) THEN
WRITE(*,*) ' *** PROGRAM STOPPED ***'
WRITE(V) 'EW SITE #',JJ,' NEEDS TO SEND A MESSAGE AND',
& ' EW MESSAGE ARRAY IS FULL'
WRITE(16,*) 'EW SITE #',JJ,' NEEDS TO SEND A MESSAGE AND',
& ' EW MESSAGE ARRAY IS FULL'
WRITE(*,*) 'PRESENT VALUE OF MAXEWMES PARAMETER IS',POS-l
WRITE(*,*) 'INCREASE MAXEWMES PARAMETER IN EWMES1 DEF AND',
& ' RECOMPILE PROGRAM MODULES'
WRITE(16,*) ' *** PROGRAM STOPPED ***'
WRITE(V) ' *** PROGRAM STOPPED ***'
STOP
ENDIF


























IF (DEBUG .GE. 3) THEN
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WRITE(16,*) 'MESSAGE DATA FROM EW SITE #',






C DETERMINE WHERE MESSAGE IS GOING VTA CONNECT ARRAY
C... LOOK FIRST FOR A MATCH OF EW TYPE AND CORRESPONDING UNIT # ..
DO20L=l,NUMCON
IF(CONNECT(L,l) .EQ. 1 AND. CONNECT(L,2) .EQ. JJ) THEN
IF(CONNECT(L,3) .EQ. 2) THEN
IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) 'EW SITE #',JJ,' WILL SEND MESSAGE TO EW,
& ' RPT STA #',CONNECT(L,4),' MSGID = ',MSGID
ENDIF
IF (DEBUG .GE. 3) THEN
WRITE(16,*) 'MESSAGE TO BE SEND IS:',
& (MSG(LL),LL=1,MAXMSGSIZE)
ENDIF
ELSEIF(CONNECT(L,3) .EQ. 3) THEN
IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) 'EW SITE #',JJ,' WILL SEND MESSAGE TO',
& ' ADWOC CENTER; MSGID = \MSGID
ENDIF
ELSEIF(CONNECT(L,3) .EQ. 4) THEN
IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) 'EW SITE #',JJ,' WILL SEND MES. TO BAT. #',
& CONNECT(L,4),'MSGID = ',MSGID
ENDIF
ELSEIF(CONNECT(L,3) .EQ. 5) THEN
IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) 'EW SITE #\JJ,' WILL SEND MES. TO SAM SITE',










C... INCREMENT POSITON INDEX AND ID # FOR NEXT EW MESSAGE
MSGID = MSGID + 1
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EWMESPOS(JJ) = POS +
1
IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) 'EW SITE MESSAGE POINTER INCREMENTED TO =',
& EWMESPOS(JJ),' FOR NEXT MESSAGE'
WRITE(16,*) 'NEXT MESSAGE ID # =',MSGID,





C LATEST CHANGE MADE 6/28/91 BFS
C COPY OF SHOT FROM NON-IADS MODE
C
C CALLED BY - IADS
C CALLS - FIRE0,FIRE1,FIRE2,FIRE3
C
PARAMETER (IM = 30,JM = 25,KM = 20)
IMPLICIT LOGICAL (A-Z)















C VARIABLES USED IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C
C VARIABLES SET BY PARAMETER STATEMENT
C IM - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C JM - MAX # OF SAM SITES
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C KM - MAX # OF PENETRATOR CHECKPOINTS
C IN COMMON BLOCK
C DEBUG - FLAG FOR DEBUG PRINTOUTS
C ITAR(JM) - HOLDS PEN. # THAT SAM SITE JM IS LOCKED ONTO
C J - SAM SITE LOOP COUNTER
C NSITE - MAX # OF SAM SITES
C NOSHOT(JM) - MAX # OF SALVOS AVAILABLE TO SAM SITE (JM)
C NSHOT(JM) - RUNNING TOTAL # OF SALVOS SAM SITE JM HAS FIRED
C PS(JM) - SURVIVAL PROBABILITY OF SAM SITE JM
C PSSMIN - MIN SURVIVAL PROBABILITY THAT THE SAM SITE MUST MAINTAIN
C - IN ORDER TO STAY IN THE SIMULATION
C STATS(JM) - INTEGER VALUE INDICATING THE STATUS OF EACH SAM SITE
C - IF =0; SITE IS NOT RADIATING
C - IF = 1; SITE IS ESTABLING A TRACK FILE ON A TARGET
C - AND GETTING READY TO FIRE
C - IF =2; SITE HAS A SALVO ENROUTE TO THE TARGET
C - IF =3; SITE IS PERFORMING POST INTERCEPT DECISIONS
C TIME - SIMULATION TIME (IN SECONDS) FROM THE START OF THE RUN
C START PROGRAM
C WRITE(V) 'FIRE'
DO 10 J = 1,NSITE
C ... IF THIS IS AN EW SITE ,SKIP OVER IT
IF(EWSITE(J) .EQ. 1) GOTO 10
IF (PSSMIN .LE. PS(J) AND. NOSHOT(J) .GE. NSHOT(J)) GO TO 20
IF (STATS(J) .NE. 0) THEN
IF (NSHOT(J) .GT. NOSHOT(J)) THEN
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1000) TIME,J
1001 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC SITE ',12,' STOPS RADIATING PERMANENTLY:',







IF(PS(J) .LT. PSSMIN) THEN
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1000) TIME,J












20 IF (STATS(J) .EQ. 0) THEN
IF (ITAR(J) .NE. 0) ITAR(J) =
CALL FIREO
GO TO 10
ELSEIF (STATS(J) .EQ. 1) THEN
CALL FIRE1
GO TO 10











C LATEST CHANGE MADE 7/03/91 BFS
C COPY OF SHOT0 FROM NON-IADS MODE
C
C CALLED BY - FIRE
C CALLS - TERRA,JAMMER,FUTLOK,NTRCPT
C
PARAMETER (IM = 30,JM = 25,KM = 20)
IMPLICIT LOGICAL (A-Z)
C DECLARE LOCAL VARIABLES
REALTF
INTEGER IJ,IK,JJ,K,MFLG,TOT




















C VARIABLES USED IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C
C VARIABLES SET BY PARAMETER STATEMENT
C IM - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C JM - MAX # OF SAM SITES
C KM - MAX # OF PENETRATOR CHECKPOINTS
C IN COMMON BLOCK
C CD1(IM,JM) - TIME (IN SECONDS) WHEN PENETRATOR IM ENTERS OUTER
C - LAUNCH ENVLOPE OF SAM SITE JM
C CD2(IM,JM) - TIME (IN SECONDS) WHEN PENETRATOR IM TRANSITIONS
C - LAUNCH ENVLOPE OF SAM SITE JM. IF THE PENETRATORS
C - FLIGHTPATH INTERSECTS THE ENVELOPE 2 TIMES, THIS IS
C - THE ENVELOPE EXIT TIME. IF 4 INTERSECTIONS OCCUR,
C - THIS IS THE EXIT OF THE ENVELOPE INTO THE SITES
C - MIN RANGE ZONE.
C CD3(IM,JM) - TIME (IN SECONDS) WHEN PENETRATOR IM TRANSITIONS
C - LAUNCH ENVLOPE OF SAM SITE JM. IF THE PENETRATORS
C - FLIGHTPATH INTERSECTS THE ENVELOPE 2 TIMES, THIS
C - TIME HAS NO MEANING. IF 4 INTERSECTIONS OCCUR,
C - THIS IS THE ENTRANCE INTO THE ENVELOPE FROM THE
C - SITES MIN RANGE ZONE.
C CD4(IM,JM) - TIME (IN SECONDS) WHEN PENETRATOR IM TRANSITIONS
C - LAUNCH ENVLOPE OF SAM SITE JM. IF THE PENETRATORS
C - FLIGHTPATH INTERSECTS THE ENVELOPE 2 TIMES, THIS
C - TIME HAS NO MEANING. IF 4 INTERSECTIONS OCCUR,
C - THIS IS THE EXIT OF THE PENETRATOR FROM THE ENVELOPE
C DEBUG - FLAG FOR DEBUG PRINTOUTS
C I - PEN. LOOP COUNTER
C IOP(IO) - HOLDS FLAGS(l/0) TO SELECT PROGRAM RUNNING MODES
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C ISECT(IM,JM) - HOLDS A FLAG (1/0) FOR EACH PENETRATOR IM WHICH
C - INDICATES WHETHER EACH SAM SITE JM CAN( = 1) OR
C - CANNOT( = 0) FIRE AT THIS PENETRATOR
C ISHOT(IM,JM)
C ITAR(JM) - HOLDS PEN. # THAT SAM SITE JM IS LOCKED ONTO
C DC(JM) - FLAG (1/0) USED TO CONTROL PRINTING OUTPUT DATA
C J - SAM SITE LOOP COUNTER
C MSITE(JM) - HOLDS THE SAM SITE TYPE (1-9) FOR SITE JM
C NAC - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C NSITE - MAX # OF SAM SITES
C PSA(IM) - SURVIVAL PROBABILITY OF PENETRATOR IM
C PSAMIN - MINIMUM SURVIVABILITY OF PENETRATOR;IF PSA(IM) IS BELOW
C - THIS, THE PENETRATOR IS REMOVED FROM THE SIMULATION
C RRAD(JM) - HOLDS TIMING DATA (IN SECONDS) FOR SAM SITE JM; USED
C - IN DETERMINING WHEN TO FIRE,RE-FIRE,TRACK,ETC...
C STATS(JM) - INTEGER VALUE INDICATING THE STATUS OF EACH SAM SITE
C - IF =0; SITE IS NOT RADIATING
C - IF = 1; SITE IS ESTABLING A TRACK FILE ON A TARGET
C - AND GETTING READY TO FIRE
C - IF =2; SITE HAS A SALVO ENROUTE TO THE TARGET
C - IF =3; SITE IS PERFORMING POST INTERCEPT DECISIONS






C LOCAL TO THIS SUBROUTINE
C IJ
C IK - FLAG(l/0) USED BY SUBROUTINE JAMMER TO INDICATE IF( = 1)
C - THE PENETRATOR IS MASKED TO A SAM SITE BY JAMMING; BY
C - SUBROUTINE TERRA TO INDICATE IF( = 1) THE PENETRATOR IS MASKED
C - BY THE TERRAIN FROM A SAM SITE; BY SUBROUTINE CHECKS TO
C - INDICATE( = 1) THAT THE PENETRATOR HAS BEEN DESTROYED; BY
C - SUBROUTINE FUTLOK TO SEE IF( = 1) THE ENGAGEMENT ANGLE OF THE
C - PENETRATOR AND THE SAM IS WITHIN THE VALUE TO ALLOW FOR A
C - LAUNCH AGAINST THIS PENETRATOR
C JJ - LOOP COUNTER
C K
C MFLG
C TOT - TOTAL NUMBER OF OTHER SAM SITES THAT ARE ENGAGING THE









C PRINT FLAG FALSE.
DO70I = l,NAC
C....IF YOU HAVE NOT YET DETECTED THE TGT WITH YOUR EW SITES SKIP OVER.
IF(DETALL(I) .EQ. 0) GO TO 70
C
IF (ISECT(I,J) .EQ. .OR. PSA(I) .LT. PSAMIN) GO TO 70
CALL TERRA(IK)
IF (IK .NE. 0) GO TO 70
CALL JAMMER(IK)
IF (IK .NE. 0) ISHOT(I,J) = l
IF (IK .NE. 0) GO TO 70
C CHECK FOR PENETRATOR WITHIN SAM CONE.
C NO INTERSECTION WITH CONE
IF (CD1(I,J) .GT. 20000.) GO TO 70
IF (TIME .LT. CD1(I,J)-TTRACK(J) .OR. TIME .GT. CD4(I,J)-
$TTRACK(J)) GO TO 70
IF (TIME + TTRACK(J) .LT. CD2(I,J)) GO TO 80
IF (CD3(I,J) .GT. 20000.) GO TO 70
IF (TIME + TTRACK(J) .GT. CD2(I,J) AND. TIME + TTRACK(J) .LT.
$CD3(I,J)) GO TO 70
C CHECK FOR MINIMUM ASPECT ANGLE IF SAM IS AN IR MISSILE.
80 CALL FUTLOK(IK)
IF (IK .NE. 0) GO TO 70
C FOR THE ONE SITE VERSUS ONE TARGET DOCTRINE
C IF ANY OTHER SITE IS ENGAGING THIS TARGET, YOU CAN'T.
IF (IOP(3) .EQ. 1) THEN
D0 85JJ = 1,NSITE
C WRITE(6,*) 'JJ,J,I,ITAR(JJ)', JJ,J,I,ITAR(JJ)
IF (J .NE. JJ AND. ITAR(JJ) .EQ. I) GO TO 70
85 CONTINUE
ENDIF
C FOR THE MAX OF TWO SITES VERSUS ONE TARGET DOCTRINE
C....IF MORE THAN ONE OTHER SITE IS ENGAGING THIS TARGET, YOU CAN'T.
IF (IOP(3) .EQ. 2) THEN
TOT =
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DO 87 JJ = 1,NSITE
IF (J .NE. JJ AND. ITAR(JJ) .EQ. I) TOT =TOT + 1
87 CONTINUE
IF(TOT .GT. 1) GO TO 70
ENDIF
C TO GET TO HERE MEANS THAT YOU HAVE AT LEAST ONE VALID TARGET.
C MFLG > 1 MEANS THAT LOCKON TO MORE THAN 1 TARGET IS POSSIBLE....
90MFLG = MFLG + 1
C IF (MFLG .GT. 1) GO TO 100
IF (IOP(3) .EQ. 5 AND. MFLG .GT. 1) GO TO 100
IF (IOP(3) .EQ. 3 AND. MFLG .GT. 1) GO TO 70





C WITH LOCKON TO MORE THAN 1 TARGET POSSIBLE,
C PICK THE ONE WITH THE LARGER Ps
100U = ITAR(J)
IF (PSA(I) .LT. PSA(IJ)) GO TO 70
CALL NTRCPT(TF)




IF (MFLG .EQ. 0) GO TO 999
C 1 MEANS SITE J IS ON LOCKON PHASE
STATS(J) = 1
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1000) TIME,J












IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1001)TIME,J,I,XT(I,2),YT(I,2),ZT(I,2)
1001 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC SITE ',12,' LOCKS ON PEN. ',I2,4X,F8.2,3X,
$ F8.2,3X,F8.2)
ENDIF









C LATEST CHANGE MADE 6/28/91 BFS.
C COPY OF SHOT1 FROM NON-IADS MODE
C
C CALLED BY - FIRE
C CALLS - FIRE4,NTRCPT
C
PARAMETER (IM = 30,JM = 25,KM = 20)
IMPLICIT LOGICAL (A-Z)
C DECLARE LOCAL VARIABLES
REALTF


















C VARIABLES USED IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C
C VARIABLES SET BY PARAMETER STATEMENT
C IM - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C JM - MAX # OF SAM SITES
C KM - MAX # OF PEN. CHECKPOINTS
C IN COMMON BLOCK
C DEBUG - FLAG FOR DEBUG PRINTOUTS
C DT - TACOPS TIME INCREMENT (1 SECOND)
C I - PEN. LOOP COUNTER
C rTAR(JM) - HOLDS PEN. # THAT SAM SITE JM IS LOCKED ONTO
C J - SAM SITE LOOP COUNTER
C NSHOT(JM) - RUNNING TOTAL # OF SALVOS SAM SITE JM HAS FIRED
C RRAD(JM) - HOLDS TIMING DATA (IN SECONDS) FOR SAM SITE JM; USED
C - IN DETERMINING WHEN TO FIRE,RE-FIRE,TRACK,ETC...
C STATS(JM) - INTEGER VALUE INDICATING THE STATUS OF EACH SAM SITE
C - IF =0; SITE IS NOT RADIATING
C - IF = 1; SITE IS ESTABLING A TRACK FILE ON A TARGET
C - AND GETTING READY TO FIRE
C - IF =2; SITE HAS A SALVO ENROUTE TO THE TARGET
C - IF =3; SITE IS PERFORMING POST INTERCEPT DECISIONS










C SHOOT SAM UNLESS TARGET TRACK IS LOST
I = ITAR(J)
RRAD(J) = RRAD(J) +DT
C TOO EARLY TO SHOOT










NSHOT(J) = NSHOT(J) +
1
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1001)TIME,J,I,NSHOT(J),XT(I,2),YT(I,2),ZT(I,2)
1001 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC SITE ',12,' FIRES ON PEN. ',12,' SALVO ', 13,
$ 4X,F8.2,1X,F8.2,1X,F8.2)
ENDIF








C LATEST CHANGE MADE 7/01/91 BFS.
C COPY OF SHOT2 FROM NON-IADS MODE
C
C CALLED BY - FIRE
C CALLS - TERRAASSESS
C
PARAMETER (IM = 30,JM = 25,KM = 20)
IMPLICIT LOGICAL (A-Z)
C DECLARE LOCAL VARIABLES
INTEGER IK
















C VARIABLES USED IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C
C VARIABLES SET BY PARAMETER STATEMENT
C IM - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C JM - MAX # OF SAM SITES
C KM - MAX # OF PEN. CHECKPOINTS
C IN COMMON BLOCK
C CDl(IMJM) - TIME (IN SECONDS) WHEN PENETRATOR IM ENTERS OUTER
C - LAUNCH ENVLOPE OF SAM SITE JM
C CD2(IM,JM) - TIME (IN SECONDS) WHEN PENETRATOR IM TRANSITIONS
C - LAUNCH ENVLOPE OF SAM SITE JM. IF THE PENETRATORS
C - FLIGHTPATH INTERSECTS THE ENVELOPE 2 TIMES, THIS IS
C - THE ENVELOPE EXIT TIME. IF 4 INTERSECTIONS OCCUR,
C - THIS IS THE EXIT OF THE ENVELOPE INTO THE SITES
C - MIN RANGE ZONE.
C CD3(IM,JM) - TIME (IN SECONDS) WHEN PENETRATOR IM TRANSITIONS
C - LAUNCH ENVLOPE OF SAM SITE JM. IF THE PENETRATORS
C - FLIGHTPATH INTERSECTS THE ENVELOPE 2 TIMES, THIS
C - TIME HAS NO MEANING. IF 4 INTERSECTIONS OCCUR,
C - THIS IS THE ENTRANCE INTO THE ENVELOPE FROM THE
C - SITES MIN RANGE ZONE.
C CD4(IM,JM) - TIME (IN SECONDS) WHEN PENETRATOR IM TRANSITIONS
C - LAUNCH ENVLOPE OF SAM SITE JM. IF THE PENETRATORS
C - FLIGHTPATH INTERSECTS THE ENVELOPE 2 TIMES, THIS
C - TIME HAS NO MEANING. IF 4 INTERSECTIONS OCCUR,
C - THIS IS THE EXIT OF THE PENETRATOR FROM THE ENVELOPE
C DEBUG - FLAG FOR DEBUG PRINTOUTS
C DT - TACOPS TIME INCREMENT (1 SECOND)
C GDT(JM) - KILL ASSES DELAY TIME FOR SAM SrTE JM
C I - PEN. LOOP COUNTER
C IOP(IO) - HOLDS FLAGS(l/0) TO SELECT PROGRAM RUNNING MODES
C ITAR(JM) - HOLDS PEN. # THAT SAM SITE JM IS LOCKED ONTO
C J - SAM SITE LOOP COUNTER
C MASKTIM(J) - TIME (IN SECONDS) WHEN FIRED ON TARGET IS TERRAIN
C - MASKED
C MWAITIM(J) - MAXIMUM WAIT TIME (IN SECONDS) AFTER THE TARGET IS
C - TERRAIN MASKED BEFORE THE SITE LOSES TRACK AND THE
C - OUTBOUND SAM IS LOST
C OUTIM(J) - TIME (IN SECONDS) WHEN FIRED ON TARGET IS OUTSIDE OF
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C - THE SITE LAUNCH ENVELOPE
C OWAITIM(J) - MAXIMUM WAIT TIME (IN SECONDS) AFTER THE TARGET IS
C - OUTSIDE OF THE SITE LAUNCH ENVELOPE BEFORE THE SITE
C - LOSES TRACK AND THE OUTBOUND SAM IS LOST
C RRAD(JM) - HOLDS TIMING DATA (IN SECONDS) FOR SAM SITE JM; USED
C - IN DETERMINING WHEN TO FIRE,RE-FIRE,TRACK,ETC...
C STATS(JM) - INTEGER VALUE INDICATING THE STATUS OF EACH SAM SITE
C - IF =0; SITE IS NOT RADIATING
C - IF = 1; SITE IS ESTABLING A TRACK FILE ON A TARGET
C - AND GETTING READY TO FIRE
C - IF =2; SITE HAS A SALVO ENROUTE TO THE TARGET
C - IF =3; SITE IS PERFORMING POST INTERCEPT DECISIONS










C TRACK TARGET AND ASSESS INTERCEPT
I = ITAR(J)
RRAD(J) = RRAD(J) +DT
C TOO EARLY FOR INTERCEPT
C CHECK IF PEN. IS TERRAIN MASKED TOO LONG.
IF (RRAD(J) .LT. XXINT(J) + TTRACK(J)) THEN
IF (MASKTIM(J) .EO. 0.0) THEN
CALL TERRA(IK)
IF (IK .EQ. 1) THEN
MASKTIM(J) =TIME
IF (DEBUG .EQ. 1) THEN
WRITE (16,1007) TIME,I,J,XT(I,2),YT(I,2),ZT(I,2)
1007 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC PEN. ',12,' MASKED FROM SITE ',12,







ELSEIF(MASKTIM(J) .NE. 0.0) THEN
CALL TERRA(IK)
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IF (IK .EQ. 1) THEN
IF(TIME-MASKTIM(J) .EQ. MWAITIM(J)) THEN
MASKTIM(J)=0.0
STATS(J) =
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1005)TIME,J,I,XT(I,2),YT(I,2),ZT(I,2)
1005 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC SITE ',12/ LOSES TRACK OF PEN. '







ELSEIF (IK .NE. 1) THEN
MASKTIM(J) = 0.0
IF (DEBUG .EQ. 1) THEN
WRITE (16,1009) TIME,I,J,XT(I,2),YT(I,2),ZT(I,2)
1009 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC PEN. ',12,' UMMASKED FROM SITE ',12,








C CHECK IF PEN. IS OUT OF ENVELOPE FOR TOO LONG
IF (OUTIM(J) .EQ. 0.0) THEN
IF (CD1(I,J) .GT. 20000.0) THEN
OUTIM(J) =TIME
IF (DEBUG .EQ. 1) THEN
WRITE (16,1008) TIME,I,J,XT(I,2),YT(I,2),ZT(I,2)
1008 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC PEN. ',12,' OUT OF ENVELOPE OF SITE'







ELSEIF(OUTIM(J) .NE. 0.0) THEN
IF (CD1(I,J) .GT. 20000.0) THEN
IF (TIME-OUTIM(J) .EQ. OWAITIM(J)) THEN
OUTIM(J) = 0.0
STATS(J) =
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
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WRITE(16,1006)TIME,J,I,XT(I,2),YT(I,2),ZT(I,2)
1006 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC SITE ',12,' LOSES TRACK OF PEN. '








$(CD4(I,J) .GE. 20000.0 AND.
$(TIME. GE. CD1(I,J) AND. TIME .LE. CD2(I,J)))
$.OR.
$(CD4(I,J) .LT. 20000.0 AND.
$(TIME .GE. CD1(I,J) AND. TIME .LE. CD2(I,J)) .OR.
$(TIME .GE. CD3(I,J) AND. TIME .LE. CD4(I,J)))) THEN
OUTIM(J) = 0.0
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1010) TIME,J,I,XT(I,2),YT(I,2),ZT(I,2)
1010 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC PEN. ',12,' BACK INSIDE ENVELOPE',
















C 3 MEANS POST-SHOT ACTIVITY
STATS(J) = 3
RRAD(J) = GDT(J)
IF (TIME .GT. CD2(I,J) AND. CD3(I,J) .GT. 20000. .OR.
$TIME .GT. CD4(I,J)) GO TO 130
IF (CD3(U) XT. 20000. AND. TIME .GT. CD2(I,J) AND.
$TIME .LT. CD3(I,J)) GO TO 140
C 12/18/87 NEW TEST CODE BFS
167
IF (CD1(I,J) .GT. 20000. AND. TIME .LT. CD1(I,J))
$GO TO 150
CALL TERRA(IK)
IF (IK .EG. 1) GO TO 160
CALL ASSESS
GO TO 999
130 IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1001) TIME,J,I,XT(I,2),YT(I,2),ZT(I,2)
WRITE(16,1011)CD1(I,J),CD2(I,J),CD3(I,J),CD4(I,J)
1001 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC SITE ',12,' MISSES PEN. ',12, » > MAX RANGE ',
$ 3F8.2)








140 IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1002) TIME,J,I,XT(I,2),YT(I,2),ZT(I,2),CD1(I,J),
$ CD2(I,J),CD3(I,J),CD4(I,J)
1002 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC SITE ',12,' MISSES PEN. ',12, ' < MIN. RANGE '








150 IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1003)TIME,J,I,XT(I,2),YT(I,2),ZT(I,2),CD1(I,J),
$ CD2(I,J),CD3(I,J),CD4(I,J)
1003 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC SITE ',12,' MISSES PEN. ',12,' OUT OF ENVELOPE '









160 IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1004)TIME,J,I,XT(I,2),YT(I,2),ZT(I,2)
1004 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC SITE ',12,' MISSES PEN. ',12,












C LATEST CHANGE MADE 6/28/91 BFS
C COPY OF SHOT3 FROM NON-IADS MODE
C
C CALLED BY - FIRE
C CALLS - TERRA,JAMMER,NTRPCT,FUTLOK
C
PARAMETER (IM = 30,JM = 25,KM = 20)
IMPLICIT LOGICAL (A-Z)
C DECLARE LOCAL VARIABLES
REALTF
INTEGER FUTSTATS,IK,K,MFLG

















C VARIABLES USED IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C
C VARIABLES SET BY PARAMETER STATEMENT
C IM - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C JM - MAX # OF SAM SITES
C KM - MAX # OF PEN. CHECKPOINTS
C IN COMMON BLOCK
C CD1(IM,JM) - TIME (IN SECONDS) WHEN PENETRATOR IM ENTERS OUTER
C - LAUNCH ENVLOPE OF SAM SITE JM
C CD2(IM,JM) - TIME (IN SECONDS) WHEN PENETRATOR IM TRANSITIONS
C - LAUNCH ENVLOPE OF SAM SITE JM. IF THE PENETRATORS
C - FLIGHTPATH INTERSECTS THE ENVELOPE 2 TIMES, THIS IS
C - THE ENVELOPE EXIT TIME. IF 4 INTERSECTIONS OCCUR,
C - THIS IS THE EXIT OF THE ENVELOPE INTO THE SITES
C - MIN RANGE ZONE.
C CD3(IM,JM) - TIME (IN SECONDS) WHEN PENETRATOR IM TRANSITIONS
C - LAUNCH ENVLOPE OF SAM SITE JM. IF THE PENETRATORS
C - FLIGHTPATH INTERSECTS THE ENVELOPE 2 TIMES, THIS
C - TIME HAS NO MEANING. IF 4 INTERSECTIONS OCCUR,
C - THIS IS THE ENTRANCE INTO THE ENVELOPE FROM THE
C - SITES MIN RANGE ZONE.
C CD4(IM,JM) - TIME (IN SECONDS) WHEN PENETRATOR IM TRANSITIONS
C - LAUNCH ENVLOPE OF SAM SITE JM. IF THE PENETRATORS
C - FLIGHTPATH INTERSECTS THE ENVELOPE 2 TIMES, THIS
C - TIME HAS NO MEANING. IF 4 INTERSECTIONS OCCUR,
C - THIS IS THE EXIT OF THE PENETRATOR FROM THE ENVELOPE
C DEBUG - FLAG FOR DEBUG PRINTOUTS
C DT - TACOPS TIME INCREMENT (1 SECOND)
C I
C ISECT(IM,JM) - HOLDS A FLAG(l/0) FOR EACH PENETRATOR IM WHICH
C - INDICATES WHETHER EACH SAM SITE JM CAN( = 1) OR
C - CANNOT( = 0) FIRE AT THIS PENETRATOR
C ISHOT(IM,JM)
C ITAR(JM) - HOLDS PEN. # THAT SAM SrTE JM IS LOCKED ONTO
C J - SAM SITE LOOP COUNTER
C MSITE(JM) - HOLDS THE SAM SITE TYPE (1-9) FOR SITE JM
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C NAC - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C NOSHOT(JM) - MAX # OF SALVOS AVAILABLE TO SAM SITE (JM)
C NSHOT(JM) - RUNNING TOTAL # OF SALVOS SAM SITE JM HAS FIRED
•C PSA(IM) - SURVIVAL PROBABILITY OF PENETRATOR IM
C PSAMIN - MINIMUM SURVIVABILITY OF PENETRATOR;IF PSA(IM) IS BELOW
C THIS, THE PENETRATOR IS REMOVED FROM THE SIMULATION
C RR^D(JM) - HOLDS TIMING DATA (IN SECONDS) FOR SAM SITE JM; USED
C - IN DETERMINING WHEN TO FIRE,RE-FIRE,TRACK,ETC...
C STATS(JM) - INTEGER VALUE INDICATING THE STATUS OF EACH SAM SITE
C - IF =0; SITE IS NOT RADIATING
C - IF = 1; SITE IS ESTABLING A TRACK FILE ON A TARGET
C - AND GETTING READY TO FIRE
C - IF =2; SITE HAS A SALVO ENROUTE TO THE TARGET
C - IF =3; SITE IS PERFORMING POST INTERCEPT DECISIONS
C TIME - SIMULATION TIME (IN SECONDS) FROM THE START OF THE RUN
C TTRACK(JM)
C LOCAL TO THIS SUBROUTINE
C FUTSTATS - FUTURE STATUS OF SAM SITE. =1 IF SrTE WILL CONTINUE TO
C - TO RADIATE. =0 IF NO OTHER TARGETS ARE PRESENTLY WITHIN
C - RANGE TO LOCKON TO.
C IK - FLAG(l/0) USED BY SUBROUTINE JAMMER TO INDICATE IF( = 1)
C - THE PENETRATOR IS MASKED TO A SAM SITE BY JAMMING; BY
C - SUBROUTINE TERRA TO INDICATE IF( = 1) THE PENETRATOR IS MASKED
C - BY THE TERRAIN FROM A SAM SITE; BY SUBROUTINE CHECKS TO
C - INDICATE( = 1) THAT THE PENETRATOR HAS BEEN DESTROYED; BY
C - SUBROUTINE FUTLOK TO SEE IF(= 1) THE ENGAGEMENT ANGLE OF THE
C - PENETRATOR AND THE SAM IS WITHIN THE VALUE TO ALLOW FOR A
C - LAUNCH AGAINST THIS PENETRATOR
C K-





C SHOT'S OVER. NOW WHAT?
RRAD(J) = RRAD(J)-DT
IF (RRAD(J) .GT. DT) GO TO 99




IF (ISECT(I,J) .EQ. .OR. PSA(I) .LT. PSAMIN) GO TO 70
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CALL TERRA(IK)
IF (IK .NE. 0) GO TO 70
CALL JAMMER(IK)
IF (IK .NE. 0) GO TO 70
C CHECK FOR PENETRATOR WITHIN SAM CONE
C NO INTERSECTION WITH CONE
IF (CD1(I,J) .GT. 20000.) GO TO 70
IF (TIME+1 LT. CD1(I,J)-TTRACK(J) .OR. TIME + 1 .GT. CD4(I,J)-
$TTRACK(J)) GO TO 70
IF (TIME + 1 + TTRACK(J) .LT. CD2(I,J)) GO TO 80
IF (CD3(I,J) .GT. 20000.) GO TO 70
IF (TIME+1 + TTRACK(J) .GT. CD2(I,J) AND. TIME + 1 + TTRACK(J) LT.
$CD3(I,J)) GO TO 70
80 CALL FUTLOK(IK)
IF (IK .NE. 0) GO TO 70
90MFLG = 1
70 CONTINUE
C MEANS SITE J STOPS RADIATING
IF (MFLG .EQ. 0) THEN
FUTSTATS =
ENDIF
C END NEW CODE 10/27/87 BFS.
I = ITAR(J)
STATS(J) =
IF (NSHOT(J) .EQ. NOSHOT(J)) NSHOT(J) = NSHOT(J) +
1
C NO MORE SHOTS FOR THE SAM SITE IF: THE SITE Ps IS LESS THAN
C THAT GIVEN OR IT HAS SHOT ALL ITS SALVOS
IF (PSA(I) .LT. PSAMIN .OR. NSHOT(J) .GT. NOSHOT(J)) GO TO 199
CALL FUTLOK(IK)
IF (IK .NE. 0) GO TO 199
C TAKE THE SHOT?
C FOOL TARGET TRACK ROUTINE
180 RRAD(J) = TTRACK(J)-DT
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CALL NTRCPT(TF)
C CHECK TO SEE IF TARGET IS IN THE ENVELOPE (NEW 12/18/87).
IF (CD1(I,J) .GT. 20000.) GO TO 199
C END NEW CODE 12/18/87
C TAKE THE SHOT
IF (TIME +TF LT. CD2(I,J)) THEN
GO TO 190
ENDIF
C TARGETS MAX RANGE
IF (CD3(I,J) .GT. 20000. .OR. TIME +TF .GT. CD4(I,J)) GO TO 199
C BETTER TO GET NEW TARGET
IF (CD3(I,J)-TIME .GT. TTRACK(J)) GO TO 199
C MAYBE WAIT FOR REAR SHOT






IF (STATS(J) .EO. ) ITAR(J) =
IF (STATS(J) .EO. AND. FUTSTATS .EQ. 0) THEN
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1000) TIME,J











C LATEST CHANGE MADE 6/28/91 BFS.
C COPY OF SHOT4 FROM NON-IADS MODE
C
C CALLED BY - FIRE1
C CALLS - CHECKS.SUSPNS
C
PARAMETER (IM = 30,JM = 25,KM = 20)
IMPLICIT LOGICAL (A-Z)
C DECLARE LOCAL VARIABLES
INTEGER IK













C VARIABLES USED IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C
C VARIABLES SET BY PARAMETER STATEMENT
C IM - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C JM - MAX # OF SAM SITES
C KM - MAX # OF PEN. CHECKPOINTS
C IN COMMON BLOCK
C CD1(IM,JM) - TIME (IN SECONDS) WHEN PENETRATOR IM ENTERS OUTER
C - LAUNCH ENVLOPE OF SAM SITE JM
C CD2(IM,JM) - TIME (IN SECONDS) WHEN PENETRATOR IM TRANSITIONS
C - LAUNCH ENVLOPE OF SAM SITE JM. IF THE PENETRATORS
C - FLIGHTPATH INTERSECTS THE ENVELOPE 2 TIMES, THIS IS
C - THE ENVELOPE EXIT TIME. IF 4 INTERSECTIONS OCCUR,
C - THIS IS THE EXIT OF THE ENVELOPE INTO THE SITES
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C - MIN RANGE ZONE.
C CD3(IM,JM) - TIME (IN SECONDS) WHEN PENETRATOR IM TRANSITIONS
C - LAUNCH ENVLOPE OF SAM SITE JM. IF THE PENETRATORS
C - FLIGHTPATH INTERSECTS THE ENVELOPE 2 TIMES, THIS
C - TIME HAS NO MEANING. IF 4 INTERSECTIONS OCCUR,
C - THIS IS THE ENTRANCE INTO THE ENVELOPE FROM THE
C - SITES MIN RANGE ZONE.
C CD4(IM,JM) - TIME (IN SECONDS) WHEN PENETRATOR IM TRANSITIONS
C - LAUNCH ENVLOPE OF SAM SITE JM. IF THE PENETRATORS
C - FLIGHTPATH INTERSECTS THE ENVELOPE 2 TIMES, THIS
C - TIME HAS NO MEANING. IF 4 INTERSECTIONS OCCUR,
C - THIS IS THE EXIT OF THE PENETRATOR FROM THE ENVELOPE
C DEBUG - FLAG FOR DEBUG PRINTOUTS
C I - PEN. LOOP COUNTER
C LX(JM) - FLAG (1/0) USED TO CONTROL PRINTING OUTPUT DATA
C J - SAM SITE LOOP COUNTER
C RRAD(JM) - HOLDS TIMING DATA (IN SECONDS) FOR SAM SITE JM; USED
C - IN DETERMINING WHEN TO FIRE,RE-FIRE,TRACK,ETC...
C STATS(JM) - INTEGER VALUE INDICATING THE STATUS OF EACH SAM SITE
C - IF =0; SITE IS NOT RADIATING
C - IF = 1; SITE IS ESTABLING A TRACK FILE ON A TARGET
C - AND GETTING READY TO FIRE
C - IF =2; SITE HAS A SALVO ENROUTE TO THE TARGET
C - IF =3; SITE IS PERFORMING POST INTERCEPT DECISIONS





C LOCAL TO THIS SUBROUTINE
C IK - FLAG(l/0) USED BY SUBROUTINE JAMMER TO INDICATE IF( = 1)
C - THE PENETRATOR IS MASKED TO A SAM SITE BY JAMMING; BY
C - SUBROUTINE TERRA TO INDICATE IF( = 1) THE PENETRATOR IS MASKED
C - BY THE TERRAIN FROM A SAM SITE; BY SUBROUTINE CHECKS TO
C - INDICATE( = 1) THAT THE PENETRATOR HAS BEEN DESTROYED; BY
C - SUBROUTINE FUTLOK TO SEE IF( = 1) THE ENGAGEMENT ANGLE OF THE
C - PENETRATOR AND THE SAM IS WITHIN THE VALUE TO ALLOW FOR A
C - LAUNCH AGAINST THIS PENETRATOR
C START PROGRAM
C WRITE(*,*) 'FIRE4'
C DOES INTRUDER EVADE SAM SYSTEM?
CALL CHECKS(IK)
IF (IK .NE. 0) GO TO 99
C WITHIN CONE....
IF (TIME .LT. CD2(I,J)) GO TO 99
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C MUST BE LONG
IF (CD3(I,J) .GT. 20000.) GO TO 160
C NOT LONG
IF (TIME .LT. CD4(I,J)) GO TO 170
C PRINT MESSAGE ONCE.
160 IF (IX(J) .NE. 0) GO TO 180
IX(J) = 1
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1005)TIME,J,IrXT(I,2),YT(I,2),ZT(I,2),CDl(I,J),
$ CD2(I,J),CD3(I,J),CD4(I,J)
1005 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC SrTE ',12,' WILL LOSE PEN. ',12,
$ ' IN 3 SECS. - LONG \3F7.1,'CD1-CD4: \4F8.1)
ENDIF









170 IF (TIME .GT. CD3(I,J)) GO TO 99
C PERFORM DECISION ONLY ONCE.
IF (LX(J) .NE. 0) GO TO 99
IX(J) = 1
C LOCK ON NEW TARGET BEST.
IF (CD3(I,J)-TIME .GT. TTRACK(J)) THEN
STATS(J) =
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1000) TIME.J








C SAM FIRES IF STATS IS UNCHANGED
RRAD(J) =TIME + TTRACK(J)-CD3(I,J)
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1006)TIME,J,I^T(I,2),YT(I,2),ZT(I,2),CD1(I,J),
$ CD2(I,J),CD3(I,J),CD4(I,J)
1006 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC SITE ',12,' HAS PEN. ',12,
$ ' IN MIN RANGE \3F7.1,'CD1-CD4: \4F8.1)
ENDIF








C LATEST CHANGE MADE 07/19/91 BFS
C FOR MESSAGES GOING TO ADWOC CENTER FROM AN EW SITE. THIS SUB
C LOCATES AND RECEIVES THE DETECTION DATA ASSOCIATED WITH THE
C MESSAGE AND UPDATES THE ADWOCS KNOWN TARGET DETECTION STATUS.
C
C CALLED BY - RADWOC
C CALLS - NONE
C
PARAMETER (IM = 30,JM = 25,KM = 20)
IMPLICIT LOGICAL (A-Z)
C DECLARE PASSED VARIABLES
INTEGER ORIGUNIT,MESID
REAL MSG2











C DECLARE LOCAL VARIABLES
INTEGER JJ,L,LL,II,DATAPOS,DATA(IM),ENDPOS
C VARIABLES USED IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C
C VARIABLES SET BY PARAMETER STATEMENT
C IM - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C JM - MAX # OF SAM SITES
C KM - MAX # OF PENETRATOR CHECKPOINTS
C IN COMMON BLOCK
C DEBUG - FLAG FOR DEBUG PRINTOUTS
C NAC - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C LOCAL TO THIS SUBROUTINE
C DATAPOS - POSITION OF ASSOCIATED DATA
C DATA - HOLDS DETECTION DATA ASSOCIATED WITH RECEIVED MESSAGE
C ENDPOS - ENDING POSITION OF EW SITE MSGID # ARRAY
C II - PASSED HOLDING MESSAGE ARRAY POINTER
C JJ - LOOP COUNTER
C L - LOOP COUNTER
C LL - LOOP COUNTER
C MSG2 - HOLDS RECEIVED MESSAGE TIME
C MESID - INCOMING MESSAGE ID #
C ORIGTYPE - INTEGER HOLDING THE ORIGIN SOURCE MESSAGE IADS TYPE #
C ORIGUNIT - INTEGER HOLDING THE ORIGIN SOURCE MESSAGE IADS UNIT #
C POS - POSITION OF NEXT OPEN SLOT IN MESSAGE ID HOLDING ARRAY
C PREVTYPE - INTEGER HOLDING THE PREVIOUS SOURCE IADS TYPE #
C UNIT - HOLDS UNIT #
C START PROGRAM
C WRITE(V) 'GETDET'
C LOCATE POSITION OF EW DETECTION DATA CORRELATING ON MESID
DO 17 JJ = l,EWMESPOS(ORIGUNIT)-l






IF(DATAPOS .EQ. 0) THEN
WRITE(*,*) 'POSITION OF EW DETECTION DATA NOT FOUND',
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& '.STOPPING PROGRAM IN SUB GETDET'
WRITE(16,*) 'POSITION OF EW DETECTION DATA NOT FOUND',
& '.STOPPING PROGRAM IN SUB GETDET'
ENDIF
IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) 'DATA IS AT POINTER POSITION'.DATAPOS
WRITE(16,*) 'HOLDING MESSAGE ID # IS NOW =',MESID
ENDIF




IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) 'MESSAGE DATA FROM EW SITE #',




& (EWDETDAT(ORIGUNIT,L,DATAPOS),L = 1,NAC)
ENDIF
C... SHIFT PENDING MESSAGES UP ONE POSITION, CLEAR DATA AT LAST
C ... POINTER POSITION AND SET POINTER OF ONE POSITION LESS
ENDPOS = EWMESPOS(ORIGUNIT)
DO 30 L=DATAPOS,ENDPOS








IF(DEBUG .GE. 3) THEN
WRITE(16,*) ' INCOMING EW MESSAGE POINTER DECREMENTED',
& ' TO =', EWMESPOS(ORIGUNIT)
ENDIF
C ... PROCESS THE NEW DETECTION DATA WITH THE EXISTING INFORMATION ...
C ... UPDATE THE KNOWN INFORMATION FOR THE EW SITE AND FOR THE COMBINED
C ... DETECTION KNOWLEDGE OF ALL TARGETS
DO60LL=l,NAC
DETTGT(ORIGUNIT,LL) = DATA(LL) + DETTGT(ORIGUNIT,LL)
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60 CONTINUE




DO 70 JJ = 1,NEWSITES
DO80LL=l,NAC
DETALL(LL) = DETTGT(JJ,LL) + DETALL(LL)
80 CONTINUE
70 CONTINUE
IF(DEBUG .GE. 3) THEN
WRITE(16,1003) MSG2,ORIGUNIT
1003 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC RECEIVED MESSAGE UPDATE FROM EW SITE ',12)
WRITE(16,1004) (DATA(LL),LL=1,NAC)
1004 FORMAT(10X,'FOR THIS EW SITE, UPDATE MESSAGE IS ',5013)
WRITE(16,1005) (DETTGT(ORIGUNlT,LL),LL= 1,NAC)
1005 FORMAT(10X,'FOR THIS EW SITE, NEW PEN. DET. STATUS IS',50I3)
ENDIF
IF(DEBUG .GE. 3) THEN
WRITE(16,*) ' NEW DETECTION STATUS FOR ALL SITES:'
DO 100 JJ - 1,NEWSITES
WRITE(16,1007) JJ,(DETTGT(JJ,LL),LL= 1,NAC)
1007 FORMAT(10X,'EW SITE #',I3,5X,50I3)
100 CONTINUE
ENDIF
IF(DEBUG .GE. 3) THEN







C LATEST CHANGE MADE 07/09/91 BFS
C RECEIVES A MESSAGE AND PUTS IT ON THE WAITING MESSAGE ARRAY
C
C CALLED BY - EWMES,REW,REWSTAADWOC,INITEW,RBAT,RSAM
C CALLS - NONE
C
PARAMETER (IM = 30,JM = 25,KM = 20)
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C DECLARE LOCAL VARIABLES
INTEGER II,POS





C DECLARE PASSED VARIABLES
REAL MSG(MAXMSGSIZE)
C VARIABLES USED IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C
C VARIABLES SET BY PARAMETER STATEMENT
C IM - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C JM - MAX # OF SAM SITES
C KM - MAX # OF PENETRATOR CHECKPOINTS
C IN COMMON BLOCK
C DEBUG - FLAG FOR DEBUG PRINTOUTS
C LOCAL TO THIS SUBROUTINE
C II - LOOP COUNTER




IF(POS .GT. 200) THEN
WRrTE(V) ' *** PROGRAM STOPPED ***'
WRITE(V) 'MESHOLD ARRAY IS FULL AND THERE ARE MORE',
& ' MESSAGES'
WRITE(16,*) 'MESHOLD ARRAY IS FULL AND THERE ARE MORE',
& ' MESSAGES'
WRITE(*,*) 'PRESENT DIMENSION OF MESHOLD IS 200'
WRITE(V) 'INCREASE DIMENSION IN HOLDM1 DEF AND',
& ' RECOMPILE PROGRAM MODULES'
WRITE(16,*) ' *** PROGRAM STOPPED ***'
WRITE(*,*) ' *** PROGRAM STOPPED ***'
STOP
ENDIF
IF(DEBUG .GE. 3) THEN




DO 10 II = 1,MAXMSGSIZE
MESHOLD(POS,II) = MSG(II)
10 CONTINUE
IF(DEBUG .GE. 3) THEN
WRITE(16,*) 'NEW MESSAGE PUT IN HOLDING ARRAY IS:',




IF(DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN






C LATEST CHANGE MADE 7/03/91 BFS
C CONTROLS DETECTION OF AND FIRING ON PENETRATORS AND CALLING OF
C IADS SUBROUTINES
C
C CALLED BY - TACOPS
C CALLS - INITEW,EWDET,FIRE,MESRDY
C
PARAMETER (IM = 30,JM = 25,KM = 20)
C IMPLICIT LOGICAL (A-Z)


















C VARIABLES USED IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C
C VARIABLES SET BY PARAMETER STATEMENT
C IM - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C JM - MAX # OF SAM SITES
C KM - MAX # OF PENETRATOR CHECKPOINTS
C IN COMMON BLOCK
C DEBUG - FLAG FOR DEBUG PRINTOUTS
C ITAR(JM) - HOLDS PEN. # THAT SAM SITE JM IS LOCKED ONTO
C J - SAM SITE LOOP COUNTER
C NSITE - MAX # OF SAM SITES
C NOSHOT(JM) - MAX # OF SALVOS AVAILABLE TO SAM SITE (JM)
C NSHOT(JM) - RUNNING TOTAL # OF SALVOS SAM SITE JM HAS FIRED
C PS(JM) - SURVIVAL PROBABILITY OF SAM SITE JM
C PSSMIN - MIN SURVIVAL PROBABILITY THAT THE SAM SITE MUST MAINTAIN
C - IN ORDER TO STAY IN THE SIMULATION
C START - FLAG(l/0) = 1 IMPLIES THIS THE STARTING (FIRST) LOOP
C - OF THE SIMULATION. DO INITIALIZING THINGS
C STATS(JM) - INTEGER VALUE INDICATING THE STATUS OF EACH SAM SITE
C - IF =0; SITE IS NOT RADIATING
C - IF = 1; SITE IS ESTABLING A TRACK FILE ON A TARGET
C - AND GETTING READY TO FIRE
C - IF =2; SITE HAS A SALVO ENROUTE TO THE TARGET
C - IF =3; SITE IS PERFORMING POST INTERCEPT DECISIONS
C TIME - SIMULATION TIME (IN SECONDS) FROM THE START OF THE RUN
C START PROGRAM
C WRrTE(V) 'IADS'
C ... AT START OF SIMULATION, SET THE INITIAL STATUS OF EACH EW SITE..




C IF(NINT(TIME) .EQ. 260) CALL EWOFF
C IF(NINT(TIME) .EQ. 101) CALL EWOFF
C IF(N1NT(TIME) .EQ. 400) CALL SAMOFF






IF(TIME .GT. 1999.) THEN






C LATEST CHANGE MADE 07/30/91 BFS
C WHEN AN ELEMENT OF THE IADS STRUCTURE IS DAMAGED, THIS SUBROUTINE
C SCANS THROUGH THE HOLDING MESSAGE ARRAY, LOCATES ANY MESSAGES
C ASSOCIATED WITH THE NEWLY DAMAGED ELEMENT AND UPDATED THE
SENDING
C TIME OF THE MESSAGE BASED UPON THE NEW DAMAGE LEVEL.
C
C CALLED BY - TICK2
C CALLS - DELMES,CDELAY,DLYMES,EWDET2,EWMES
C
PARAMETER (IM = 30,JM = 25,KM = 20)
IMPLICIT LOGICAL (A-Z)
C DECLARE PASSED VARIABLES.
INTEGER TYPE,UNIT1,UNIT2
REALRND1
C DECLARE LOCAL VARIABLES-
INTEGER IADSTYPE,IADSUNIT,II,JJ,LL,L,UPDATE(IM)
REAL DELAY























C VARIABLES USED IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C
C VARIABLES SET BY PARAMETER STATEMENT
C IM - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C JM - MAX # OF SAM SITES
C KM - MAX # OF PENETRATOR CHECKPOINTS
C IN COMMON BLOCK.
C DEBUG - FLAG FOR DEBUG PRINTOUTS
C I - PENETRATOR #
C J - SAM SITE #
C NAC - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C PS(JM) - SURVIVAL PROBABILITY OF SITE JM
C - IF =2; SITE HAS A SALVO ENROUTE TO THE TARGET
C - IF =3; SITE IS PERFORMING POST INTERCEPT DECISIONS
C PSSMIN - MIN. SURVIVAL PROBABILITY FOR SAM SITE TO STAY IN SIM.
C STATS(JM) - INTEGER VALUE INDICATING THE STATUS OF EACH SAM SITE
C - IF =0; SITE IS NOT RADIATING
C - IF = 1; SITE IS RADIATING
C TIME - SIMULATION TIME (IN SECONDS) FROM THE START OF THE RUN
C XS(JM) - X POSITION OF SITE
C YS(JM) - Y POSITION OF SITE
C LOCAL TO THIS SUBROUTINE
C ACTION - INTEGER INDICATING ACTION DESIRED IN MESSAGE
C CTIME - CURRENT TIME: TIME THAT MESSAGE IS TO BE SENT
C DELAY - EXTRA DELAY TIME DUE TO DAMAGE OF EW SITE
C II - LOOP COUNTER
C JJ - ARRAY POINTER
C L - EW SITE UNIT # FOR SAM SITE UNIT # OF INTEREST
C - OR NON-SAM TYPE TARGET NUMBER (DEPENDS UPON USE)
C INID - ID # OF INCOMING MESSAGE
C POS - POSITION OF NEXT OPEN SLOT IN MESSAGE ID HOLDING ARRAY
C RND1 - RANDOM NUMBER USED IN TICK2 SUB TO DETERMINE SURVIVAL
C - OUTCOME IN A PROBABILISTIC WAY
C UPDATE(IM) - HOLDS UPDATED DETECTION INFO FOR A RECENTLY KILLED




IF (TYPE .EQ. 1 AND. EWSITE(UNITl) .EQ. 1) THEN
C ... TARGET HIT WAS AN EW SITE IN THE IADS....
C ...DETERMINE THE UNIT NUMBER FOR THIS EW SITE
L =
DO 17 JJ = 1,NEWSITES
IF(EWID(JJ) .EQ. UNIT1) THEN
L = JJ
IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN






IF (L .EQ. 0) THEN
WRITE(16,*) ' UNABLE TO DETERMINE EW SITE #, STOPPING'
STOP
ENDIF
IF (PS(UNITl) .LT. EWPSMIN) THEN
C ... EW SITE DEAD. REMOVE DETECTION DATA FROM ADWOC
C ... AND UPDATE TIME OF ANY MESSAGES FROM THIS SITE
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE (16,1000) L
1000 FORMATf DESTROYED SITE WAS EW SITE #',I2)
ENDIF




C ... SEND A MESSAGE TO THE IADS ELEMEMTS TO REMOVE DETECTION INFO
C ... SET ALL DETECTED TARGETS TO UNDETECTED STATUS
C ... FIRST GET AN UPDATED DETECTION REPORT FOR THE EW SITE ..
CALL EWDET2(IADSUNIT,UPDATE)






IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) ' CHANGE IN DETECTION STATUS FOR EW SITE #',
& IADSUNIT
WRITE(16,*) ' (-1= LOST, 0= NO CHANGE, 1= NEW DETECTION)'
WRITE(16,*) ' (1-NAC) UPDATE DETECTION ARRAY :',
& (UPEWTGT(IADSUNIT,LL),LL=1,NAC)
WRITE(16,*) ' DELAY SET (SITE DEAD) TO = ',DELAY,
& ' TIME WHEN MESSAGE WILL BE SENT = ',TIME +DELAY
ENDIF
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1009) TIME,IADSUNIT,TIME +DELAY
1009 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC EW SITE ',12,' WILL SEND MESSAGE',
& ' AT TIME ',F5.0)
ENDIF
CALL EWMES(IADSUNIT,(TIME + DELAY))
C ... SEND A MESSAGE TO THE IADS ELEMEMTS TO REMOVE DETECTION INFO
ELSEIF (PS(UNITl) .GE. EWPSMIN) THEN
IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN





IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN





IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE (16,1010) L




IF (TYPE .EQ. 1 AND. EWSITE(UNITl) .EQ. 0) THEN
C ... TARGET HIT WAS A SAM SITE IN THE IADS....
LADSTYPE=5
IADSUNIT = UNIT1
IF (PS(J) XT. PSSMIN) THEN
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE (16,1007) TIME,I,J,PS(J),RD1
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1007 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC STANDOFF WEAPON ',12,' DESTROYS ',
& 'SAM SITE #',12,' PS = ',F4.2,' RND#',F4.2)
ENDIF
CALL DELMES(IADSTYPE,IADSUN1T)
ELSEIF (PS(J) .GE. PSSMIN) THEN
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE (16,1008) TIME,I,J,PS(J),RD1
1008 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC STANDOFF WEAPON ',12,' IMPACTS',
& ' SAM SITE #',12,' PS = ',F4.2,' RND#\F4.2)
ENDIF
IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN




IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN





IF (TYPE .EQ. 2) THEN
C ... THIS IS A NON-EW OF SAM SITE TYPE IADS TARGET
C ... FIND OUT WHAT TYPE AND UNIT # THIS IADS ELEMENT IT IS..
IADSTYPE =
IADSUN1T =
DO 30 II = 1,NUMIADSTGTS





IF (IADSTYPE .EQ. .OR. IADSUNIT .EQ. 0) THEN
WRITE(16,*) ' UNABLE TO DETERMINE IADS TYPE OR UNIT #'




C ... DETERMINE NEW DELAY TIME AND THEN LOCATE MESSAGE(S) AND ALTER
IF(IADSTYPE .EQ. 2) THEN
IF (PST(L) .LT. MINRPTPS) THEN
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
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WRITE (16,1001) IADSUNIT
1001 FORMAT(5X,'NON-SAM TYPE TARGET IS RPT STA #\I2)
ENDIF
CALL DELMES(IADSTYPE,IADSUNIT)
ELSEIF (PST(L) .GE. MINRPTPS) THEN
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE (16,1002) TIME,I,IADSUNIT,PST(L),RD1
1002 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC STANDOFF WEAPON ',12,' IMPACTS',
& ' RPT STA # ',12,' PS = ',F4.2,' RND#',F4.2)
ENDIF
IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN






IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN




ELSEIF(IADSTYPE .EQ. 3) THEN
IF (PST(L) LT. MINADWOCPS) THEN
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE (16,1003) TIME,I,PST(L),RD1
1003 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC STANDOFF WEAPON ',12,' DESTROYS ',
& 'ADWOC CENTER; PS = ',F4.2,' RND#',F4.2)
ENDIF
CALL DELMES(IADSTYPE,LADSUNIT)
ELSEIF (PST(L) .GE. MINADWOCPS) THEN
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE (16,1004) TIME,I,PST(L),RD1
1004 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC STANDOFF WEAPON ',12,' IMPACTS',
& ' ADWOC CENTER; PS = \F4.2,' RND#',F4.2)
ENDIF
IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN




IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN




ELSEIF(LADSTYPE .EQ. 4) THEN
IF (PST(L) LT. MINBATPS) THEN
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE (16,1005) TIME,I,IADSUNIT,PST(L),RD1
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1005 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC STANDOFF WEAPON ',12/ DESTROYS ',
& 'BAT CNRT# ',12,' PS = ',F4.2,' RND#',F4.2)
ENDIF
CALL DELMES(IADSTYPE,IADSUNIT)
ELSEIF (PST(L) .GE. MINBATPS) THEN
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE (16,1006) TIME,I,IADSUNIT,PST(L),RD1
1006 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC STANDOFF WEAPON ',12,' IMPACTS',
& ' BAT CNRT# ',12,' PS = ',F4.2,' RND#',F4.2)
ENDIF
IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN






IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN









C LATEST CHANGE MADE 6/28/91 BFS
C SETS INITIAL STATUS EACH EW SITE AT THE START OF THE SIMULAITON.
C STATUS =0; NON-RADIADITING. =1; RADIATING AND TRYING TO DETECT
C PENETRATORS
C
C CALLED BY - IADS
C CALLS - HOLDMES
C
PARAMETER (IM - 30.JM - 25,KM = 20)
C IMPLICIT LOGICAL (A-Z)
C DECLARE LOCAL VARIABLES
INTEGER II
REAL MSG(13)











C VARIABLES USED IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C
C VARIABLES SET BY PARAMETER STATEMENT
C IM - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C JM - MAX # OF SAM SITES
C KM - MAX # OF PEN. CHECKPOINTS
C VARIABLES IN COMMON BLOCK
C DEBUG - FLAG FOR DEBUG PRINTOUTS
C STATS(JM) - INTEGER VALUE INDICATING THE STATUS OF EACH SAM SITE
C - IF =0; SITE IS NOT RADIATING
C - IF - 1; SITE IS ESTABLING A TRACK FILE ON A TARGET
C - AND GETTING READY TO FIRE, SITE IS RADIATING
C - IF =2; SITE HAS A SALVO ENROUTE TO THE TARGET
C - IF =3; SITE IS PERFORMING POST INTERCEPT DECISIONS
C LOCAL TO THIS SUBROUTINE













C... SET ALL EW SITES TO RADIATING, I.E. TRYING TO DETECT TARGETS
DO 10II = 1,NEWSITES






IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1003)MSG(1),MSG(2),NINT(MSG(7))
1003 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC ADWOC WILL SEND START UP MESSAGE AT TIME',
& F5.0,' TO EW SITE # ',12)
WRITE(16,*) ' MSGID = ',NINT(MSG(9))
ENDIF
CALL HOLDMES(MSG)
C ... SEND COPY OF MESSAGE TO RPT STATIONS TOO
MSG(6) = 2.0
MSG(7) = 1.0
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1004) MSG(1),MSG(2),NINT(MSG(13))
1004 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC ADWOC WILL SEND START UP MESSAGE AT TIME',
& F5.0,' TO EW SITE # ',12)
WRITE(16,*) ' VIA RPT STA #',NINT(MSG(7)),




IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,1004)MSG(1),MSG(2),NINT(MSG(13))
WRITE(16,*) ' VIA RPT STA #',NINT(MSG(7)),
& ' MSGID = ',NINT(MSG(9))
ENDIF
CALL HOLDMES(MSG)
MSGID = MSGID + 1
10 CONTINUE
C ... GENERATE A DUPLICATE MESSAGE AS A TEST
C MSGID = MSGID-2
C MSG(2) = 20.0
C MSG(8) = 0.0
C DO 20 II = 1,NEWSITES
C MSG(7) = REAL(II)
C MSG(9) = REAL(MSGID)
C CALL HOLDMES(MSG)





C LATEST CHANGE MADE 07/11/91 BFS
C DETERMINES IF A MESSAGE IS READY TO SEND, DETERMINES THE IADS
C TYPE THE MESSAGE IS GOING TO AND CALLS THE APPROPRIATE SUB.
C
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C CALLED BY - IADS
C CALLS - REW,REWSTA,RADWOC,RBAT,RSAM
C
PARAMETER (IM = 30,JM = 25,KM = 20)
IMPLICIT LOGICAL (A-Z)
C DECLARE LOCAL VARIABLES
INTEGER GOINGTO,II,JJ,MESID
REAL MESTIME









C VARIABLES USED IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C
C VARIABLES SET BY PARAMETER STATEMENT
C IM - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C JM - MAX # OF SAM SITES
C KM - MAX # OF PENETRATOR CHECKPOINTS
C IN COMMON BLOCK
C DEBUG - FLAG FOR DEBUG PRINTOUTS
C DT - TIME STEP SIM. CLOCK IS INCREMENTED BY
C TIME - SIMULATION TIME (IN SECONDS) FROM THE START OF THE RUN
C LOCAL TO THIS SUBROUTINE
C GOINGTO - IADS UNIT # THAT MESSAGE IS GOING TO
C II - LOOP COUNTER
C JJ - LOOP COUNTER
C MESID - HOLDS MESSAGE ID #
C MESTIME - HOLDS TIME WHEN MESSAGE WILL BE SENT
C START PROGRAM
C WRITE(*,*) 'MESRDY'
C ... CHECK IF ANY MESSAGES ARE READY TO BE SENT
C ... CONSTRUCT A LOOP THAT WILL ALLOW POINTING AND ENDING INDEX
C ... TO BE MODIFIED WHEN MESSAGES ARE TAKEN OFF ...
11 = 1
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10 MESTIME = MESHOLD(II,2)
GOINGTO = NINT(MESHOLD(II,7))
MESID = NINT(MESHOLD(II,9))
IF(DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*)'MESSAGE POINTER =',II,' MESSAGE TIME =\MESTIME,
& ' CURRENT TIME =\TIME
ENDIF
C ... IF TIME EQUALS ZERO THEN WE ARE AT THE END OF THE ARRAY ....
IF(NINT(MESHOLD(II,l)) .EQ. 0) THEN
IF(DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*)'MESSAGE POINTER =',II,' MESHOLD(II,1) = 0',




C ... IS MESSAGE NOW READY TO BE SENT
IF(MESTIME .GE. TIME AND. MESTIME .LT. TIME + DT) THEN
IF(DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRrTE(16,*) TIME,' SEC MESSAGE FOUND READY TO BE SENT',
& ';MSGID # =',MESID
ENDIF
.. FIND WHO RECEIVES THIS MESSAGE THATS READY
IF(NINT(MESHOLD(II,6)) .EQ. 1) THEN
IF(DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*)'MESSAGE READY FOR EW SITE',GOINGTO
ENDIF
CALL REW(II)
ELSEIF(NINT(MESHOLD(II,6)) .EQ. 2) THEN
IF(DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*)'MESSAGE READY FOR EW REPORTING STATION',GOINGTO
ENDIF
CALL REWSTA(II)
ELSEIF(NINT(MESHOLD(II,6)) .EQ. 3) THEN
IF(DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*)'MESSAGE READY FOR ADWOC CENTER'
ENDIF
CALL RADWOC(II)
ELSEIF(NINT(MESHOLD(II,6)) .EQ. 4) THEN
IF(DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*)'MESSAGE READY FOR BATTALION CENTER',GOINGTO
ENDIF
CALL RBAT(II)
ELSEIF(NINT(MESHOLD(II,6)) .EQ. 5) THEN
IF(DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
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C... INCREMENT POINTER, IF > 200 THEN AT END OF ARRAY AND STOP LOOP ..
11 = 11 + 1








C LATEST CHANGE MADE 07/30/91 BFS
C DETERMINES THE NON-SAM TYPE TARGET ID NUMBER FOR THE PASSED IADS
C TYPEAND ELEMENT. THEN DETERMINES THE ELEMENTS CURRENT PROBABILITY
C OF SURVIVAL
C
C CALLED BY - REWSTA,RADWOC,RBAT
C CALLS - NONE
C
PARAMETER (IM = 30,JM = 25,KM = 20)
IMPLICIT LOGICAL (A-Z)
C DECLARE PASSED VARIABLES
INTEGER TYPE,UNIT
REAL PSURVW
C DECLARE LOCAL VARIABLES
INTEGER II,IDNUM









C VARIABLES USED IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C
C VARIABLES SET BY PARAMETER STATEMENT
C IM - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C JM - MAX # OF SAM SrTES
C KM - MAX # OF PENETRATOR CHECKPOINTS
C VARIABLES USED IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C
C IN COMMON BLOCK
C DEBUG - FLAG FOR DEBUG PRINTOUTS
C PST(20) - SURVIVAL PROBABILITY OF NON-SAM(IADS) TYPE TARGET
C LOCAL TO THIS SUBROUTINE
C II - LOOP COUNTER




DO 10 II = 1,NUMIADSTGTS
IF(IDIADSTGT(II,2) .EQ. TYPE AND.




IF (IDNUM .EQ. 0) THEN
WRITE(16,*) ' UNABLE TO DETERMINE NON-SAM TARGET # FOR ',
& 'IADS TYPE AND UNIT#;',UNIT,TYPE







C LATEST CHANGE MADE 6/26/91 BFS
C REMOVES EW SITES FROM SIMULATION BY MAKING THE INITIAL PS = 0.0.
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C USED IN NON-IADS MODE WHEN IADS DATA IS IN THE INPUT DATAFILE
C
C CALLED BY - REDIAD
C CALLS - NONE
C
PARAMETER (IM = 30,JM = 25,KM = 20)
C IMPLICIT LOGICAL (A-Z)
C DECLARE LOCAL VARIABLES
INTEGER II






C VARIABLES USED IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C
C VARIABLES SET BY PARAMETER STATEMENT
C IM - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C JM - MAX # OF SAM SITES
C KM - MAX # OF PEN. CHECKPOINTS
C IN COMMON BLOCK
C EWID(9) - ID # OF SAM SITES DESIGNATED AS EW SITES
C NEWSITES - MAX # OF EW SITES IN SAM DATA BLOCK




C ... SETS ALL SITES DESIGNATED AS EW TO ZERO TAKING THEM OUT OF SIM.
C ... USED WHEN EW SITES ARE IN SAM DATA BLOCK BUT RUNNING NON-IADS
C WRITE(V) 'BEFORE ZEROING, PS OF SITES IS'
C DO 20 11 = 1,3
C WRITE(Y) 'II,PS(II)',II,PS(II)
C 20 CONTINUE




C WRITE(Y) 'AFTER ZEROING, PS OF SITES IS'






C LATEST CHANGE MADE 07/19/91 BFS
C FOR MESSAGES GOING TO ADWOC CENTER. CALLS A SUB. THAT RECEIVES
C A MESSAGE OFF HOLDING MESSAGE ARRAY AND PROCESSES IT. THE ADWOC
C IS THE CENTER FOR DECISION MAKING BASED ON INFORMATION RECEIVED
C FROM MESSAGES. IF THE INCOMING MESSAGES ID # IS UNIQUE, THE
C MESSAGE AND INFORMATION IS RECEIVED. IF THE ID # IS NOT UNIQUE,
C THE MESSAGE IS REJECTED, THUS AVOIDING REPETITIVE ACTIONS.
C
C CALLED BY - MSGRDY
C CALLS - SHIFTU,HOLDMES,GETDET
C
PARAMETER (IM = 30,JM = 25,KM = 20)
IMPLICIT LOGICAL (A-Z)
C DECLARE PASSED VARIABLES
INTEGER II







C DECLARE LOCAL VARIABLES
INTEGER JJ,MESID,ORIGTYPE,POS,PREVTYPE,ORIGUNIT,TYPE,UNIT
REAL MSG(MAXMSGSIZE),PSURVIV
C VARIABLES USED IN THIS SUBROUTINE
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cC VARIABLES SET BY PARAMETER STATEMENT
C IM - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C JM - MAX # OF SAM SITES
C KM - MAX # OF PENETRATOR CHECKPOINTS
C IN COMMON BLOCK
C DEBUG - FLAG FOR DEBUG PRINTOUTS
C LOCAL TO THIS SUBROUTINE
C II - PASSED HOLDING MESSAGE ARRAY POINTER
C JJ - LOOP COUNTER
C MSG(MAXMSGSIZE) - HOLDS RECEIVED MESSAGE INFORMATION
C MESID - INCOMING MESSAGE ID #
C ORIGTYPE - INTEGER HOLDING THE ORIGIN SOURCE MESSAGE IADS TYPE #
C ORIGUNIT - INTEGER HOLDING THE ORIGIN SOURCE MESSAGE IADS UNIT #
C POS - POSITION OF NEXT OPEN SLOT IN MESSAGE ID HOLDING ARRAY
C PREVTYPE - INTEGER HOLDING THE PREVIOUS SOURCE IADS TYPE #
C PSURVIV - CURRENT SURVIVAL PROBABILITY OF THIS UNIT #
C TYPE - IADS ADWOC CENTER TYPE NUMBER (-3)
C UNIT - HOLDS UNIT #( = 1)
C START PROGRAM
C WRITE(V) 'RADWOC







C ... DETERMINE IF ADWOC IS ALIVE, RETURN OF DEAD.
CALL NSPS(TYPE,UNIT,PSURVIV)
IF(PSURVIV .LT. MINADWOCPS) THEN
IF(DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,*)' ADWOC DEAD; DOES NOT RECEIVE ANY',
& ' MESSAGES OR SEND ANY'




. CONTINUE IF ADWOC IS NOT DEAD
IF(DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
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WRITE(16,*)' IN RADWOC, RECEIVING MES ID# = \MESID
ENDIF
C ... COMPARE INCOMING MESSAGE ID WITH ID # OF PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED
C ... MESSAGES, IF A MATCH; IGNORE MESSAGE, TAKE IT OFF HOLDING ARRAY
POS =ADWMESIDPOS
DO 10 JJ = l,POS-l
IF(ADWMESID(JJ) .EQ. MESID) THEN
IF(DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*)' MESSAGE #',MESID,' IGNORED;',






C ... TO GET HERE, THIS IS NEW MESSAGE SO HOLD ITS ID #
C ... CHECK THAT YOU HAVE ROOM TO ADD ANOTHER ID # TO ID ARRAY
IF(POS .GT. MAXADWMESID) THEN
WRrTE(V) ' *** PROGRAM STOPPED ***'
WRITE(Y) 'ADWOC NEEDS TO STORE NEW ID # AND',
& ' ADWOC ID ARRAY IS FULL'
WRITE(*,*) 'PRESENT VALUE OF MAXADWMESID PARAMETER IS',POS-l
WRITE(Y) 'INCREASE MAXADWMESID IN ADWMES1 DEF AND',
& ' RECOMPILE PROGRAM MODULES'
WRITE(*,*) ' *** PROGRAM STOPPED ***'
WRITE(16,*) ' *** PROGRAM STOPPED ***'
WRITE(16,*) 'ADWOC NEEDS TO STORE NEW ID # AND',
& ' ADWOC ID ARRAY IS FULL'
WRITE(16,*) 'PRESENT VALUE OF MAXADWMESID PARAMETER IS',POS-l
WRITE(16,*) 'INCREASE MAXADWMESID IN ADWMES1 DEF AND',
& ' RECOMPILE PROGRAM MODULES'
WRrTE(16,*) ' *** PROGRAM STOPPED ***'
STOP
ENDIF




C TRANSFER MESSAGE INTO LOCAL HOLDING ARRAY




C DELETE CURRENT MESSAGE FROM HOLDING MESSAGE ARRAY
CALL SHIFTU(II)
IF(PREVTYPE .EQ. 1) THEN
C ... MESSAGE IS FROM AN EW SITE, RECEIVE THE MESSAGE AND ASSOCIATED
C ... DETECTION DATA
CALL GETDET(ORIGUNIT,MESID,MSG(2))
ELSEIF(PREVTYPE .EQ. 2) THEN
C ... MESSAGE COMES FROM AN EW REPORTING STATION.
IF(ORIGTYPE .EQ. 1) THEN
C... MESSAGE IS FROM AN EW SITE. DO THE SAME AS IF COMING FROM EW SITE
CALL GETDET(ORIGUNIT,MESID,MSG(2))
ENDIF
ELSEIF(PREVTYPE .EQ. 4) THEN
C ... SOURCE OF MESSAGE IS A BATTALION CENTER
ELSEIF(PREVTYPE .EQ. 5) THEN





C LATEST CHANGE MADE 07/24/91 BFS
C FOR MESSAGES GOING TO SAM SITES ONLY, THIS SUB.
C RECEIVES MESSAGE OFF HOLDING MESSAGE ARRAY AND PROCESSES IT.
C BATTALION STATIONS ARE MESSAGES PASSER ONLY AND DO NO ACTION
C OF THEMSELVES. THE SOURCE AND DESTINATION OF THE MESSAGE WILL
C DETERMINE WHERE COPIES OF THE MESSAGE GET SENT. IF THE MESSAGES
C ID # IS UNIQUE THE MESSAGE IS PASSED ALONG. IF IT IS NOT UNIQUE,
C THE MESSAGE IS NOT PASSED ALONG, THUS AVOIDING INFINITE LOOPS AND
C MULTIPLE MESSAGES.
C
C CALLED BY - MSGRDY
C CALLS - SHIFTU,CDELAY,HOLDMES
C
PARAMETER (IM = 30,JM = 25,KM = 20)
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IMPLICIT LOGICAL (A-Z)
C DECLARE PASSED VARIABLES
INTEGER II






















C VARIABLES USED IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C
C VARIABLES SET BY PARAMETER STATEMENT
C IM - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C JM - MAX # OF SAM SITES
C KM - MAX # OF PENETRATOR CHECKPOINTS
C IN COMMON BLOCK
C DEBUG - FLAG FOR DEBUG PRINTOUTS
C LOCAL TO THIS SUBROUTINE
C ACTION - INTEGER INDICATING ACTION DESIRED IN MESSAGE
C DELAY - TIME DELAY FROM PRESENT TIME WHEN MESSAGE WILL BE SENT
C DESTTYPE - INTEGER HOLDING DESTINATION SOURCE MESSAGE IADS TYPE #
C DESTUNIT - INTEGER HOLDING DESTINATION SOURCE MESSAGE IADS UNIT #
C II - PASSED HOLDING MESSAGE ARRAY POINTER
C L - LOOP COUNTER
C LL - LOOP COUNTER
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C MSG(MAXMSGSIZE) - HOLDS RECEIVED MESSAGE INFORMATION
C MESID - INCOMING MESSAGE ID #
C POS - POSITION OF NEXT OPEN SLOT IN MESSAGE ID HOLDING ARRAY
C PREVTYPE - INTEGER HOLDING THE PREVIOUS SOURCE IADS TYPE #
C PSURVIV - CURRENT SURVIVAL PROBABILITY OF THIS UNIT #
C TYPE - IADS EW REPORTING TYPE NUMBER ( = 2)
C UNIT - HOLDS UNIT #
C START PROGRAM
C WRITE(*,*) 'RBAT'








DETERMINE IF THIS BATTALION CENTER IS ALIVE.
CALL NSPS(TYPE,UNIT,PSURVIV)
IF(PSURVIV XT. MINBATPS) THEN
IF(DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,*)' BAT STA',UNIT,'DEAD; DOES NOT RECEIVE ANY',
& ' MESSAGES OR SEND ANY'




C ... CONTINUE IF BATTALION CENTE IS NOT DEAD
IF(DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*)' IN RBAT, BAT CTR',UNIT,'RECEIVES ',
& 'MESID# = ',MESID
ENDIF
C ... COMPARE INCOMING MESSAGE ID WITH ID # OF PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED
C ... MESSAGES, IF A MATCH; IGNORE MESSAGE, TAKE IT OFF HOLDING ARRAY
POS = BATMESIDPOS(UNIT)
DO 10JJ = 1,POS-1
IF(BATMESID(UNIT,JJ) .EQ. MESID) THEN
IF(DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*)' MESSAGE ID# \MESID,' IGNORED;',







C ... TO GET HERE, THIS IS NEW MESSAGE SO HOLD ITS ID #
C ... CHECK THAT YOU HAVE ROOM TO ADD ANOTHER ID # TO ID ARRAY.
IF(POS .GT. MAXBATMESID) THEN
WRITE(V) ' *** PROGRAM STOPPED ***'
WRITE(*,*) 'BAT STA #',UNIT,' NEEDS TO STORE NEW ID # AND',
& ' BAT ID ARRAY IS FULL'
WRITE(V) 'PRESENT VALUE OF MAXBATMESID PARAMETER IS',POS-l
WRITE(*,*) 'INCREASE MAXBATMESID IN BATMES1 DEF AND',
& ' RECOMPILE PROGRAM MODULES'
WRITE(V) ' *** PROGRAM STOPPED ***'
WRITE(16,*) ' *** PROGRAM STOPPED ***'
WRITE(16,*) 'BAT STA #',UNIT,' NEEDS TO STORE NEW ID # AND',
& ' BAT ID ARRAY IS FULL'
WRITE(16,*) 'PRESENT VALUE OF MAXBATMESID PARAMETER IS',POS-l
WRITE(16,*) 'INCREASE MAXBATMESID IN BATMES1 DEF AND',
& ' RECOMPILE PROGRAM MODULES'
WRITE(16,*) ' *** PROGRAM STOPPED ***'
STOP
ENDIF
C ... ARRAY HAS ROOM SO BUT NEW MSG ID # INTO IT AND INCREMENT POINTER
BATMESID(UNIT,POS) = MESID
BATMESIDPOS(UNIT) = BATMESIDPOS(UNIT) +
1
C TRANSFER DATA INTO LOCAL HOLDING ARRAY
DO 15 JJ = 1,MAXMSGSIZE
MSG(JJ) = MESHOLD(II,JJ)
15 CONTINUE
IF(DEBUG .EQ. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) ' RECEIVED BAT MES. = ',(MSG(JJ),JJ = l.MAXMSGSIZE)
ENDIF
C DELETE CURRENT FROM HOLDING MESSAGE ARRAY
CALL SHIFTU(II)
C ...DETERMINE THE ARRAY INDEX FOR THIS IADS ELEMENT IN THE NON-SAM
C ... TARGET PS ARRAY
DO 17 JJ = 1,NUMIADSTGTS
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IF(IDIADSTGT(JJ,2) .EQ. 4 AND. IDIADSTGT(JJ,3) .EQ. UNIT) THEN
L=IDIADSTGT(JJ,1)
IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) ' BATTALION CENTER #',UNIT,






C ... COMPUTE TIME DELAY OF MESSAGE
IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN






IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) ' COMPUTED BAT. CENTER DELAY = \DELAY,
& ' TIME WHEN MESSAGE WILL BE SENT = ',TIME +DELAY
ENDIF
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1003) TIME,UNIT,TIME + DELAY,MESID
1003 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC BAT CNTR ',12,' WILL SEND MESSAGE',
& ' AT TIME \F5.0,' MSGID # ',12)
ENDIF
MSG(2) =TIME +DELAY
C DETERMINE SOURCE OF MESSAGE AND APPROPRIATE SENDING DESTINATION
IF(PREVTYPE .EQ. 1) THEN
C ... MESSAGE IS FROM AN EW SITE, NO CONNECTION PRESENTLY ASSUMED
ELSEIF(PREVTYPE .EQ. 2) THEN
C... MESSAGE FROM AN EW REPORTING STATION IS AN ALERT.
C ... DIRECT ALERT TO THE SAM SITES AND SEND A COPY TO
C OTHER BATTALION CENTERS
C... PASS COPY OF MESSAGE TO SAM SITES I.E. CONNECT(L,3) = 5
DO30L=l,NUMCON
IF(CONNECT(L,l) .EQ. 4 AND. CONNECT(L,2) .EQ. UNIT) THEN






IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) 'BAT CNTR #',NINT(MSG(5)),' WILL SEND MES.',
& ' TO SAM SITE #',NINT(MSG(7)),'MSGID = ',NINT(MSG(9))
ENDIF
IF (DEBUG .GE. 3) THEN
WRITE(16,*) ' MESSAGE TO BE SEND IS:',






C... PASS COPY OF MESSAGE TO OTHER BATTALION CENTERS
DO40L=l,NUMCON
IF(CONNECT(L,l) .EQ. 4 AND. CONNECT(L,2) .EQ. UNIT) THEN





IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) 'BAT CNTR #',NINT(MSG(5)),' WILL SEND MES.',
& ' TO BAT CNTR #',NINT(MSG(7)),'MSGID = ',NINT(MSG(9))
ENDIF
IF (DEBUG .GE. 3) THEN







ELSEIF(PREVTYPE .EQ. 3) THEN
C... MESSAGE IS FROM ADWOC CENTER. PASS MESSAGE ALONG TO SAM SITE
C ... DESIGNATED AND A COPY TO OTHER BATTALION CENTERS





IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) 'BAT CNTR #',NINT(MSG(5)),' WILL SEND MESSAGE',
206
& ' TO SAM SITE #',NINT(MSG(7)),'MSGID = \NINT(MSG(9))
ENDIF
IF (DEBUG .GE. 3) THEN




C... PASS COPY OF MESSAGE TO OTHER BATTALION CENTERS
DO50L=l,NUMCON
IF(CONNECT(L,l) .EQ. 4 AND. CONNECT(L,2) .EQ. UNIT) THEN





IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) 'BAT CNTR #',NINT(MSG(5)),' WILL SEND MES.',
& ' TO BAT CNTR #',NINT(MSG(7)),'MSGID = ',NINT(MSG(9))
ENDIF
IF (DEBUG .GE. 3) THEN







ELSEIF(PREVTYPE .EQ. 4) THEN
C ... SOURCE OF MESSAGE IS A BATTALION CENTER
IF(DESTTYPE .EQ. 3) THEN
C ... DESTINATION OF MESSAGE IS ADWOC CENTER





IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) 'BAT CNTR #',NINT(MSG(5)),' WILL SEND',
& ' MESSAGE TO ADWOC CENTER; MSGID = \NINT(MSG(9))
ENDIF
IF (DEBUG .GE. 3) THEN
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WRITE(16,*) ' MESSAGE TO BE SEND IS:',
& (MSG (LL),LL = 1,MAXMSGSIZE)
ENDIF
CALL HOLDMES(MSG)
ELSEIF(DESTTYPE .EQ. 5) THEN
C ... DESTINATION OF MESSAGE IS SAM SITE





IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) 'BAT CNTR #',NINT(MSG(5)),' WILL SEND MES.',
& ' TO SAM SITE #',NINT(MSG(7)),'MSGID = ',NINT(MSG(9))
ENDIF
IF (DEBUG .GE. 3) THEN





ELSEIF(PREVTYPE .EQ. 5) THEN
C ... SOURCE OF MESSAGE IS A SAM UNIT, SEND COPY OF MESSAGE TO ADWOC
C ... CENTER AND OTHER BATTALION CENTERS





IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) 'BAT CNTR #',NINT(MSG(5)),' WILL SEND',
& ' MESSAGE TO ADWOC CENTER; MSGID = \NINT(MSG(9))
ENDIF
IF (DEBUG .GE. 3) THEN




C... PASS COPY OF MESSAGE TO OTHER BATTALION CENTERS
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DO60L=l,NUMCON
IF(CONNECT(L,l) .EQ. 4 AND. CONNECT(L,2) .EQ. UNIT) THEN





IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) 'BAT CNTR #',NINT(MSG(5)),' WILL SEND MES.\
& ' TO BAT CNTR #',NINT(MSG(7)),'MSGID = ',NINT(MSG(9))
ENDIF
IF (DEBUG .GE. 3) THEN











C LATEST CHANGE MADE 7/16/91 BFS
C READS IN THE EXTRA DATA NEEDED BY IADS MODIFICATIONS. IF IN A
C NON-IADS MODE, CALLS PSEWO. AFTER READING IN DATA, SETS THE
C EWSITE(*) ARRAY WHICH INDICATES WHICH SAM SITES ARE EW SITES
C
C CALLED BY - REDIN
C CALLS - PSEW0,SETID
C
PARAMETER (IM = 30,JM = 25,KM = 20)
C IMPLICIT LOGICAL (A-Z)
C DECLARE LOCAL VARIABLES
INTEGER JJA,B,C












C DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C
C VARIABLES SET BY PARAMETER STATEMENT
C IM - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C JM - MAX # OF SAM SITES
C KM - MAX # OF PEN. CHECKPOINTS
C VARIABLES IN COMMON BLOCK USED IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C J - SAM SITE LOOP COUNTER
C







C READ DESIGNATED EW SITE ID NUMBERS
DO 250 JJ = 1,NEWSITES
READ(15,*) EWID(JJ)
250 CONTINUE
C IF NOT IADS BUT EW SITES EXIST THEN SET PS TO ZERO ...




C READ EW SITE PARAMETERS




C READ EW REPORTING SITE PARAMETERS
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READ(15,*) NUMRPT




C READ ADWOC CENTER PARAMETERS
READ(15,*) ADWPROCDLYADWDAMDLYADWDAMRAT
READ(15,*) MINADWOCPS.PSADWOC
C READ BATTALION CENTER PARAMETERS
READ(15,*) NUMBAT




C READ SAM SITE PARAMETERS
READ(15,*) SAMPROCDLY,SAMDAMDLY,SAMDAMRAT
C... READ IN IADS STRUCTURE
READ(15,*) NUMCON
DO 290 JJ = l.NUMCON
READ(15,*) (CONNECT(JJ,L),L=l,4)
290 CONTINUE
C... READ IN IADS ELEMENTS THAT WILL BE (NON-SAM TYPE) TARGETS
READ(15,*) NUMIADSTGTS






C DONE READING IN IADS DATA
C ....SET - 1 IN EWSITE(JM) FOR EVERY SAM SITE THAT REALLY IS EW SITE.












C LATEST CHANGE MADE 07/23/91 BFS
C FOR MESSAGES GOING TO EW SITES ONLY, THIS SUBROUTINE
C RECEIVES MESSAGE OFF HOLDING MESSAGE ARRAY AND PROCESSES IT.
C STORES NEW MESSAGE ID# IN ARRAY. IF INCOMING MESSAGE ID HAS
C ALREADY BEEN RECORDED, MESSAGE IS IGNORED.
C PRESENTLY IT IS ASSUMED THAT THE ONLY MESSAGE SENT TO AN EW SITE
C WILL BE TO TELL IT TO TURN ON OR OFF. EW SITES DO NOT SEND ANY
C MESSAGES UPON THE RECEIPT OF A MESSAGE.
C
C CALLED BY - MSGRDY
C CALLS - SHIFTU,EWMES,CDELAY
C
PARAMETER (IM = 30,JM » 25,KM = 20)
IMPLICIT LOGICAL (A-Z)
C DECLARE PASSED VARIABLES.
INTEGER II
C DECLARE LOCAL VARIABLES...
INTEGER ACTION,EWUNIT,INID,Jl,JJ,L,POS
REAL CTIME,DELAY



















C VARIABLES USED IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C
C VARIABLES SET BY PARAMETER STATEMENT
C IM - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C JM - MAX # OF SAM STTES
C KM - MAX # OF PENETRATOR CHECKPOINTS
C IN COMMON BLOCK
C DEBUG - FLAG FOR DEBUG PRINTOUTS
C NAC - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C PS(JM) - SURVIVAL PROBABILITY OF SITE JM
C - IF =2; SITE HAS A SALVO ENROUTE TO THE TARGET
C - IF =3; SITE IS PERFORMING POST INTERCEPT DECISIONS
C STATS(JM) - INTEGER VALUE INDICATING THE STATUS OF EACH SAM SITE
C - IF =0; SITE IS NOT RADIATING
C - IF = 1; SrTE IS RADIATING
C TIME - SIMULATION TIME (IN SECONDS) FROM THE START OF THE RUN
C LOCAL TO THIS SUBROUTINE
C ACTION - INTEGER INDICATING ACTION DESIRED IN MESSAGE
C CTIME - CURRENT TIME: TIME THAT MESSAGE IS TO BE SENT
C DELAY - EXTRA DELAY TIME DUE TO DAMAGE OF EW SrTE
C EWUNIT - HOLDS EW UNIT #
C II - PASSED HOLDING MESSAGE ARRAY POINTER
C Jl - ARRAY POINTER
C JJ - ARRAY POINTER
C L - ARRAY POINTER
C INID - ID # OF INCOMING MESSAGE
C POS - POSTTION OF NEXT OPEN SLOT IN MESSAGE ID HOLDING ARRAY
C START PROGRAM
C WRITE(V) 'REW
C ... RECEIVE DATA FROM MESSAGE AND ACT ON IT
C ... MESSAGES COME FROM ADWOC AND TELL EW SITE TO TURN ON OR OFF.






IF(DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*)' IN REW SUB, MES. REC. FOR EW SITE\EWUNIT,
& 'ACTION = \ACTION,' MSG ID# = ',INID
ENDIF
C ... COMPARE INCOMING MESSAGE ID WITH ID # OF PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED
C ... MESSAGES, IF A MATCH IGNORE MESSAGE
POS = REWMESIDPOS(EWUNIT)
DO 10 JJ = l,POS-l
IF(REWMESID(EWUNIT,JJ) .EQ. INID) THEN
IF(DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*)' MESSAGE ID#',INID,'IGNORED;',






C ... TO GET HERE, THIS IS NEW MESSAGE SO HOLD ITS ID # AND PROCESS IT
C ... CHECK THAT YOU HAVE ROOM TO ADD ANOTHER ID # TO ID ARRAY
IF(POS .GT. MAXEWMESID) THEN
WRITE(*,*) ' *** PROGRAM STOPPED ***'
WRITE(*,*) 'EW SITE NEEDS TO STORE NEW ID # AND',
& ' EW SITE ID ARRAY IS FULL'
WRITE(*,*) 'PRESENT VALUE OF MAXEWMESID PARAMETER IS',POS-l
WRITE(V) 'INCREASE MAXEWMESID IN EWMES2 DEF AND',
& ' RECOMPILE PROGRAM MODULES'
WRITE(*,*) ' *** PROGRAM STOPPED ***'
WRITE(16,*) ' *** PROGRAM STOPPED ***'
WRITE(16,*) 'EW SITE NEEDS TO STORE NEW ID # AND',
& ' EW SITE ID ARRAY IS FULL'
WRITE(16,*) 'PRESENT VALUE OF MAXEWMESID PARAMETER IS',POS-l
WRITE(16,*) 'INCREASE MAXEWMESID IN EWMES2 DEF AND',
& ' RECOMPILE PROGRAM MODULES'
WRITE(16,*) ' *** PROGRAM STOPPED ***'
STOP
ENDIF
C ... ADD NEW MESSAGE ID # TO MESSAGE ID NUMBER HOLDING ARRAY
REWMESID(EWUNIT,POS) = INID
REWMESIDPOS(EWUNIT) = REWMESIDPOS(EWUNIT) +
1
IF(ACTION .EQ. 0) THEN
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C ... ORDERED TO TURN OFF BUT IS ALREADY OFF BECAUSE IT IS DEAD.
IF (PS(EWID(EWUNIT)) XT. EWPSMIN) THEN
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,*) ' EW SITE #,PS,EWPSMIN\
& EWUNIT,PS(EWID(EWUNIT)),EWPSMIN






C ... ORDERED TO TURN OFF BUT SITE IS ALREADY TURNED OFF
IF (STATS(EWID(EWUNIT)) .EQ. 0) THEN
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,*) ' EW SITE #, STATUS',
& EWUNIT,STATS(EWID(EWUNIT))






C ... BEFORE SHUTTING OFF THE EW SITE
C ... SET ALL DETECTED TARGETS TO UNDETECTED STATUS





IF (DEBUG .GE. 3) THEN






IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) ' CHANGE IN DETECTION STATUS FOR EW SITE #',
& EWUNIT
WRITE(16,*) ' (-1= LOST, 0= NO CHANGE, 1= NEW DETECTION)'
WRITE(16,*) ' (1-NAC) UPDATE DETECTION ARRAY :',
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& (UPEWTGT(EWUNIT,L),L = 1,NAC)
WRITE(16,*) ' COMPUTED DELAY = \DELAY,
& ' TIME WHEN MESSAGE WILL BE SENT = ',TIME + DELAY
ENDIF
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1003) TIME,EWUNIT,TIME +DELAY
1003 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC EW SITE ',12/ WILL SEND MESSAGE',
& ' AT TIME \F5.0)
ENDIF
CALL EWMES(EWUNIT,(TIME + DELAY))
C ... SET EW SITE STATUS TO OFF
STATS(EWID(EWUNIT)) =ACTION
EWSTATS(EWUNIT) =ACTION
IF(DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1001) CTIME,EWUNIT
1001 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC EW SITE ',12,' ORDERED TO TURN OFF; DOES SO.')
ENDIF
ELSEIF(ACTION .EQ. 1) THEN
C ... ORDERED TO TURN ON BUT SITE IS ALREADY TURNED ON
IF (STATS(EWID(EWUNIT)) .EQ. 1) THEN
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,*) ' EW SITE #, STATUS',
& EWUN1T,STATS(EWID(EWUNIT))







IF(DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE( 16,1002) CTIME,EWUNIT
1002 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC EW SITE ',12,' ORDERED TO TURN ON; DOES SO.')
ENDIF
ENDIF






C LATEST CHANGE MADE 07/25/91 BFS
C FOR MESSAGES GOING TO EW REPORTING STATIONS ONLY, THIS SUB.
C RECEIVES MESSAGE OFF HOLDING MESSAGE ARRAY AND PROCESSES IT.
C EW REPORTING STATIONS ARE MESSAGES PASSER ONLY AND DO NO ACTION
C OF THEMSELVES. THE SOURCE AND DESTINATION OF THE MESSAGE WILL
C DETERMINE WHERE COPIES OF THE MESSAGE GET SENT. IF THE MESSAGES
C ID # IS UNIQUE THE MESSAGE IS PASSED ALONG. IF IT IS NOT UNIQUE,
C THE MESSAGE IS NOT PASSED ALONG, THUS AVOIDING INFINITE LOOPS AND
C MULTIPLE MESSAGES.
C
C CALLED BY - MSGRDY
C CALLS - NSPS,SHIFTU,CDELAY
C
PARAMETER (IM = 30,JM = 25,KM = 20)
IMPLICIT LOGICAL (A-Z)
C DECLARE PASSED VARIABLES
INTEGER II























C VARIABLES USED IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C
C VARIABLES SET BY PARAMETER STATEMENT
C IM - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C JM - MAX # OF SAM SITES
C KM - MAX # OF PENETRATOR CHECKPOINTS
C IN COMMON BLOCK
C DEBUG - FLAG FOR DEBUG PRINTOUTS
C LOCAL TO THIS SUBROUTINE
C ACTION - INTEGER INDICATING ACTION DESIRED IN MESSAGE
C DELAY - TIME DELAY FROM PRESENT TIME WHEN MESSAGE WILL BE SENT
C DESTTYPE - INTEGER HOLDING DESTINATION SOURCE MESSAGE IADS TYPE #
C DESTUNIT - INTEGER HOLDING DESTINATION SOURCE MESSAGE IADS UNIT #
C II - PASSED HOLDING MESSAGE ARRAY POINTER
C L - LOOP COUNTER
C LL - LOOP COUNTER
C MSG(MAXMSGSIZE) - HOLDS RECEIVED MESSAGE INFORMATION
C MESID - INCOMING MESSAGE ID #
C ORIGTYPE - INTEGER HOLDING THE ORIGIN SOURCE MESSAGE IADS TYPE #
C ORIGUNIT - INTEGER HOLDING THE ORIGIN SOURCE MESSAGE IADS UNIT #
C POS - POSITION OF NEXT OPEN SLOT IN MESSAGE ID HOLDING ARRAY
C PREVTYPE - INTEGER HOLDING THE PREVIOUS SOURCE IADS TYPE #
C PSURVIV - CURRENT SURVIVAL PROBABILITY OF THIS UNIT #
C TYPE - IADS EW REPORTING TYPE NUMBER ( = 2)
C UNIT - HOLDS UNIT #
C START PROGRAM
C WRITE(*,*) 'REWSTA'










C ... DETERMINE IF THIS STATION IS ALIVE
CALL NSPS(TYPE,UNTT,PSURVIV)
IF(PSURVIV XT. MINRPTPS) THEN
IF(DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,*)' RPT STA',UNIT,'DEAD; DOES NOT RECEIVE ANY',
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& ' MESSAGES OR SEND ANY'




C ... CONTINUE IF STATION IS NOT DEAD
IF(DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*)' IN REWSTA, RPT STA\UNIT,'RECEIVES ',
& 'MES ID# = \MESID
ENDIF
C ... COMPARE INCOMING MESSAGE ID WITH ID # OF PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED
C ... MESSAGES, IF A MATCH; IGNORE MESSAGE, TAKE IT OFF HOLDING ARRAY
POS = RPTMESIDPOS(UNIT)
DO 10JJ = 1,POS-1
IF(RPTMESID(UNIT,JJ) .EQ. MESID) THEN
IF(DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*)' MESSAGE ID# \MESID,' IGNORED;',






C ... TO GET HERE, THIS IS NEW MESSAGE SO HOLD ITS ID #
C ... CHECK THAT YOU HAVE ROOM TO ADD ANOTHER ID # TO ID ARRAY
IF(POS .GT. MAXRPTMESID) THEN
WRITE(*,*) ' *** PROGRAM STOPPED ***'
WRITE(*,*) 'RPT STA #',UNIT,' NEEDS TO STORE NEW ID # AND',
& ' STA ID ARRAY IS FULL'
WRITE(16,*) 'RPT STA #',UNIT,' NEEDS TO STORE NEW ID # AND',
& ' STA ID ARRAY IS FULL'
WRITE(V) 'PRESENT VALUE OF MAXRPTMESID PARAMETER IS',POS-l
WRITE(16,*) 'PRESENT VALUE OF MAXRPTMESID PARAMETER IS',POS-l
WRITE(V) 'INCREASE MAXRPTMESID IN RPTMES1 DEF AND',
& ' RECOMPILE PROGRAM MODULES'
WRITE(16,*) 'INCREASE MAXRPTMESID IN RPTMES1 DEF AND',
& ' RECOMPILE PROGRAM MODULES'
WRITE(16,*) ' *** PROGRAM STOPPED ***'
WRITE(V) ' *** PROGRAM STOPPED ***'
STOP
ENDIF
C ... ARRAY HAS ROOM SO BUT NEW MSG ID # INTO IT AND INCREMENT POINTER
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RPTMESID(UNIT,POS) =MESID
RPTMESIDPOS(UNIT) = RPTMESIDPOS(UNIT) +
1
C TRANSFER DATA INTO LOCAL HOLDING ARRAY.
DO 15 JJ = 1,MAXMSGSIZE
MSG(JJ) = MESHOLD(II,JJ)
15 CONTINUE
C DELETE CURRENT FROM HOLDING MESSAGE ARRAY
CALL SHIFTU(II)
C ...DETERMINE THE ARRAY INDEX FOR THIS IADS ELEMENT IN THE NON-SAM
C ... TARGET PS ARRAY
DO 17 JJ = 1,NUMIADSTGTS
IF(IDIADSTGT(JJ,2) .EQ. 2 AND. IDIADSTGT(JJ,3) .EQ. UNIT) THEN
L = IDIADSTGT(JJ,1)
IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) ' EW REPORTING STATION #',UNIT,






C ... COMPUTE TIME DELAY OF MESSAGE
IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN






IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) ' COMPUTED RPT STATION DELAY = ',DELAY,
& ' TIME WHEN MESSAGE WILL BE SENT = ',TIME + DELAY
ENDIF
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1003) TIME,UNIT,TIME + DELAY.MESID
1003 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC RPT STA ',12,' WILL SEND MESSAGE',
& ' AT TIME \F5.0,' MSGID # ',12)
ENDIF
MSG(2) -TIME +DELAY
C DETERMINE SOURCE OF MESSAGE AND APPROPRIATE SENDING DESTINATION
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IF(PREVTYPE .EQ. 1) THEN
C ... MESSAGE IS FROM AN EW SITE, SEND COPY OF MESSAGE TO REPORTING
C ... STATIONS AND ADWOC, IF ADWOC IS DEAD, SEND ALERT TO BAT AND SAMS.
C DETERMINE WHERE MESSAGE IS GOING VIA CONNECT ARRAY
C... LOOK FIRST FOR A MATCH OF REPORT STATION TYPE AND UNIT # ..
DO20L=l,NUMCON
IF(CONNECT(L,l) .EQ. 2 AND. CONNECT(L,2) .EQ. UNIT) THEN





IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) 'RPT STA #\NINT(MSG(5)),' WILL SEND MES.',
& ' TO RPT STA #',NINT(MSG(7)),'MSGID = \N1NT(MSG(9))
ENDIF
IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN










IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) 'RPT STA #',NINT(MSG(5)),' WILL SEND MES.',
& ' TO ADWOC; MSGID = ',NINT(MSG(9))
ENDIF
IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) ' MESSAGE TO BE SEND IS:',




C ... IF ADWOC IS DEAD THEN SEND AN ALERT TO THE BATTALION CENTERS
IF(PSADWOC LT. MINADWOCPS) THEN
MSG(9) = MSGID





C ... SET ALERT MESSAGE BIT
MSG(8) = 1.0






IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) 'RPT STA #\NINT(MSG(5)),' WILL SEND MES.',
& ' TO BAT. #\NINT(MSG(7)),'MSGID = \NINT(MSG(9)),' ** ALERT **'
ENDIF
IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
















C ... SET ALERT MESSAGE BIT
MSG(8) = 1.0





IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) 'RPT STA #',NINT(MSG(5)),' WILL SEND MES. TO',
& ' SAM SITE #',NINT(MSG(7)),'MSGID = ',NINT(MSG(9)),' ** ALERT **'
ENDIF
IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
















ELSEIF(PREVTYPE .EQ. 2) THEN
C ... MESSAGE COMES FROM AN EW REPORTING STATION. CHECK DESTINATION,
C ... SEND COPY OF MESSAGE BASED ON ULTIMATE ORIGIN AND DESTINATION
IF(ORIGTYPE .EQ. 1) THEN
C... MESSAGE IS FROM AN EW SITE. PASS MESSAGE ALONG TO ADWOC
C ... AND IF ADWOC IS DEAD, SEND AN ALERT TO BATTALION STATIONS
C DETERMINE WHERE MESSAGE IS GOING VIA CONNECT ARRAY
C... LOOK FIRST FOR A MATCH OF REPORT STATION TYPE AND UNIT # ..
DO30L=l,NUMCON
IF(CONNECT(L,l) .EQ. 2 AND. CONNECT(L,2) .EQ. UNIT) THEN





IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) 'RPT STA #',NINT(MSG(5)),' WILL SEND MES.\
& ' TO RPT STA #',NINT(MSG(7)),'MSGID\NINT(MSG(9))
ENDIF
IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) ' MESSAGE TO BE SEND IS:',









IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) 'RPT STA #',NINT(MSG(5)),' WILL SEND',
& ' MESSAGE TO ADWOC; MSGID = \NINT(MSG(9))
ENDIF
IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) ' MESSAGE TO BE SEND IS:',




C ... IF ADWOC IS DEAD THEN SEND AN ALERT TO THE BATTALION CENTERS
IF(PSADWOC .LT. MINADWOCPS) THEN
MSG(9) = MSGID
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C ... SET ALERT MESSAGE BIT
MSG(8) = 1.0





IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) 'RPT STA #',NINT(MSG(5)),' WILL SEND MES.\
& ' TO BAT. #',NINT(MSG(7)),'MSGID = ',NINT(MSG(9)),' ** ALERT **'
ENDIF
IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
















C ... SET ALERT MESSAGE BIT
MSG(8) = 1.0





IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) 'RPT STA #',NINT(MSG(5)),' WILL SEND MES. TO',
& ' SAM SITE #',NINT(MSG(7)),'MSGID = ',NINT(MSG(9)),' ** ALERT **'
ENDIF
IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) ' MESSAGE TO BE SEND IS:',
& (MSG(LL).LL = 1,MAXMSGSIZE)
ENDIF
CALL HOLDMES(MSG)









C MSGID = MSGID + 1
C IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
C WRrTE(16,*) ' MSGID ID # INCREMENTED TO =\MSGID,





ELSEIF(ORIGTYPE .EQ. 3) THEN
C... MESSAGE IS FROM ADWOC CENTER. PASS MESSAGE ALONG TO EW SITE
C ... DESIGNATED AND TO OTHER EW REPORTING STATIONS





IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) 'RPT STA #',NINT(MSG(5)),' WILL SEND MESSAGE TO',
& ' EW SITE #',NINT(MSG(13)),'MSGID = \NINT(MSG(9))
ENDIF
IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN




C... PASS ONLY MESSAGE TO OTHER EW REPORTING STATIONS
DO40L=l,NUMCON
IF(CONNECT(L,l) .EQ. 2 AND. CONNECT(L,2) .EQ. UNIT) THEN





IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) 'RPT STA #',NINT(MSG(5)),' WILL SEND MES.',
& ' TO RPT STA #',NINT(MSG(7)),'MSGID = ',NINT(MSG(9))
ENDIF
IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
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ELSEIF(PREVTYPE .EQ. 3) THEN
C ... SOURCE OF MESSAGE IS AN ADWOC CENTER
C... MESSAGE IS FROM ADWOC CENTER. PASS MESSAGE ALONG TO EW SITE
C ... DESIGNATED AND TO OTHER EW REPORTING STATIONS





IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) 'RPT STA #\NINT(MSG(5)),' WILL SEND MESSAGE',
& ' TO EW SITE #',NINT(MSG(7)),'MSGID = \NINT(MSG(9))
ENDIF
IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) ' MESSAGE TO BE SEND IS:',
& (MSG(LL),LL = 1,MAXMSGSIZE)
ENDIF
CALL HOLDMES(MSG)
C... PASS ONLY MESSAGE TO OTHER EW REPORTING STATIONS
DO 50L=1,NUMCON
IF(CONNECT(L,l) .EQ. 2 AND. CONNECT(L,2) .EQ. UNIT) THEN





IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) 'RPT STA #',NINT(MSG(5)),' WILL SEND MES.',
& ' TO RPT STA #',NINT(MSG(7)),'MSGID = *,NINT(MSG(9))
ENDIF
IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN








ELSEIF(PREVTYPE .EQ. 4) THEN
C ... SOURCE OF MESSAGE IS A BATTALION CENTER
C ... PRESENTLY NO CONNECTION ASSUMED
ELSEIF(PREVTYPE .EQ. 5) THEN
C ... SOURCE OF MESSAGE IS A SAM UNIT





C LATEST CHANGE MADE 07/24/91 BFS
C FOR MESSAGES GOING TO SAM UNITS. RECEIVES
C A MESSAGE OFF HOLDING MESSAGE ARRAY AND PROCESSES IT.
C IF THE INCOMING MESSAGES ID # IS UNIQUE, THE
C MESSAGE AND INFORMATION IS RECEIVED. IF THE ID # IS NOT UNIQUE,
C THE MESSAGE IS REJECTED, THUS AVOIDING REPETITIVE ACTIONS.
C
C CALLED BY - MSGRDY
C CALLS - SHIFTU,HOLDMES
C
PARAMETER (IM = 30,JM = 25,KM = 20)
IMPLICIT LOGICAL (A-Z)
C DECLARE PASSED VARIABLES
INTEGER II


















C DECLARE LOCAL VARIABLES
INTEGER ACTION,JJ,MESID,POS,SAMNUM
REAL MSG(MAXMSGSIZE),CTIME,DELAY
C VARIABLES USED IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C
C VARIABLES SET BY PARAMETER STATEMENT
C IM - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C JM - MAX # OF SAM SITES
C KM - MAX # OF PENETRATOR CHECKPOINTS
C IN COMMON BLOCK
C DEBUG - FLAG FOR DEBUG PRINTOUTS
C PS(JM) - SURVIVAL PROBABILITY OF SITE JM
C PSSMIN - MIN. SURVIVAL PROBABILITY FOR SAM SITE TO STAY IN SIM.
C STATS(JM) - INTEGER VALUE INDICATING THE STATUS OF EACH SAM SITE
C - IF =0; SITE IS NOT RADIATING
C - IF = 1; SITE IS RADIATING
C LOCAL TO THIS SUBROUTINE
C ACTION - INTEGER SPECIFYING ACTION DESIRED FROM THIS MESSAGE
C CTIME - CURRENT TIME: TIME THAT MESSAGE IS TO BE SENT
C II - PASSED HOLDING MESSAGE ARRAY POINTER
C JJ - LOOP COUNTER
C MSG(MAXMSGSIZE) - HOLDS RECEIVED MESSAGE INFORMATION
C MESID - INCOMING MESSAGE ID #
C ORIGTYPE - INTEGER HOLDING THE ORIGIN SOURCE MESSAGE IADS TYPE #
C ORIGUNIT - INTEGER HOLDING THE ORIGIN SOURCE MESSAGE IADS UNIT #
C POS - POSITION OF NEXT OPEN SLOT IN MESSAGE ID HOLDING ARRAY
C PREVTYPE - INTEGER HOLDING THE PREVIOUS SOURCE IADS TYPE #
C SAMNUM - INTEGER HOLDING THE SAM UNIT # THIS MESSAGE IS FOR
C START PROGRAM
C WRITE(V) 'RSAM'






C ... DETERMINE IF THIS SAM SITE IS ALIVE
IF (PS(SAMNUM) .LT. PSSMIN) THEN
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,*)' SAM SITE\SAMNUM,'DEAD; DOES NOT RECEIVE ANY',
& ' MESSAGES OR SEND ANY'




C ... CONTINUE IF SAM SITE IS NOT DEAD
IF(DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*)' IN RSAM, RECEIVING MES ID# = \MESID
ENDIF
C ... COMPARE INCOMING MESSAGE ID WITH ID # OF PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED
C ... MESSAGES, IF A MATCH; IGNORE MESSAGE, TAKE IT OFF HOLDING ARRAY
POS =RSAMMESIDPOS(SAMNUM)
DO 10 JJ = l,POS-l
IF(RSAMMESID(SAMNUM,JJ) .EQ. MESID) THEN
IF(DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*)' MESSAGE #',MESID,' IGNORED;',






C ... TO GET HERE, THIS IS NEW MESSAGE SO HOLD ITS ID #
C ... CHECK THAT YOU HAVE ROOM TO ADD ANOTHER ID # TO ID ARRAY
IF(POS .GT. MAXSAMMESID) THEN
WRITE(*,*) ' *** PROGRAM STOPPED ***'
WRITE(*,*) 'SAM SITE #',SAMNUM,' NEEDS TO STORE',
& ' NEW ID # AND SAM SITE ID ARRAY IS FULL'
WRITE(*,*) 'PRESENT VALUE OF MAXSAMMESID PARAMETER IS',POS-l
WRITE(*,*) 'INCREASE MAXADWMESID IN SAMMES1 DEF AND',
& ' RECOMPILE PROGRAM MODULES'
WRITE(*,*) ' *** PROGRAM STOPPED ***'
WRITE(16,*) ' *** PROGRAM STOPPED ***'
WRITE(16,*) 'SAM SITE #',SAMNUM,' NEEDS TO STORE',
& ' NEW ID # AND SAM SITE ID ARRAY IS FULL'
WRITE(16,*) 'PRESENT VALUE OF MAXSAMMESID PARAMETER IS',POS-l
WRITE(16,*) 'INCREASE MAXADWMESID IN SAMMES1 DEF AND',
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& ' RECOMPILE PROGRAM MODULES'
WRITE(16,*) ' *** PROGRAM STOPPED ***'
STOP
ENDIF
C ... ARRAY HAS ROOM SO PUT NEW MSG ID # INTO IT AND INCREMENT POINTER
RSAMMESID(SAMNUM,POS) = MESID
RSAMMESIDPOS(SAMNUM) = RSAMMESIDPOS(SAMNUM) +
1
WRITE(16,*) ' MESID#',MESID,'STORED AT SAM SITE #',SAMNUM,
& 'NEW MES POS = \RSAMMESIDPOS(SAMNUM)
IF(ACTION .EQ. 0) THEN
C ... ORDERED TO TURN OFF BUT IS ALREADY OFF BECAUSE IT IS DEAD.
IF (PS(SAMNUM) .LT. PSSMIN) THEN
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,*) ' SAM SITE #,PS,PSSMIN',
& SAMNUM,PS(SAMNUM),PSSMIN





. ORDERED TO TURN OFF BUT SITE IS ALREADY TURNED OFF
IF (STATS(SAMNUM) .EQ. 0) THEN
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,*) ' SAM SITE #, STATUS',
& SAMNUM,STATS(SAMNUM)




IF (DEBUG .GE. 3) THEN





IF (DEBUG .GE. 2) THEN
WRITE(16,*) ' COMPUTED DELAY = ',DELAY,
& ' TIME WHEN MESSAGE WILL BE SENT- \CTIME +DELAY
ENDIF
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IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1003) CTIME,SAMNUM,CTIME +DELAY
1003 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC SAM SITE ',12,' WILL SEND MESSAGE',
& ' AT TIME \F5.0)
ENDIF
C ... CONSTRUCT A MESSAGE WHEN SITE MUST SHUT DOWN AND SEND IT TO ?
C CALL HOLDMES(MSG)
C ... SET SAM SITE STATUS TO OFF
STATS(SAMNUM) =ACTION
IF(DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1001) CTIME,SAMNUM
1001 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC SAM SITE ',12,' ORDERED TO TURN OFF; DOES.')
ENDIF
ELSEIF(ACTION .EQ. 1) THEN
C ... ORDERED TO TURN ON BUT SITE IS ALREADY TURNED ON
IF (STATS(SAMNUM) .EQ. 1) THEN
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,*) ' SAM SITE #, STATUS',
& SAMNUM,STATS(SAMNUM)





IF(DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1002) CTIME,SAMNUM
1002 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC SAM SITE ',12,' ORDERED TO TURN ON; DOES.')
ENDIF
ENDIF







C LATEST CHANGE MADE 7/09/91 BFS
C SETS THE ARRAY INDICATING WHETHER A NON-SAM TARGET IS AN IADS
C ELEMENT( = 1) OR NOT( = 0)
C
C CALLED BY - REDIAD
C CALLS - NONE
C
PARAMETER (IM = 30,JM = 25,KM = 20)
C IMPLICIT LOGICAL (A-Z)
C DECLARE LOCAL VARIABLES
INTEGER JJ,KK










C DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C
C VARIABLES SET BY PARAMETER STATEMENT
C IM - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C JM - MAX # OF SAM SITES
C KM - MAX # OF PEN. CHECKPOINTS
C VARIABLES IN COMMON BLOCK USED IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C NTARGETS - MAXIMUM NUMBER OF NON-SAM TARGETS IN THIS SIM
C VARIABLES LOCAL TO THIS SUBROUTINE
C JJ - LOOP COUNTER
C KK - LOOP COUNTER
C START PROGRAM
C WRITE(V) 'SETID'
DO 10 JJ = 1,NTARGETS
IADSTGT(JJ) =
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DO 20 KK = 1,NUMIADSTGTS












C LATEST CHANGE MADE 07/03/91 BFS
C SHIFTS WAITING MESSAGES ONE POSITION UP
C
C CALLED BY - MSGRDY
C CALLS - NONE
C
PARAMETER (IM = 30,JM = 25,KM = 20)
IMPLICIT LOGICAL (A-Z)
C DECLARE PASSED VARIABLES
INTEGER I
C DECLARE LOCAL VARIABLES
INTEGER II,L,POS





C VARIABLES USED IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C
C IN COMMON BLOCK
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C DEBUG - FLAG FOR DEBUG PRINTOUTS
C LOCAL TO THIS SUBROUTINE
C II - LOOP COUNTER
C L - LOOP COUNTER
C POS - INPUT INDEX OF MESSAGE IN HOLDING ARRAY
C START PROGRAM
C WRITE(*,*) 'SHIFTU'
C... SHIFT PENDING MESSAGES UP ONE POSITION, CLEAR DATA AT LAST
C ... POINTER POSITION AND DECREMENTS POINTER BY ONE
POS =NEXTHOLDPOS
DO30L = I,POS
DO 40 II = 1,MAXMSGSIZE






IF(DEBUG .GE. 3) THEN
WRITE(16,*) 'HOLDING MESSAGES SHIFTED UP, NEXT MESSAGE',





C LATEST CHANGE MADE 6/28/91 BFS
C TURNS OFF AN EW SITE AT A GIVEN TIME DURING THE SIMULATION.
C USED TO TEST THE IADS MODIFICATIONS.
C
C CALLED BY - IADS
C CALLS - HOLDMES
C
PARAMETER (IM = 30,JM = 25,KM = 20)
C IMPLICIT LOGICAL (A-Z)















C VARIABLES USED IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C
C VARIABLES SET BY PARAMETER STATEMENT
C IM - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C JM - MAX # OF SAM SITES
C KM - MAX # OF PEN. CHECKPOINTS
C VARIABLES IN COMMON BLOCK
C DEBUG - FLAG FOR DEBUG PRINTOUTS
C STATS(JM) - INTEGER VALUE INDICATING THE STATUS OF EACH SAM SITE
C - IF =0; SITE IS NOT RADIATING
C - IF = 1; SITE IS ESTABLING A TRACK FILE ON A TARGET
C - AND GETTING READY TO FIRE, SITE IS RADIATING
C - IF =2; SITE HAS A SALVO ENROUTE TO THE TARGET
C - IF =3; SITE IS PERFORMING POST INTERCEPT DECISIONS
C LOCAL TO THIS SUBROUTINE


















IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1003) MSG(1),MSG(2),N1NT(MSG(7))
1003 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC ADWOC WILL SEND SHUT OFF MESSAGE AT TIME',
& F5.0,' TO EW SITE # ',12)
WRITE(16,*) ' MSGID = ',NINT(MSG(9))
ENDIF
CALL HOLDMES(MSG)




C LATEST CHANGE MADE 07/24/91 BFS
C USED AS AN INFORMATION, STATUS AND DEBUG GUIDE.
C LISTS THE FINAL MESSAGE POINTER POSITIONS AND MAX LIMITS
C FOR THE IADS ELEMENTS.
C
C CALLED BY - TACOPS
C CALLS - NONE
C
PARAMETER (IM = 30,JM = 25,KM - 20)
IMPLICIT LOGICAL (A-Z)
C '....DECLARE VARIABLES IN COMMON BLOCK.
INTEGER DEBUG.NSITE
C COMMON BLOCK











C DECLARE LOCAL VARIABLES
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INTEGER II,JJ,POS
C VARIABLES USED IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C
C VARIABLES SET BY PARAMETER STATEMENT
C IM - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C JM - MAX # OF SAM SITES
C KM - MAX # OF PENETRATOR CHECKPOINTS
C IN COMMON BLOCK
C DEBUG - FLAG FOR DEBUG PRINTOUTS
C LOCAL TO THIS SUBROUTINE
C II - LOOP COUNTER
C JJ - LOOP COUNTER
C START PROGRAM
C WRITE(*,*) 'MESSUM'
WRITE(16,*) ' MESSAGE POINTER SUMMARY '
WRITE(16,*) ' EW SITES '
WRITE(16,*) 'MAX # OF ID #S POSSIBLE TO BE STORED = ',MAXEWMESID
DO 10JJ = 1,NEWSITES
IF(REWMESIDPOS(JJ) .GE. 1) THEN
IF(DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN





WRITE(16,*) ' --EW REPORTING STATIONS '
WRITE(16,*) 'MAX # OF ID #S POSSIBLE TO BE STORED =\MAXRPTMESID
DO 20 JJ = 1,NUMRPT
IF(RPTMESIDPOS(JJ) .GE. 1) THEN
IF(DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN





WRITE(16,*) ' ADWOC CENTER - '
WRITE(16,*) 'MAX # OF ID #S POSSIBLE TO BE STORED =\MAXADWMESID
IF(ADWMESIDPOS .GE. 1) THEN
IF(DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN





WRITE(16,*) ' SAM SITES '
WRITE(16,*) 'MAX # OF ID #S POSSIBLE TO BE STORED =\MAXSAMMESID
DO 100 JJ = NEWSITES + 1,NSITE
IF(RSAMMESIDPOS(JJ) .GE. 1) THEN
IF(DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN









C LATEST CHANGE MADE 6/28/91 BFS
C TURNS OFF A SAM SITE AT A GIVEN TIME DURING THE SIMULATION.
C USED TO TEST THE IADS MODIFICATIONS.
C
C CALLED BY - IADS
C CALLS - HOLDMES
C
PARAMETER (IM = 30,JM = 25,KM = 20)
C IMPLICIT LOGICAL (A-Z)
C DECLARE LOCAL VARIABLES
REAL MSG(13)











C VARIABLES USED IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C
C VARIABLES SET BY PARAMETER STATEMENT
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C IM - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C JM - MAX # OF SAM SITES
C KM - MAX # OF PEN. CHECKPOINTS
C VARIABLES IN COMMON BLOCK
C DEBUG - FLAG FOR DEBUG PRINTOUTS
C TIME - CURRENT SIM. TIME
C LOCAL TO THIS SUBROUTINE
C MSG(13) - HOLDS DATA CONTAINING MESSAGE TO BE SENT
C START PROGRAM
C WRITE(*,*) 'SAMOFF














IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1003) MSG(1),MSG(2),NINT(MSG(7))
1003 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC ADWOC WILL SEND SHUT OFF MESSAGE AT TIME',
& F5.0,' TO SAM SITE # ',12)
WRITE(16,*) ' MSGID = ',NINT(MSG(9))
ENDIF
CALL HOLDMES(MSG)




C LATEST CHANGE MADE 6/28/91 BFS
C TURNS ON A SAM SITE AT A GIVEN TIME DURING THE SIMULATION.
C USED TO TEST THE IADS MODIFICATIONS.
C
C CALLED BY - IADS
C CALLS - HOLDMES
C
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PARAMETER (IM = 30,JM = 25,KM = 20)
C IMPLICIT LOGICAL (A-Z)
C DECLARE LOCAL VARIABLES
REAL MSG(13)









C VARIABLES USED IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C
C VARIABLES SET BY PARAMETER STATEMENT
C IM - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C JM - MAX # OF SAM SITES
C KM - MAX # OF PEN. CHECKPOINTS
C VARIABLES IN COMMON BLOCK
C DEBUG - FLAG FOR DEBUG PRINTOUTS
C TIME - CURRENT SIM. TIME
C LOCAL TO THIS SUBROUTINE
C MSG(13) - HOLDS DATA CONTAINING MESSAGE TO BE SENT
C START PROGRAM
C WRITE(*,*) 'SAMOFF
C ... ADWOC SENDS MESSAGE TO SAM SITE #5 TO TURN OFF IN 10 SEC
MSG(1) =TIME













IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1003) MSG(1),MSG(2),NINT(MSG(7))
1003 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC ADWOC WILL SEND SHUT OFF MESSAGE AT TIME',
& F5.0,' TO SAM SITE # ',12)
WRITE(16,*) ' MSGID = ',NINT(MSG(9))
ENDIF
CALL HOLDMES(MSG)




C *** LATEST CHANGE MADE 6/25/91 BFS
PARAMETER (IM = 30,JM = 25,KM = 20)
IMPLICIT LOGICAL (A-Z)
C DECLARE LOCAL VARIABLES
INTEGER BOMBS,IDHAC,II,JJ,K,KK,L,LL,N,NCK,NO0,NOl,NPENTYPE
CHARACTER TITLE*70

























































C DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C
C VARIABLES SET BY PARAMETER STATEMENT
C IM - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C JM - MAX # OF SAM SITES
C KM - MAX # OF PEN. CHECKPOINTS
C VARIABLES IN COMMON BLOCK USED IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C ALTARM(IO) - ALTITUDE (IN NMI) OF ARM AT GIVEN TIMES FROM LAUNCH.
C - THIS VARIABLE ALONG WITH TARM(IO) AND RNGARM(IO)
C - FORM THE BASIC ARM TRAJECTORY AND THE DATA IS GIVEN
C - IN THE INPUT DATAFILE
C ALTMN - ALTITUDE BELOW WHICH PARM STARTS SEARCHING FOR A SITE
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C ANGM - HALF ANGLE HELD OF VIEW OF ARM
C BM(8)
C BOM(IM) - MAX # OF BOMB GROUPS THAT A/C IM WILL DROP
C BOMPK(2,20) - BOMB PK AGAINST SAM AND NON-TARGETS
C BOMPT(IM,N) - CHECKPOINT # WHERE A/C IM DROPS BOMB GROUP N
C BOMTGT(IM,2,N) - TARGET TYPE AND TARGETS LOCATION # FOR BOMBS N
C CKONl(JM)
C CNTRL2(IM) - MAX # OF TYPE 2 STANDOFF WEAPONS THAT A/C IM CONTROLS
C CS(IM)
C C2END(IM,N) - CHECKPOINT # WHERE CONTROL A/C IM ENDS CONTROL OF
C - ITS TYPE 2 STANDOFF WEAPON # N
C C2START(IM,N) - CHECKPOINT # WHERE A/C IM STARTS CONTROLING TYPE
C - 2 STANDOFF WEAPON # N
C C2TIME(IM,N) - TIME (IN SECONDS) BEFORE IMPACT WHEN CONTROL A/C IM
C - MAY BE KILLED AND ITS TYPE 2 STANDOFF WEAPON # N IT
C - WAS CONTROLLING MAY STILL HIT THE TARGET
C C2WPN(IM,N) - PENETRATOR # FOR TYPE 2 STANDOFF WEAPON # N THAT
C - WILL BE CONTROLLED BY A/C IM
C DEBUG - FLAG FOR DEBUG PRINTOUTS
C DIST(JM)
C DRMTG(IM,8)
C DT - TACOPS TIME INCREMENT (1 SECOND)
C ESITE1(9,10) - LAUNCH BOUNDRY RANGE VALUES FOR SAM SITES
C ESITE2(9,10) - LAUNCH BOUNDRY ALTITUDE VALUES FOR SAM SITES
C FEND(7,2)
C FTPRTA(26,7)
C GDT(JM) - KILL ASSES DELAY TIME FOR SAM SITE JM
C GTFUS(JM)
C HT(JM)
C I - PEN. LOOP COUNTER
C IOP(IO) - HOLDS FLAGS(l/0) TO SELECT PROGRAM RUNNING MODES
C ISECT(IM,JM) - HOLDS A FLAG(l/0) FOR EACH PENETRATOR IM WHICH
C - INDICATES WHETHER EACH SAM SITE JM CAN(= 1) OR
C - CANNOT(=0) FIRE AT THIS PENETRATOR
C ISEED - DOUBLE PRECISION # USED AS SEED IN RANDOM # SUB. DRAND
C J - SAM SITE LOOP COUNTER
C LNCHl(IM) - MAX # OF TYPE 1 STANDOFF WEAPONS AC/ IM LAUNCHES
C LNCH2(IM) - MAX # OF TYPE 2 STANDOFF WEAPONS AC/ IM LAUNCHES
C LMAXS(9)
C L1CKPT(IM,N) - CHECKPOINT # WHERE A/C IM LAUNCHES ITS TYPE 1
C - STANDOFF WEAPON # N
C L2CKPT(IM,N) - CHECKPOINT # WHERE A/C IM LAUNCHES ITS TYPE 2
C - STANDOFF WEAPON # N
C L1WPN(IM,N) - PENETRATOR # FOR TYPE 1 STANDOFF WEAPON # N THAT
C - A/C IM WILL LAUNCH
C L2WPN(IM,N) - PENETRATOR # FOR TYPE 2 STANDOFF WEAPON THAT
C - A/C IM WILL LAUNCH
C MDEST(IM,2) - FOR PENETRATOR IM;
C - IF MDEST(IM,1) = 1; PENETRATOR IS TARGETTED AGAINST
C - A SAM SITE AND MDEST(IM,2) HOLDS THE SITE #.
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C - IF MDEST(IM,1) = 2; PENETRATOR IS TARGETTED AGAINST
C - A NON-SAM SITE TYEP TARGET AND MDEST(IM,2) HOLDS
C - THE TARGET #.
C MSITE(JM) - HOLDS THE SAM SITE TYPE (1-9) FOR SITE JM
C MWAITIM(J) - MAXIMUM WAIT TIME (IN SECONDS) AFTER THE TARGET IS
C - TERRAIN MASKED BEFORE THIS SITE TYPE LOSES TRACK AND
C - THE OUTBOUND SAM IS LOST (DATA READ IN AS SITE TYPE
C - AND IS CONVERTED TO SITE LOCATION # IN SUB INIT)
C NAC - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C NCKPT(IM)
C NHRMAC - TOTAL NUMBER OF A/C CARRYING ARM MISSILES
C NUMB(IM) - # OF PREPROGRAMMED ARM MISSILES ON A/C IM
C NUMD(IM) - # OF DIRECTIVE ARM MISSILES ON A/C IM
C NUMR(IM) - # OF REACTIVE ARM MISSILES ON A/C IM
C NSITE - MAX # OF SAM SITES
C NUMSHT(JM) - MAX # OF SALVOS THIS SAM TYPE HAS AVAILABLE
C ORDR
C OWAITIM(J) - MAXIMUM WAIT TIME (IN SECONDS) AFTER THE TARGET IS
C - OUTSIDE OF THE SITE LAUNCH ENVELOPE BEFORE THIS SITE
C - TYPE LOSES TRACK AND THE OUTBOUND SAM IS LOST (DATA
C - READ IN AS SITE TYPE AND IS CONVERTED TO SITE
C - LOCATION # IN SUB INIT)
C PENTARPK(2,2,20) - PK OF EACH PENETRATOR TYPE FOR EACH SAM SITE
C - TYPE OR EACH NON-AD TARGET NUMBER
C PENTYPE(IM) - INTEGER INDICATING THE PENETRATOR TYPE
C PKM(9) - PK OF ARM FOR THE 9 SAM TYPES
C PMPREF(IM,8)
C PPK(JM)
C PS(JM) - INITIAL PS OF EACH SAM SITE
C PSAMIN - MINIMUM SURVIVABILITY OF PENETRATOR;IF PSA(IM) IS BELOW
C - THIS, THE PENETRATOR IS REMOVED FROM THE SIMULATION
C PSSMIN - MIN SURVIVAL PROBABILITY THAT THE SAM SITE MUST MAINTAIN
C - IN ORDER TO STAY IN THE SIMULATION
C RNGARM(IO) - DOWNRANGE (IN NMI) OF ARM FROM LAUNCH.
C - THIS VARIABLE ALONG WITH TARM(IO) AND ALTARM(IO)
C - FORM THE BASIC ARM TRAJECTORY AND THE DATA IS GIVEN




C TARM(IO) - TIME (IN SECONDS) FROM LAUNCH OF ARM;READ IN FROM THE
C - INPUT DATAFILE. ALONG WITH ALTARM(IO) AND RNGARM(IO),
C - THIS FORMS THE BASIC ARM TRAJECTORY FROM WHICH THE
C - EXACT ARM TRAJECTORY (FOR EACH SECOND AFTER LAUNCH)




C TMEM - MAX TIME (IN SECONDS) DURING WHICH THE ARM WILL STILL HIT






C XS(JM) - X POSITION (IN NMI) OF SAM SITE JM
C Y(IM,KM)
C YS(JM) - Y POSITION (IN NMI) OF SAM SITE JM
C Z(IM,KM)
C ZS(JM) - Z POSITION (IN NMI) OF SAM SITE JM
C VARIABLES LOCAL TO THIS SUBROUTINE

















C OPEN(5,FILE = 'A:ZTACOPSJN\STATUS = 'OLD')
C OPEN(7,FILE = 'A:ZTACOPS.DOC',STATUS = 'NEW')
OPEN(15,FILE = '/TACOPS IN')
OPEN(17,FILE = '/TACOPS DOC B')
WRrrE(*,*) 'DO YOU WANT ANY DEBUG OUTPUT?(0 = NO; 1 = YES,SOME; 2 = YES,
$ MORE; 3 = YES, ALL)'
READ(*,*) DEBUG
C IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) OPEN(6,FILE = 'A:ZTDEBUG.OUT,STATUS = 'NEW)
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) OPEN(16,FILE = '/TDEBUG OUT B')
DT = 1.0
BOMBS =0
C START READING INPUT DATA
READ(15,1000) TITLE
1000 FORMAT(A70)
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) WRITE(16,1000) TITLE




READ (15,*) (IOP(II),II = 1,10)
C IOP(1) = EXPECTED VALUE: IOP(l) = l STOCHASTIC MODEL...
C IOP(2) = REG DOCTRINE: IOP(2) = l PERFECT COODINATION.
C IOP(3) = FREE FIRING : IOP(3) = l 1-ON-l FIRING DOCTRINE....
C THE FOLLOWING ARE BUILT IN INPUTS
ISEED = 1000000.00
IF (IOP(l) .EQ. 1) THEN





IF (IOP(9) .EQ. 1) WRITE(18,1000) TITLE
C READ AIRCRAFT DATA
READ (15,*) NAC,NSITE,PSAMIN,NPENTYPE,NTARGETS
C WRITE SECOND DATA RECORD TO DOC FILE
WRITE( 17,3002) NAC,NSITE,NTARGETS
3002 FORMAT(I3,I3,I3)
C *** READ IN TOTAL # AND ID # OF MULTITARGETTING SAMS.
READ(15,*) MAXMS
IF (MAXMS .EQ. 0) GOTO 15




C READ SAM SITE DATA
DO 20 J = l,NSrTE
20 READ(15,*) XS(J),YS(J),ZS(J),VM(J),GDT(J),PPK(J),MSITE(J),
$THETJ(J),CKONl(J),GTFUS(J),PS(J),NUMSHT(J)




C FOR PENETRATOR TYPE
IF (PENTYPE(I) .EQ. 0) THEN
READ(15,*) BOM(I),LNCHl(I),LNCH2(I),CNTRL2(I)























C FOR PENETRATOR TYPE 1




C FOR PENETRATOR TYPE 2





C READ CHECKPOINT POSITION AND VELOCITY DATA.
NCK = NCKPT(I)
DO40K=l,NCK
40 READ (15,*) X(I,K),Y(I,K),Z(I,K),V(I,K)
30 CONTINUE
C READ THE PK OF THE WEAPONS AGAINST THE TARGETS
IF (NPENTYPE .EQ. 0) GOTO 53
DO 50 II = 1,NPENTYPE
READ(15,*) (PENTARPK(II )1,L),L=1 )9)
IF (NTARGETS .GT. 0) READ(15,*) (PENTARPK(II,2,L),L=1,NTARGETS)
50 CONTINUE
53 CONTINUE
IF (BOMBS .EQ. 0) GOTO 55
READ(15,*) (BOMPK(l,L),L=l,9)
IF (NTARGETS .GT. 0) READ(15,*) (BOMPK(2,L),L=l,NTARGETS)
55 CONTINUE
DO60I = l,NAC
READ(15,*) (ISECT(I,J),J - 1,NSITE)
60 CONTINUE
C READ THE ARM AIRCRAFT DATA.
READ (15,*) NHRMACTMEM
IF(NHRMAC .EQ. 0) GO TO 140
READ(15,*) (PKM(L),L=1,9)
DO 70II = 1,NHRMAC
READ (15,*) IDHAC,NUMD(IDHAC),NUMB(IDHAC),NUMR(IDHAC)
IF(NUMD(IDHAC) .EQ. 0) GO TO 90
NO0 = NUMD(IDHAC)
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DO 80 JJ = l,NO0
80 READ (15,*) DRMTG(IDHAC,JJ),TLDRM(IDHAC,JJ)
90 IF(NUMB(IDHAC) .EQ. 0) GO TO 70
N01 = NUMB(IDHAC)
DO 100 JJ = 1,N01
100 READ(15,*) TLB(IDHAC,JJ),PMPREF(IDHAC,JJ)
70 CONTINUE
C READ DEFENSE SITE DATA.
140 READ(15,*) PSSMIN
DO 150 J = 1,9
READ (15,*) LL,TRACK(J),MWAITIM(J),OWAITIM(J)
LMAXS(J) = LL-1




C READ ARM FOOTPRINTS.
READ(15,*) (FEND(L,1),L = 1,7)
READ(15,*) (SSEND(L,1),L=1,7)
READ (15,*) KK
DO 190K = 1,KK
READ (15,*) (FTPRTA(K,L),L=1,7)
190 CONTINUE
C READ ARM TRAJECTORY
READ(15,*) ANGMALTMN
DO 210 11 = 1,10
210 READ(15,*) TARM(II)ALTARM(II),RNGARM(II)
READ(15,*) ORDR
READ(15,*) (BM(L),L=l,ORDR + l)
C READ TERRRAIN AND AIRCRAFT RADAR DATA.
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: ... IF NOT IADS AND NO EW SITES, YOU ARE DONE READING
IF (IOP(3) .LE. 4 AND. NEWSITES .EQ. 0) GOTO 900







C LATEST CHANGES MADE ON 6/27/91 BFS.
PARAMETER (IM = 30,JM = 25,KM = 20)
C IMPLICIT LOGICAL (A-Z)
































C DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C
C VARIABLES SET BY PARAMETER STATEMENT
C IM - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C JM - MAX # OF SAM SITES
C KM - MAX # OF PEN. CHECKPOINTS
C VARIABLES IN COMMON BLOCK USED IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C ADAMG - TOTAL HARDKILL MISSILE DAMAGE BY SAM SYSTEMS
C DEBUG - FLAG FOR DEBUG PRINTOUTS
C DELTI - DELAY TIME (IN SECONDS) TO READY REACTIVE ARM
C DMDAMG - TOTAL SAM SITE DAMAGE BY DIRECTED ARMS
C DT - TACOPS TIME INCREMENT (1 SECOND)
C I - PEN. LOOP COUNTER
C IOP(IO) - HOLDS FLAGS(l/0) TO SELECT PROGRAM RUNNING MODES
C J - SAM SITE LOOP COUNTER
C MDEST(IM,2) - FOR PENETRATOR IM;
C - IF MDEST(IM,1) = 1; PENETRATOR IS TARGETTED AGAINST
C - A SAM SITE AND MDEST(IM,2) HOLDS THE SITE #.
C - IF MDEST(IM,1) = 2; PENETRATOR IS TARGETTED AGAINST
C - A NON-SAM SITE TYEP TARGET AND MDEST(IM,2) HOLDS
C - THE TARGET #.
C MSITE(JM) - HOLDS THE SAM SITE TYPE (1-9) FOR SITE JM
C NAC - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C NDP - RUNNING TOTAL OF DARMS FIRED SO FAR
C NHRMAC - TOTAL NUMBER OF A/C CARRYING ARM MISSILES
C NOSHOT(JM) - MAX # OF SALVOS AVAILABLE TO SAM SITE (JM)
C NPP - RUNNING TOTAL # OF PREPROGRAMMED ARMS FIRED
C NRE - RUNNING TOTAL # OF REACTIVE ARMS FIRED
C NSHOT(JM) - RUNNING TOTAL # OF SALVOS SAM SITE JM HAS FIRED
C NSITE - MAX # OF SAM SITES
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C NTARGETS - MAX # OF NON-SAM TARGETS IN THE DATAFILE
C PMDAMG - TOTAL SAM SITE DAMAGE BY PREPROGRAMMED ARMS
C PS(JM) - SURVIVAL PROBABILITY OF SAM SITE JM
C PSA(IM) - SURVIVAL PROBABILITY OF PENETRATOR IM
C PSAMIN - MINIMUM SURVIVABILITY OF PENETRATOR;IF PSA(IM) IS BELOW
C - THIS, THE PENETRATOR IS REMOVED FROM THE SIMULATION
C PST(20) - PS OF NON-AD TYPE TARGETS
C RMDAMG - TOTAL SAM SITE DAMAGE BY REACTIVE ARMS
C TDAMG - TOTAL SAM SITE DAMAGE BY ALL WEAPONS
C TIME - SIMULATION TIME (IN SECONDS) FROM THE START OF THE RUN
C TIMEL - LATEST TIME (IN SECONDS) WHEN THE SLOWEST PENETRATOR
C - WILL BE AT ITS LAST CHECKPOINT
C XS(JM) - X POSITION (IN NMI) OF SAM SITE JM
C YS(JM) - Y POSITION (IN NMI) OF SAM SITE JM











C LP - COUNTER FOR LOOPS DONE IN A STOCHASTIC MODE RUN
C SDAMG - TOTAL SAM SITE DAMAGE BY HARDKILL MISSILES




WRITE(V) ' TACOPS - MOD 10 '
WRrTE(V) ' '
C WITH UP TO 60 PENETRSTORS AND 15 CHECKPOINTS EACH,
C 30 SAM SITES/20 NON-SAM TARGETS AND 48 ARMS.
C
C LATEST MODS INCLUDE THE CAPABILITY TO:
C
C 1) HAVE ATTRITION ON NON-SAM TYPE TARGETS
C 2) HAVE MORE THAN ONE STANDOFF WEAPON TYPE WITH
C UNIQUE PK FOR THE SAM AND NON-SAM TYPE TARGETS
C 3) HAVE EACH SAM SITE WITH A UNIQUE ALTITUDE
C 4) HAVE AN ARM PK FOR EACH UNIQUE SAM TYPE
C 5) ALLOW A/C TO DROP BOMBS AND LAUNCH PENETRATORS
C IF THEY SURVIVE TO THE WEAPONS RELEASE POINT
C 6) HAVE EACH SITE WITH A UNIQUE STARTING PS AND
C NUMBER OF AVAILABLE SALVOS
C 7) CORRECTION TO PARM FLIGHT PATH COMPUTATIONS; SUB FUTLOK
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C REPLACES SUB LOCKON - WILL NOT ALLOW SITES TO FIRE IF, AT
C INTERCEPT, THE FUZE ANGLE WILL BE BAD; EXPANDED DOCUMENTING
C OUTPUT DATA FOR ZTR PROGRAM IN THE AREAS OF SAM SITE
C RADIATING STATUS AND ARM FUNCTIONS; DEFINED TYPE 1 STANDOFF
C WEAPON TO BE A FIRE AND FORGET TYPE, AND A NEW TYPE 2
C STANDOFF WEAPON THAT REQUIRES POST-LAUNCH CONTROL OR
C DESIGNATION
C 8) CORRECTED CODE IN SHOT SUBROUTINES TO NOT ALLOW SITES TO
C FIRE AND INTERCEPT PENETRATORS THAT ARE OUT OF ENVELOPE OR
C ARE TERRAIN MASKED; ADDED TO INPUT DATAFILE VALUES FOR THE
C MAXIMUM WAIT TIME BEFORE THE SITE LOSES THE TRACK FOR TERRAIN








DO 70 J = 1,NSITE
INITDAMG = INITDAMG + l.O-PS(J)
70 CONTINUE
LOOP = IOP(10)
IF (IOP(9) .NE. 1) GO TO 5
C OPEN(8,FILE = 'A:ZTACOPS.OUT,STATUS = 'NEW)
C REWIND 8









C SHOW PRESENT AND ENDING TIME ON SCREEN....
C WRITE(*,1999) TIME,LIM
C1999 FORMAT(' + PRESENT TIME = \F5.0,' TIME PROGRAM ENDS- ',14)





IF(NHRMAC .EQ. 0) GO TO 30
C= = = = = = = PC VERSION WAS 'CALL ARM' = = = = = = = = = = = =
CALL AARM
IF(NDP .GT. 0) CALL DARM
IF(NPP .GT. 0) CALL PARM(AJ)
IF(NRE .GT. 0) CALL RARM
30 CONTINUE
DO40I = l,NAC
40 IF (PSA(I) .GE. PSAMIN) GO TO 20
ICO = ICO + 1
IF(ICO LT. 2) GO TO 20
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE (16,1008)
1008 FORMAT(' ALL PENETRATORS SHOT DOWN!')
WRITE (*,*) ' '
WRITE (*,*) ' ALL PENETRATORS SHOT DOWN!'
ENDIF
C WRITE EVENT AND DATA TO DOC FILE.
WRITE(17,2001) 35,2
2001 FORMAT(I2,I2)





1009 FORMAT(' ALL GIVEN CHECKPOINTS VISITED.')
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C WRITE EVENT AND DATA TO DOC FILE.
WRITE(17,2002) 36,2
2002 FORMAT(I2,I2)
WRITE(17,3002) ' ALL CHECKPOINTS VISITED.'
3002 FORMAT(A30)





C PRINT OUT SAM SITES FINAL PS.
TDAMG = 0.
DO 50 J = 1,NSITE
D4S = '
IDAT = MAX0(0,NOSHOT(J)-NSHOT(J))
TDAMG =TDAMG + 1.0-PS(J)
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1000) D4S,J,IDAT,NOSHOT(J),PS(J),XS(J),YS(J)









IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,*) ' '
WRITE(16,1001) INITDAMG
1001 FORMATC TOTAL SITE DAMAGE BEFORE THIS RUN = \F7.3)
WRITE(16,1002) TDAMG + INITDAMG
1002 FORMAT(' TOTAL SITE DAMAGE TO THE PRESENT = \F7.3)
WRITE(16,1003) TDAMG




IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
DATS = ' AIRCRAFT DAMAGE BY SAMS = '
WRITE(16,1007) DATSADAMG
DATS = ' SITE DAMAGE BY NON-ARM WEAPONS = '
WRITE(16,1007) DATS,SDAMG
C DATS = ' SITE DAMAGE BY DIRECTED ARMS = '
C WRITE(16,1007) DATS,DMDAMG
DATS = ' STTE DAMAGE BY PRE-EMPTIVE ARMS = '
WRITE(16,1007) DATS,PMDAMG






































C PRINT OUT NON-SAM GROUND TARGETS FINAL PS
C IF THIS TYPE OF TARGET IS USED IN THE RUN
C (i.e. NTARGETS > 0)
IF (NTARGETS .EQ. 0) GOTO 10
TGTDAMG = 0.0
DO 60 L=1,NTARGETS
TGTDAMG =TGTDAMG + l.O-PST(L)
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1010) L,PST(L)







IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1011) TGTDAMG






C ... CALL MESSAGE POINTER SUMMARY SUBROUTINE
C CALL MESSUM
10 CONTINUE





C IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) CLOSE(6)
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) CLOSE(16)






C LATEST CHANGE MADE 6/20/89 BFS.
PARAMETER (IM = 30,JM = 25,KM = 20)
IMPLICIT LOGICAL (A-Z)




C DECLARE PASSED VARIABLES
REAL SDAMG
C DECLARE DOUBLE PRECISION FUNCTION.
REAL*8 DRAND






























C DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C
C PASSED VARIABLES
C SDAMG - TOTAL SAM SITE DAMAGE BY AIR DELIVERED WEAPONS
C VARIABLES SET BY PARAMETER STATEMENT
C IM - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C JM - MAX # OF SAM SITES
C KM - MAX # OF PEN. CHECKPOINTS
C VARIABLES IN COMMON BLOCK USED IN THIS SUBROUTINE
C BOM(IM) - MAX # OF BOMB GROUPS THAT A/C IM DROPS
C BOMTGT(IM,2,M) - TARGET TYPE AND LOCATION # FOR BOMB GROUP M
C BOMTIM(IM.N) - TIME (IN SECONDS) WHEN A/C IM DROPS BOMB GROUP N
C CNTRL2(IM) - MAX # OF TYPE 2 STANDOFF WEAPONS THAT A/C IM CONTROLS
C C2DEDTIM(IM) - TIME (IN SECONDS) WHEN CONTROL A/C IM WAS KILLED
C C2END(IM,N) - CHECKPOINT # WHERE A/C IM ENDS CONTROL OF ITS
C - TYPE 2 STANDOFF WEAPON # N
C C2ETIM(IM,N) - END TIME (IN SECONDS) WHEN AIRCRAFT IM ENDS CONTROL
C - OF ITS TYPE 2 STANDOFF WEAPON # N
C C2START(IM,N) - CHECKPOINT # WHERE A/C IM STARTS CONTROL OF ITS
C - TYPE 2 STANDOFF WEAPON # N
C C2STIM(IM,N) - START TIME (IN SECONDS) WHEN AIRCRAFT IM STARTS
C - CONTROL OF A TYPE 2 STANDOFF WEAPON # N
C C2TIME(IM,N) - TIME (IN SECONDS) BEFORE IMPACT OF CONTROL A/C IM
C - WHEN CONTROL OF ITS TYPE 2 STANDOFF WEAPON # N MAY
C - BE LOST AND THE WEAPON WILL STILL HIT THE TARGET
C C2WPN(IM,N) - PENETRATOR # FOR TYPE 2 STANDOFF WEAPON #N THAT A/C
C - # IM WILL CONTROL
C IOP(IO) - HOLDS FLAGS(l/0) TO SELECT PROGRAM RUNNING MODES
C LEG(IM) - HOLDS THE FLIGHTPATH CHECKPOINT DATA LEG NUMBER
C LNCH1TIM(IM,N) - TIME (IN SECONDS) WHEN A/C IM LAUNCHES TTS TYPE 1
C - STANDOFF WEAPONS # N
C LNCH2TIM(IM,N) - TIME (IN SECONDS) WHEN A/C IM LAUNCHES ITS TYPE 2
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C - STANDOFF WEAPONS # N
C LNCHl(IM) - MAX # OF TYPE 1 STANDOFF WEAPONS A/C IM LAUNCHES
C LNCH2(IM) - MAX # OF TYPE 2 STANDOFF WEAPONS A/C IM LAUNCHES
C L1CKPT(IM,N) - CHECKPOINT # WHERE A/C IM LAUNCHES ITS TYPE 1
C - STANDOFF WEAPON # N
C L2CKPT(IM,N) - CHECKPOINT # WHERE A/C IM LAUNCHES TTS TYPE 2
C - STANDOFF WEAPON # N
C L1WPN(IM,N) - PENETRATOR # FOR TYPE 1 STANDOFF WEAPON # N THAT A/C
C - # IM WILL LAUNCH
C L2WPN(IM,N) - PENETRATOR # FOR TYPE 2 STANDOFF WEAPON # N THAT A/C
C - # IM WILL LAUNCH
C MDEST(IM,2) - FOR PENETRATOR IM;
C - IF MDEST(IM,1) = 1; PENETRATOR IS TARGETTED AGAINST
C - A SAM SITE AND MDEST(IM,2) HOLDS THE SITE #.
C - IF MDEST(IM,1) = 2; PENETRATOR IS TARGETTED AGAINST
C - A NON-SAM SITE TYEP TARGET AND MDEST(IM,2) HOLDS
C - THE TARGET #.
C MSITE(JM) - HOLDS THE SAM SITE TYPE (1-9) FOR SITE JM
C NAC - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C NCKPT(IM)
C NEW(IM)
C NSITE - MAX # OF PENETRATORS
C PENTARPK(2,2,20) - PK OF EACH PENETRATOR TYPE FOR EACH SAM SITE
C - TYPE OR EACH NON-AD TARGET NUMBER
C PENTYPE(IM) - INTEGER INDICATING THE PENETRATOR TYPE
C PSAC(IM,N) - PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL OF THE CONTROL AIRCRAFT IM AT
C - THE TIME THIS AIRCRAFT REACHES THE CONTROL POINT FOR
C - STANDOFF WEAPON N
C PSAL(IM,L,N) - PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL OF THE LAUNCH AIRCRAFT IM
C - AT THE TIME A TYPE L STANDOFF WEAPON N IS LAUNCHED
C PSAMIN - MINIMUM SURVIVABILITY OF PENETRATOR;IF PSA(IM) IS BELOW
C - THIS, THE PENETRATOR IS REMOVED FROM THE SIMULATION
C PSA(IM) - SURVIVAL PROBABILITY OF PENETRATOR IM
C PS(JM) - SURVIVAL PROBABILITY OF SAM SITE JM
C PSSMIN - MIN SURVIVAL PROBABILITY THAT THE SAM SITE MUST MAINTAIN
C - IN ORDER TO STAY IN THE SIMULATION
C PST(20) - PS OF NON-SAM TYPE TARGET
C RRAD(JM) - HOLDS TIMING DATA (IN SECONDS) FOR SAM SITE JM; USED
C - IN DETERMINING WHEN TO FIRE,RE-FIRE,TRACK,ETC...
C STATS(JM) - INTEGER VALUE INDICATING THE STATUS OF EACH SAM SITE
C - IF =0; SITE IS NOT RADIATING
C - IF = 1; SITE IS ESTABLING A TRACK FILE ON A TARGET
C - AND GETTING READY TO FIRE
C - IF =2; SITE HAS A SALVO ENROUTE TO THE TARGET
C - IF =3; SITE IS PERFORMING POST INTERCEPT DECISIONS
C T(IM,KM)
C TIME - SIMULATION TIME (IN SECONDS) FROM THE START OF THE RUN
C WHO(IM,J,K,N) - HOLDS DATA ON WHO LAUNCHES AND CONTROLS WHOM.
C - FOR A/C IM: INPUT ARE:
C - J-IS STANDOFF WEAPON TYPE (1 OR 2)
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bilities that K-way and higher effects are zero
DF L. R. Chisq Prob Pearson Chisq Prob Iteration
10 5.9295 .8212 5.9811 .8168 8
47 39.9497 .7572 37.8685 .8266 5
99 125.2471 .0385 119.3168 .0804 5
133 254.0287 .0000 244.2417 .0000 2
143 1161.1507 .0000 1090.9009 .0000 2
bilities that all K-•way effects are zero
DF L. R. Chisq Prob Pearson Chisq Prob
10 5.9295 .8212 5.9811 .8168
37 34.0202 .6095 31.8874 .7073
52 85.2974 .0025 81.4483 .0056
34 128.7816 .0000 124.9249 .0000
10 907.1220 .0000 846.6591 .0000
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C - WHERE K = 1; DATA IS THE WEAPON # IT LAUNCHES
C - WHERE K = 2; DATA IS THE WEAPON # IT CONTROLS
C - N IS THE WEAPON #(1-4) ASSIGNED TO THAT A/C
C - OUTPUT IS : STANDOFF WEAPON PEN. #
C - FOR STANDOFF WEAPON IM: INPUTS ARE
C - J-IS STANDOFF WEAPON TYPE (2 IS NORMALLY USED)
C - WHERE K = 1; DATA IS THE LAUNCH A/C #
C - WHERE K - 2; DATA IS THE CONTROL A/C #
C - FOR N= 1; OUTPUT IS A/C # IF INTEREST
C - FOR N = 2; OUTPUT IS WEAPON # OF A/C OF INTEREST
C X(IM,KM)
C XS(JM) - X POSITION (IN NMI) OF SAM SITE JM
C XT(IM,2)
C Y(IM,KM)




C VARIABLES LOCAL TO THIS SUBROUTINE
C CACDED - FLAG (1/0) TO INDICATE THAT THE TYPE 2 WEAPON IMPACTED
C - THE GROUND AND WAS INEFFECTIVE AGAINST THE TARGET BECAUSE
C - ITS CONTROL AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN DESTROYED WELL BEFORE












C PKMSL - HOLDS PK VALUE FROM PENTARPK ARRAY
C VA - FRACTION OF TIME LEFT BETWEEN PREVIOUS CHECKPOINT AND THE





DO 10I = 1,NAC
IF (CNTRL2(I) .GE. 1) THEN
DO 100 M = 1,CNTRL2(I)
IF (C2ETIM(I,M) .GE. TIME AND. C2ETIM(I,M) LT. TIME + DT) THEN
261
PSAC(I,M) = PSA(I)
IF (PSA(I) .GE. PSAMIN) THEN
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1010)TIME,I,WHO(I,2,2,M),PSAC(I,M)
1010 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC A/C ',12/ ENDS CONTROL FUNCTION ',










C IF THE A/C HAS BEEN KILLED, WAS IT SUPPOSED TO DO SOMETHING?.
IF (PSA(I) .LT. PSAMIN) THEN
IF (BOM(I) .GE. 1) THEN
DO 110M = 1,BOM(I)
IF (TIME .LT. BOMTIM(I,M)) THEN
BOM(I)=0
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1017) TIME.I
1017 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC A/C ',12,' IS KILLED AND WILL NOT',









IF (LNCHl(I) .GE. 1) THEN
DO 120M = 1,LNCH1(I)
IF (TIME .LT. LNCH1TIM(I,M) AND.
$ PSA(L1WPN(I,M)) .NE. 0.0) THEN
PSA(L1WPN(I,M)) = 0.0
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1016) TIME,I,L1WPN(I,M)
1016 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC A/C ',12,' IS KILLED AND WILL NOT',










IF (LNCH2(I) .GE. 1) THEN
DO 130M = 1,LNCH2(I)
IF (TIME .LT. LNCH2TIM(I,M) AND.
$ PSA(L2WPN(I,M)) .NE. 0.0) THEN
PSA(L2WPN(I,M)) = 0.0
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1011) TIME,I,L2WPN(I,M)
1011 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC A/C ',12,' IS KILLED AND WILL NOT',









IF (CNTRL2(I) .GE. 1) THEN
DO 140 M = 1,CNTRL2(I)
IF (TIME .LT. C2ETIM(I,M) AND.
$ C2DEDTIM(I) .EQ. 0) THEN
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1012) TIME,I,C2WPN(I,M)
1012 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC A/C ',12,' IS KILLED AND WILL NOT',






C IF IOP(4) = 1 AND IF THE CONTROL A/C HAS BEEN DESTROYED BEFORE
C NOW, THE LAUNCH A/C DOES NOT LAUNCH A WEAPON. OTHERWISE THE
C WEAPON IS LAUNCHED BUT IS NOT CONTROLLED AND HAS NO ATTRIATION
C AGAINST THE TARGET ALTHOUGH THE SAMS MAY ENGAGE IT.
C
IF (IOP(4) .EQ. 1) THEN
PSA(C2WPN(I,M)) = 0.0
LNCH2TIM(WHO(C2WPN(I,M),2,1,1),WHO(C2WPN(I,M),2,1,2)) = 0.0
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1018) C2WPN(I,M)
1018 FORMATf THE CONTROL A/C IS KILLED SO PEN. # ',12,
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DO 145 M = 1,CNTRL2(I)






C TIME TO DROP BOMBS ?
IF (BOM(I) .GE. 1) THEN
DO 150M = 1,BOM(I)
IF (BOMTIM(I,M) .GE. TIME AND.
$ BOMTIM(I,M) .LT. TIME + DT) THEN
IF (BOMTGT(I,l,M) .EQ. 1) THEN
J = BOMTGT(I,2,M)
C RD1 = DRAND(ISEED)
RD1 = ISEED
C= = = = = = DRAND USED IN PC VERSION NOT MAINFRAME VERSION
DP = PS(J)
IF (IOP(l) .EQ. 0) PS(J) = PS(J)*(1.0-PSA(I)*
$ BOMPK(l,MSITE(J)))
IF (IOP(l) .NE. AND. RD1 .LT. PSA(I)*
$ BOMPK(l,MSITE(J)))
$ PS(J) = 0.0
DP = DP-PS(J)
SDAMG =SDAMG + DP
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE (16,1005) TIME,I,J,PS(J),RD1,XS(J),YS(J)
1005 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC A/C ',12,' BOMBS SAM SITE ',12,






ELSEIF (BOMTGT(I,l,M) .EQ. 2) THEN
L=BOMTGT(I,2,M)
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C RD1 = DRAND(ISEED)
RD1 = ISEED
C= = = = = = DRAND USED IN PC VERSION NOT MAINFRAME VERSION =
IF (IOP(l) .EQ. 0) PST(L) = PST(L)*(1.0-PSA(I)*BOMPK(2,L))
IF (IOP(l) .NE. AND. RD1 .LT. PSA(I)*BOMPK(2,L))
$ PST(L) = 0.0
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE (16,1006) TIME,I,L,PST(L),RD1,XS(J),YS(J)
1006 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC A/C ',12,' BOMBS NON-SAM TARGET ',
$ 12,' PS = \F4.2,' RND#',F4.2,2F6.1)
ENDIF








C TIME TO LAUNCH STANDOFF WEAPON TYPE 1 ?.
IF (LNCHl(I) .GE. 1) THEN
DO 160M = 1,LNCH1(I)
IF (LNCH1TIM(I,M) .GE. TIME AND.
$ LNCH1TIM(I,M) .LT. TIME + DT) THEN
PSAL(I,1,M) = PSA(I)
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE (16,1007) TIME,I,L1WPN(I,M),PSA(I)
1007 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC A/C ',12,' LAUNCHES PEN. # ',12,









C TIME TO LAUNCH STANDOFF WEAPON TYPE 2 ?
IF (LNCH2(I) .GE. 1) THEN
DO 170M = 1,LNCH2(I)
IF (LNCH2TIM(I,M) .GE. TIME AND.
$ LNCH2TIM(I,M) .LT. TIME + DT) THEN
PSAL(I,2,M) = PSA(I)
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
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WRITE (16,1008) TIME,I,L2WPN(I,M),PSA(I)
1008 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC A/C ',12,' LAUNCHES PEN. # ',12,









C TIME TO START CONTROL STANDOFF WEAPON TYPE 2 ?.
IF (CNTRL2(I) .GE. 1) THEN
DO 180 M = 1,CNTRL2(I)
IF (C2STIM(I,M) .GE. TIME AND.
$ C2STIM(I,M) .LT. TIME + DT) THEN
PSAC(I,M) = PSA(I)
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE (16,1009) TIME,I,C2WPN(I,M),PSAC(I,M)
1009 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC A/C ',12,' STARTS CONTROLING PEN. # ',









C UPDATE AIRCRAFT POSITION
LEG(I) =






DO 20 N = 2,NC
IF (TIME .LE. T(I,N)) GO TO 30
LEG(I) = LEG(I) + 1
20 CONTINUE
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IF(MDEST(I,1) .EQ. .OR. N .LT. NC) GO TO 10
C STANDOFF WEAPON IS NOW AT THE END OF ITS FLIGHTPATH...
C DETERMINE EFFECTS OF IMPACT OF STANDOFF WEAPON
C AGAINST SAM SITES
CACDED=0
IF(MDEST(I,1) -EQ. 1) THEN
J = MDEST(I,2)
DP = PS(J)
C RD1 = DRAND(ISEED)
RD1 = ISEED
C= = = = = = DRAND USED IN PC VERSION NOT MAINFRAME VERSION
PKMSL = PENTARPK(PENTYPE(I),1,MSITE(J))
IF (PENTYPE(I) .EQ. 1) THEN
IF (IOP(l) .EQ. 0) PS(J) = PS(J)*(1.0-PKMSL*PSA(I)*
$ PSAL(WHO(I,l,l,l),l,WHO(I,l,l,2)))
ELSEIF (PENTYPE(I) .EQ. 2) THEN
IF (PSA(WHO(I,2,2,l)) .GE. PSAMIN) THEN
IF (TIME .LE. C2ETIM(WHO(I,2,2,l),WHO(I,2,2,2))) THEN
IF (IOP(l) .EQ. 0) PS(J) = PS(J)*(1.0-PKMSL*PSA(I)*
$ PSAL(WHO(I,2,l,l),2,WHO(I,2,l,2))*(PSAC(
$ WHO(I,2,2,l),WHO(I,2,2,2)) + PSA(WHO(I,2,2,1)))/2.0)
ELSEIF (TIME .GT. C2ETIM(WHO(I,2,2,l),WHO(I,2,2,2))) THEN




ELSEIF (PSA(WHO(I,2,2,l)) .LT. PSAMIN) THEN
IF (TIME-C2DEDTIM(WHO(I,2,2,l)) .LT.
$ C2TIME(I,WHO(I,2,2,2))) THEN










1013 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC PEN. ',12,' (TYPE 2',
$ ' WPN) IMPACTS GROUND; CONTROL A/C ',12,











IF (IOP(l) .NE. AND. RD1 LT. PKMSL) PS(J) = 0.0
DP = DP-PS(J)
SDAMG =SDAMG + DP
PSA(I) = 0.0
C ***...CHECK SrTE IF IT PART OF A MULTITARGETTING GROUP
CALL MULSAM(MULTI)
C ***
C OR FOR NON-SAM TARGETS
ELSEIF (MDEST(I,1) .EQ. 2) THEN
L = MDEST(I,2)
C RD1 = DRAND(ISEED)
RD1 = ISEED
C= = = = = = DRAND USED IN PC VERSION NOT MAINFRAME VERSION
PKMSL = PENTARPK(PENTYPE(I),2,L)
IF (PENTYPE(I) .EQ. 1) THEN
IF (IOP(l) .EQ. 0) PST(L) = PST(L)*(1.0-PKMSL*PSA(I)*
$ PSAL(WHO(I,l,l,l),l,WHO(I,l,l,2)))
ELSEIF (PENTYPE(I) .EQ. 2) THEN
IF (PSA(WHO(I,2,2,l)) .GE. PSAMIN) THEN
IF (TIME .LE. C2ETIM(WHO(I,2,2,l),WHO(I,2,2,2))) THEN
IF (IOP(l) .EQ. 0) PST(L) = PST(L)*(1.0-PKMSL*PSA(I)*
$ PSAL(WHO(I,2,l,l),2,WHO(I,2,l,2))*(PSAC(
$ WHO(I,2,2,l),WHO(I,2,2,2)) + PSA(WHO(I,2,2,1)))/2.0)
ELSEIF (TIME .GT. C2ETIM(WHO(I,2,2,l),WHO(I,2,2,2))) THEN




ELSEIF (PSA(WHO(I,2,2,l)) LT. PSAMIN) THEN
IF (TIME-C2DEDTIM(WHO(I,2,2,l)) LT.
$ C2TIME(I,WHO(I,2,2,2))) THEN






IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE(16,1014) TIME,I,WHO(I,2,2,l)
1014 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC PEN. ',12,' (TYPE 2',
$ ' WPN) IMPACTS GROUND; CONTROL A/C ',12,











IF (IOP(l) .NE. AND. RD1 .LT. PKMSL) PST(L) = 0.0
PSA(I) = 0.0
ENDIF
DO 40 JJ = 1,NSITE
IF(ITAR(JJ) .NE. I) GO TO 40
STATS(JJ) = 3
RRAD(JJ) = GDT(JJ) + 1.0
C SITE LOSES PEN. AS A TARGET WHEN THE PEN. HITS ITS INTENDED
C GROUND TARGET AND ADDED 'PS(J) .GT. PSSMIN' 9/18/87 BFS..
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1 AND. PS(J) .GT. PSSMIN) THEN
WRITE (16,1003) TIME,JJ,I
1003 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC SITE ',12,' LOSES PEN. ',12,







C PRINTOUT RESULTS OF WEAPON IMPACT
IF (CACDED .EQ. 1) GO TO 10
C..*** RESULTS ALREADY PRINTED OUT IF SITE IS PART OF MULTITARGET GROUP
IF (MULTI .EQ. 1) GO TO 10
IF (MDEST(I,1) .EQ. 1) THEN
IF (PS(J) .LT. PSSMIN) THEN
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE (16,1000) TIME,I,J,PS(J),RD1,XS(J),YS(J)
1000 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC STANDOFF WEAPON ',12,' DESTROYS SITE ',
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ELSEIF (PS(J) .GE. PSSMIN) THEN
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE (16,1001) TIME,I,J,PS(J),RD1,XS(J),YS(J)
1001 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC STANDOFF WEAPON ',12,' IMPACTS SITE ',







ELSEIF (MDEST(I,1) .EQ. 2) THEN
IF (PST(L) XT. PSSMIN) THEN
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE (16,1015) TIME,I,L,PST(L),RD1
1015 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC STANDOFF WEAPON ',12,' DESTROYS ',






ELSEIF (PST(L) .GE. PSSMIN) THEN
IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE (16,1004) TIME,I,L,PST(L),RD1
1004 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC STANDOFF WEAPON ',12,' IMPACTS NON-SAM'








C ... IF USING IADS MODE, UPDATE MESSAGE TIME DUE TO NEW DAMAGE LEVEL.







XT(I,2) = X(I,N) -(X(I,N)-X(I,N-1))*VA
YT(I,2) = Y(I,N) -(Y(I,N)-Y(I,N-1))*VA
ZT(I,2) = Z(I,N) -(Z(I,N)-Z(I,N-1))*VA
NEW(I) = 1
C NEW(I) = 1 MEANS COURSE HAS RECENTLY CHANGED
IF (TIME-1.0*DT .GT. T(I,N-1)) NEW(I) =
IF (NEW(I) .EQ. 0) GO TO 10
IF((XT(I,2)-X(I,N)) .EQ. (YT(I,2)-Y(I,N)) AND.





IF (HEAD .LT. 0.) HEAD = HEAD + 360.
DI = (XT(I,2)-X(I,N-1))*(XT(I,2)-X(I,N-1)) + (YT(I,2)-Y(I,N-1))*
$(YT(I,2)-Y(I,N-1))
DI = SQRT(DI)





IF (DEBUG .GE. 1) THEN
WRITE (16,1002) TIME,I,HEAD,ELEV,XT(I,2),YT(I,2),ZT(I,2)
1002 FORMAT(F5.0,' SEC PEN. ',12,' CHANGES COURSE',F6.1,' =AZ ',
$ F6.1,' = EL\3F8.2)
ENDIF













C PARAMETERS OF AWDDATA DEF
C
C PSADWOC - CURRENT PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL OF THE ADWOC CENTER
C MINADWOCPS - MINIMUM SURVIVAL PROBABILITY FOR ADWOC TO SAY IN SIM.
C ADWPROCDLY - NORMAL PROCESSING DELAY FROM DETECTION OF PENETRATOR
C - UNTIL ADWOC CENTER READY TO SEND MESSAGE (SECONDS)
C ADWDAMDLY - MAX. EXTRA DELAY UNTIL ADWOC CENTER READY TO SEND
C - MESSAGE DUE TO SITE BEING DAMAGED
C ADWDAMRAT - SCALE FACTOR USED WITH ADWDAMDLY(9) TO COMPUTE DELAY








C PARAMETERS OF ADWMES1 DEF
C
C ADWMESID(MAXADWMESID)-
C - HOLDS THE ID NUMBER OF EACH UNIQUE MESSAGE TO THE ADWOC CENTER.
C - USED TO COMPARE INCOMING MESSAGES AND REJECT PREVIOUSLY
C - RECEIVED MESSAGES
C MAXADWMESID - MAX SIZE OF RECEIVED ID ARRAY






C PARAMETERS OF BATDATA DEF
C
C NUMBAT - MAX NUMBER OF BATTALION CENTERS IN THIS SIMULATION.
C MINBATPS - MIN. SURVIVAL PROB. FOR BATTALION CENTERS TO SAY IN SIM.
C BATPROCDLY - NORMAL PROCESSING DELAY FROM DETECTION OF PENETRATOR
C - UNTIL BATTALION CENTER READY TO SEND MESSAGE (SECONDS)
C BATDAMDLY(9) - MAX. EXTRA DELAY UNTIL BATTALION CENTER READY TO SEND
C - MESSAGE DUE TO BATTALION CENTER BEING DAMAGED
C BATDAMRAT(9) - SCALE FACTOR USED WITH BATDAMDLY(9) TO COMPUTE DELAY









C PARAMETERS OF BATMES1 DEF
C
C BATMESID(9,MAXBATMESID)-
C - HOLDS THE ID NUMBER OF EACH UNIQUE MESSAGE TO EACH BATTALION
C - CENTER. USED TO COMPARE INCOMING MESSAGES AND REJECT PREVIOUSLY
C - RECEIVED MESSAGES
C MAXBATMESID - MAX SIZE OF RECEIVED ID ARRAY
C BATMESIDPOS(9) - ARRAY POINTER WHERE NEXT MESSAGE ID# MAY BE INSERTED






C PARAMETERS OF CON1 DEF
C
C CONNECT(MAXCON,4) - HOLDS IADS CONNECTION STRUCTURE. INDICATES WHERE
C - EACH IADS NODE CAN SEND A MESSAGE TO. FIRST PAIR #'S
C - IDENTIFY SENDER AND SECOND PAIR IDENTIFY RECEIVER
C - (*,1) - FROM TYPE #
C - (*,2) - FROM UNIT #
C - (*,3) - TO TYPE #
C - (*,4) - TO UNIT #
C MAXCON - MAX NUMBER OF CONNECTIONS IN IADS STRUCTURE
C NUMCON - # OF CONNECTIONS TO BE READIN IN IADS STRUCTURE DATA FILE
C MAXIADSTGTS - MAX NUMBER OF IADS UNITS THAT ARE NON-SAM TARGETS
C NUMIADSTGTS - TOTAL NUMBER OF IADS UNITS THAT ARE NON-SAM TARGETS
C - IN THIS INPUT DATAFILE
C IDLADSTGT(MAX1ADSTGTS,3) - FOR EACH NON-SAM TARGET NUMBER, THIS
C - HOLDS THE IADS TYPE AND UNIT NUMBER, USED TO IDENTIFY
C - WHAT THE NON-SAM TARGET IS. (*,1) - NON-SAM TGT #;
C - (*,2) - IADS TYPE #; (*,3) - IADS UNIT #
C IADSTGT(IO) - FLAG(l/0) INDICATING IF THIS NON-SAM TARGET
C - IS A IADS TARGET OR NOT. = 1 IS IADS TYPE TARGET, =0 NOT.
C - USED TO INDENTIFY IS A NON-SAM TARGET IS AN IADS TARGET.











C PARAMETERS OF EWDATA DEF
C
C EWPROCDLY - NORMAL PROCESSING DELAY FROM DETECTION OF PENETRATOR
C - UNTIL EW SITE READY TO SEND MESSAGE (SECONDS)
C EWDAMDLY(9) - MAX. EXTRA DELAY UNTIL EW SITE READY TO SEND MESSAGE
C - DUE TO SITE BEING DAMAGED
C EWDAMRAT(9) - SCALE FACTOR USED WITH EWDAMDLY(9) TO COMPUTE DELAY
C - DUE TO SITE DAMAGE





C PARAMETERS OF EWMES2 DEF
C
C REWMESID(9,MAXEWMESID)-
C - HOLDS THE ID NUMBER OF EACH UNIQUE MESSAGE TO EACH EW SITE. USED
C - TO COMPARE INCOMING MESSAGES AND REJECT PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED
C - MESSAGES
C MAXEWMESID - MAX SIZE OF RECEIVED ID ARRAY
C REWMESIDPOS(9) - ARRAY POINTER WHERE NEXT MESSAGE ID# MAY BE
INSERTED






C PARAMETERS OF EW1 DEF
C
C EWDETECT(K,IM) - FLAG(l/0) = 1 IF EW SITE K CURRENTLY DETECTS PEN IM
C - =0 EW SITE CURRENTLY DOES NOT DETECT PEN IM.
C EWSTATS(9) - STATUS(l/0) OF EW SITES. =1 RADIATING
C START - FLAG(l/0) = 1 INDICATES SIMULATION JUST STARTED. USED IN
C - INITIALIZING SUBS
C UPEWTGT(9,IM) - FLAG(-l/0/l) INDICATING THE NEWLY UPDATED DETECTION
C - RESULTS OF EACH EW SITE. -1= LOST DETECTION, 0= NO






C PARAMETERS OF HOLDM1 DEF
C
C MESHOLD(200,MAXMSGSIZE) - HOLDS MESSAGES GENERATED BY IADS ELEMENTS
C - EACH ELEMENT IN NOW DESCRIBED
C - (K,l) - TIME EVENT OCCURRED
C - (K,2) - TIME WHEN MESSAGE IS TO BE SENT
C - (K,3) - PS OF EW SITE WHEN EVENT OCCURRED
C - (K,4) - SrTE TYPE # (EW SITE = 1) WHERE MES IS FROM
C - (K,5) - SrTE ID # (I.E. EWID(K)) WHERE MES. IS FROM
C - (K,6) - SITE TYPE # (EW SITE = 1) WHERE MES IS TO
C - (K,7) - SITE ID # (I.E. EWID(K)) WHERE MES. IS TO
C - (K,8) - ACTION # DESIRED WITH THIS MESSAGE
C - (K,9) - # FOR UNIQUE MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION
C - (K,10) - ORIGINATING IADS TYPE #
C - (K,ll) - ORIGINATING IADS UNIT #
C - (K,12) - FINAL DESTINATION IADS TYPE #
C - (K,13) - FINAL DESTINATION IADS UNTT #
C NEXTHOLDPOS - POINTER INDICATING LOCATION OF NEXT AVAILABLE
C - POSITION FOR INPUTTING A MESSAGE INTO THE ARRAY
C EWDETMES(K,MAXMSGSIZE,MAXEWMES) -
C - HOLDS DATA ASSOCIATED WITH A DETECTION MESSAGE FROM
C - EW SITE # K. EACH ELEMENT IN NOW DESCRIBED
C - (K,l) - TIME EVENT OCCURRED
C - (K,2) - TIME WHEN MESSAGE IS TO BE SENT
C - (K,3) - PS OF EW SITE WHEN EVENT OCCURRED
C - (K,4) - SITE TYPE # (EW SITE = 1) WHERE MES IS FROM
C - (K,5) - SITE ID # (I.E. EWID(K)) WHERE MES. IS FROM
C - (K,6) - SITE TYPE # (EW SITE = 1) WHERE MES IS TO
C - (K,7) - SITE ID # (I.E. EWID(K)) WHERE MES. IS TO
C - (K,8) - ACTION # DESIRED WITH THIS MESSAGE
C - (K,9) - # FOR UNIQUE MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION
C - (K,10) - ORIGINATING IADS TYPE #
C - (K,ll) - ORIGINATING IADS UNIT #
C - (K.12) - FINAL DESTINATION IADS TYPE #
C - (K,13) - FINAL DESTINATION IADS UNIT #
C EWDETDAT(9,IM,MAXEWMES) -
C - HOLDS THE UPDATED DETECTION CHANGES ASSOCIATED WITH
C - THE MESSAGE. FORMAT IS -1= LOST DETECTION, 0= NO
C - CHANGE, 1= NEW DETECTION OF PENETRATOR IM
C EWMESPOS(9) - INDEX IN MESSAGE HOLDING ARRAY TO INPUT NEXT MESSAGE
C - FOR EACH EW SITE
C MAXEWMES - MAX NUMBER OF MESSAGES IN HOLDING ARRAY











C PARAMETERS OF KNOWN1 DEF
C
C DETTGT(9,IM) - INDICATES DETECTION STATUS FROM EACH EW SITE
C - BASED ON RECEIVED MESSAGES. VALUE IS 1 IF NEW DETECTION
C - =0 IF NO CHANGE AND =-1 IF LOST DETECTION ON THIS
C - PENETRATOR
C DETALL(IM) - INDICATES COMBINED DETECTION STATUS FROM ALL EW SITES
C - BASED ON RECEIVED MESSAGES. VALUE IS # OF EW SITES
C - THAT HAVE DETECTED THIS PENETRATOR. IF =0, PENETRATOR





C PARAMETERS OF MESID DEF
C
C MSGID - NUMBER USED TO UNIQUELY IDENTIFY MESSAGES. USED TO TAG
C - MESSAGES IN MESSAGE HOLDING ARRAY AND ASSOCIATED DETECTION





C PARAMETERS OF QIADS DEF
C
C NEWSITES - MAX # OF EW SITES
C EWID - SAM ID # DESIGNATING THIS AS AN EW SITE






C PARAMETERS OF RPTDATA DEF
C
C NUMRPT - MAX NUMBER OF EW REPORTING STATIONS IN THIS SIMULATION.
C MINRPTPS - MIN. SURVIVAL PROB. FOR EW RPT STATION TO SAY IN SIM.
C RPTPROCDLY - NORMAL PROCESSING DELAY FROM DETECTION OF PENETRATOR
C - UNTIL EW REPORTING SITE READY TO SEND MESSAGE (SECONDS)
C RPTDAMDLY(9) - MAX. EXTRA DELAY UNTIL EW REPORTING STTE READY TO
C - SEND MESSAGE DUE TO SITE BEING DAMAGED
C RPTDAMRAT(9) - SCALE FACTOR USED WITH RPTDAMDLY(9) TO COMPUTE DELAY








C PARAMETERS OF RPTMES1 DEF
C
C RPTMESID(9,MAXRPTMESID)-
C - HOLDS THE ID NUMBER OF EACH UNIQUE MESSAGE TO EACH EW REPORTING
C - STATION. USED TO COMPARE INCOMING MESSAGES AND REJECT PREVIOUSLY
C - RECEIVED MESSAGES
C MAXRPTMESID - MAX SIZE OF RECEIVED ID ARRAY
C RPTMESIDPOS(9) - ARRAY POINTER WHERE NEXT MESSAGE ID# MAY BE INSERTED






C PARAMETERS OF SAMDATA DEF
C
C SAMPROCDLY - NORMAL PROCESSING DELAY FROM DETECTION OF PENETRATOR
C - UNTIL SAM SITE READY TO SEND MESSAGE (SECONDS)
C SAMDAMDLY - MAX. EXTRA DELAY UNTIL SAMSITE READY TO SEND MESSAGE
C - DUE TO SITE BEING DAMAGED
C SAMDAMRAT - SCALE FACTOR USED WITH SAMDAMDLY(9) TO COMPUTE DELAY






C PARAMETERS OF SAMMES1 DEF
C
C RSAMMESID(JM,MAXSAMMESID)-
C - HOLDS THE ID NUMBER OF EACH UNIQUE MESSAGE TO EACH SAM SITE.
C - USED TO COMPARE INCOMING MESSAGES AND REJECT PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED
C - MESSAGES
C MAXSAMMESID - MAX SIZE OF RECEIVED ID ARRAY
C RSAMMESIDPOS(JM) - ARRAY POINTER WHERE NEXT MESSAGE ID# MAY BE







1. Library, Code 52
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000







4. Mr. Gino LaMarca
Weapons Planning Group, Code 304
Naval Weapons Center
China Lake, CA 93555-6001
5. Mr. Bryan F. Smith
Weapons Planning Group, Code 304
Naval Weapons Center
China Lake, CA 93555-6001













c.l A model of an Integ-
rated Air Defense Systems




c.l A model of an Integ-
rated Air Defense Systems
(IADS) for the TACOPS
program.

